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Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting and
Secondary Boycotts in U.S. Trade
Policy
PeterL. Fitzgerald*
ABSTRACT

The extraterritorialapplicationof U.S. economic sanctions
and trade controls is a perennial topic of discussion among
international trade practitioners and a frequent cause for
concern abroad. While long presentin one form or another as

part of several U.S. trade and export control programs, there
has been a resurgence in the use of unilateral extraterritorial
trade regulationby the United Statesfollowing the unraveling
of widespread internationalconsensus on who should be the
targets for such controls and sanctions as a result of the
breakup of the Soviet Union, and the demise of the
international Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export
Moreover, the pressures created by rapidly
Controls.
developing new means of conducting domestic and
international commerce online and over the Internet now
exacerbate the problems created with these types of controls,
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by vastly increasing both the number of international
transactionsand the speed with which they are conducted.
The most recent focus of the discussion of unilateral
extraterritorialcontrols in the popular and academic press
has been the Helms-Burton Act, which revised the terms of
the U.S. embargo of Cuba. The amendments to the Cuban
embargo controls that the Helms-Burton Act introduced have
generated significant oppositionfrom other countries, such as
Canadaand the United Kingdom. Additionally, the European
Union has expressed its opposition through the initiationof a
complaint with the World Trade Organization. Rather than
the novel changes brought about by the Helms-Burton Act
alone, however, it is the long-standing use of traditional
"blacklisting" tools as part of the government's trade
regulation and sanctions programs that most clearly
highlights the difficulties inherent in unilateral extraterritorial
controls. Using the Cuban embargo program as an example,
this Article explores the question of the legitimacy of these
"blacklisting" measures under international standards,
includingthose advocated and espoused by the United States
itself in connection with the Arab League's boycott of Israel.
An emerging rule of customary international law, the Article
concludes, proscribes the use of blacklisting to conduct
internationalsecondary boycotts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It starts so simply. It's snowing and cold in Quebec, Canada.
The midwinter gray clouds cover the town of Duvernay, causing
the late afternoon light to simply melt away into evening. Turning
from the frost speckled window, Pierre Boileau warms his hands
around a steaming cup of coffee before sitting down at his
computer. He shuffles some papers and picks up a squarish
multicolored cardboard envelope he received, unsolicited, in the
morning mail; he tears open the perforation and removes a 3.5
inch black computer disk. Pierre thinks, "Well, this package says
I get ten free hours to try out the Internet, so I might as well see
what all this online stuff is all about."
Using the cardboard mailer as a coaster for the coffee cup, he
turns on his personal computer and feeds the disk into the
machine. A triangular icon with the word "Setup" appears on the
screen. With a quick flick of his wrist Pierre moves the arrow-like
cursor on his computer screen using his computer's "mouse," and
"clicks" twice on the setup icon. Instructions flash on the screen,
and with a couple more "clicks" Pierre has installed the software

on his computer and is ready to "log on" for the first time. He
does so by "clicking" on a new triangular icon which appears on
his computer screen, labeled "America Online."' Another series of

1.
The scenario described in this introduction is entirely hypothetical.
Pierre Boileau's connection to the America Online service is simply being used as
an example to highlight the ease with which modem, and especially electronic,
business practices can create complex legal issues when dealing with unilateral
extraterritorial trade controls. Concrete examples of the problems facing America
Online in the hypothetical are discussed later. See infra notes 317-38 and
accompanying text (Dresser Industries); notes 339-45 and accompanying text
(Compagnie Europ~enne des Pdtroles); notes 346-54 and accompanying text
(Freuhauf); notes 396-99 and accompanying text (Wal-Mart).
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instructions appear, asking Pierre to type in the registration
number and password printed on the cardboard mailer, to choose
a local phone number in Quebec for the computer to dial for the
service, and to provide his name, address, and credit card

number. This done, Pierre then "clicks" on the screen where it
reads "Sign On," and the computer dials out over the phone lines
and makes a connection to the America Online Canada computer
service while Pierre takes another sip of his coffee.
When the connection is made, America Online checks the
validity of the credit card number, just as any other company
might do with a mail order or telephone catalog transaction, and
opens an account for Pierre Boileau. Pierre now has access to the
Internet. According to the contract that appeared on his screen
during the initial setup and sign-on process, which Pierre did not
bother to read, he has ten hours free usage of the service. 2 After
this trial usage period, Pierre will be charged $9.95 a month for
his membership in the service, and $2.95 an hour if more than
3
five hours are spent online in any single month.
This gives America Online just ten hours to avoid a
disastrous collision between two irreconcilable sets of laws and
policiesl Once Pierre's "free" time expires, and money starts to be
owed and billed, the company will violate the U.S. Trading With
the Enemy Act (TWEA)4 by engaging in an unapproved financial
transaction with an individual the United States considers as a
"Cuban agent." s America Online Canada will find itself caught

2.
America Online Canada offered a ten hour trial membership shortly
after it was established as a subsidiary of America Online Inc., the U.S.-based
parent company, on January 30, 1996. See David Bosworth, America Online
Launches AOL Canadawith Trial Membership Offer, TORONTO DM NEWS, Mar. 11,

1996, at Supp. 15.
3.
These were the rates that AOL Canada offered in its initial offer.
Interestingly, the rates were quoted in U.S., rather than Canadian, dollars
because the operation of the service was still being run out of the United States.

Id. Subsequently, AOL Canada revised its pricing to use Canadian currency, and
offered two different packages. The revised pricing options provide either 20
hours of online time for C$26.95 per month, with C$3.95 for each additional
hour; or five hours for C$13.95 per month, plus C$3.95 for each additional hour.
See AOL CanadaSurpasses 100,000 Members, AOL PRESS RELEASE, Oct. 23, 1996,
availableat <http://www-db.aol.com/corp/news/press> .
4.
50 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1994). The TWEA, passed in 1917 in connection
with World War One, provides the legislative basis for the embargoes of both
Cuba and North Korea. The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) administers these TWEA based embargoes with the Cuban Asset
Control Regulations (CACR), 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-515.901 (1997), and the
Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR), 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-500.901 (1997).
The FACR currently apply only to North Korea, but these same regulations were
previously used for the embargoes of Cambodia and Vietnam, as well as for China
during the Korean War era.
5.
See infranote 13 and accompanying text.
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between violating the unilateral extraterritorial controls the
United States imposes as part of its embargo of Cuba, 6 or the
local laws that were passed precisely to prevent the extension of
the embargo to reach transactions within Canada, 7 both of which
carry substantial civil and criminal penalties for their violation. 8
America Online is in fact fortunate that its offer includes the
"free trial period," which gives it a little time to avoid being
inadvertently caught between these two opposing governmental
policies. With a different type of offering, it is possible to become
entangled in this type of problem as soon as the transaction is
completed-before the computers disconnect or the telephone is
hung up, before Pierre's coffee even has a chance to get cold. In a
world where online transactions are becoming increasingly
common, in one form or another, this problem could occur
virtually instantaneously and without any warning or notice.
So, with a very simple business transaction, just a couple of
"clicks" on a computer connected to the Internet, there is a
serious international conflicts-of-law problem that highlights two

of the fundamental issues facing international business today and
an extremely difficult practical compliance problem. Firstly, this
example with Pierre highlights the difficulties that quickly arise
when controls are created unilaterally in one country and then
applied extraterritorially. The United States is placing increasing
reliance on such tools in its trade control and sanctions
9
programs, particularly with regard to blacklist-like mechanisms.

6.

See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.

7.
For a discussion of Canada's Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, see
infra notes 268-86.
8.
Penalties for violating the TWEA include up to ten years imprisonment,
criminal fines of $1 million ($100,000 for individuals), and civil fines of up to
$55,000. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 16 (1994); 31 C.F.R. § 515.701; 61 Fed. Reg.
54936 (1996). Penalties for violating the Canadian Foreign Extraterritorial
Measures Act include up to five years imprisonment and fines of up to C$1.5
million. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act § 7, reprintedin 36 I.L.M. 111,
120-21 (1997).
9.
A recent study sponsored by the National Association of
Manufacturers stated the following:
The United States is resorting increasingly to unilateral economic
sanctions against a broad range of countries for a wide variety of reasons.
A new wrinkle in 1996, apart from the dramatic increase from previous
years, was the use of secondary boycott measures, which extended the
reach of U.S. Law to overseas companies doing business in the targeted
country, angering allies and provoling threats of retaliation. This growing

resort to unilateral sanctions departs from a period in the late 1980s of
relative restraint, due, in part to the lessons learned during the abortive oil
pipeline sanctions against the Soviet Union in 1982 and the grain embargo

of 1980.
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The resurgence of these unilateral extraterritorial trade
regulations is due, in part, to the lack of international consensus
on who should be the targets for such controls after the breakup
of the Soviet Union and the demise of the international
Coordinating Committees on Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM).10 One incidental result of this trend is a shift in the
burden of determining which transactions pose policy difficulties
for the government away from licensing officials and onto those
conducting the transactions themselves, who must screen their
transactions against the blacldists.1 1 Secondly, this example also
illustrates the difficulty of identifying what standards should be
applied to extraterritorial controls to resolve disputes concerning
their legitimate use.12

II. EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF U.S. TRADE-RELATED BLACKUSTS
How can an

ostensibly

domestic transaction

between

Canadian parties, without any overt connection to international
business, much less any dealings with Cuba or the United States,
trigger the Cuban embargo? Moreover, how is America Online
Canada expected to know that it has a potential connection with
the U.S. embargo policy toward Cuba?

See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, A CATALOG OF NEW U.S. UNILATERAL
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES 1993-1996, 1 (1997).
10.
COCOM was created in 1949 as a forum to establish and enforce a
common, multilateral set of East-West trade controls aimed at limiting both
military and civilian exports and technology transfers to communist countries.
The seventeen member nations that comprised COCOM agreed to disband the
organization in 1994. It was replaced by the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies in 1997.
Additionally, a series of tailored agreements and treaties aimed at imposing
limited multilateral controls on the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons and their associated missile delivery systems were established as the
Cold War drew to an end. Unlike the weapons proliferation agreements or the
earlier COCOM regime, however, the Wassenaar Arrangement does not establish
a common set of trade controls. Instead, it merely seeks to promote the exchange
of information among nations regarding sensitive transactions with a vaguely
identified set of "rogue" countries. The actual controls to be imposed, if any, are
left entirely up to the "national discretion" of the various members of the
Wassenaar regime. See generally Peter L. Fitzgerald, Prevention of Liability for
Export Control Violations, in BNA/ACCA COMPLIANCE MANUAL: PREVENTION OF

CORPORATE LIABILITY, ch. 14 (1996).
11.
12.

See infranote 438 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.
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A. The BasicBlacklist Mechanism
The problem arises in this hypothetical because in the early
1980s the U.S. government decided that Pierre Boileau was acting
for, or on behalf of, Cuba in his various dealings.1 3 Accordingly,
Pierre's name was added to a list of "Specially Designated
Nationals" (SDNs) of Cuba, maintained by the U.S. Treasury

Department's Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC). 14 This list
operates as a type of "blacklist," prohibiting those subject to U.S.
laws from engaging in any financial dealings with the named
parties without U.S. government approval. I s The SDN list is used

13.
As a result of efforts by the Cuban Interest Section in the United States
to encourage businesses to circumvent the embargo restrictions by establishing
dummy companies in third countries, "two U.S. companies, six Panamanian
firms, one Jamaican firm and three individuals," including Pierre Boileau, were
placed on the Cuban Specially Designated National (SDN) list on January 7,
1981. Ricardo Escartin, the First Secretary of the Cuban Interest Section, which
was then operating out of the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington, D.C., was
expelled and criminal investigations commenced against the U.S. parties. See
Reuter N. Am. News, Feb. 11, 1981, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUNA
File.
14.
Pierre Boileau is the only individual whose name appears in the list of
Cuban SDNs located in Canada. The other 17 Canadian SDNs are all companies.
See 31 C.F.R. ch. V, apps. A & B (1997). Interestingly, although the Cuban
embargo was imposed in 1963, the SDN lists were not published with the
embargo regulations as part of the C.F.R. until 1996. See 61 Fed. Reg. 32,936,
32,939, 32,970, 33,021 (1996). Prior to that time, these "blacklists" were made
available only on an ad hoc basis by OFAC or by infrequent announcements in
the Federal Register. For example, the first publication of the Cuban SDN list in
the Federal Register did not occur until 1986. See 51 Fed. Reg. 44,459 (1986).
The most recent publication of the OFAC "blacklists," on June 27, 1997, includes
over 2100 names. See 62 Fed. Reg. 34,934 (1997).
15.
The CACR prohibits virtually all dealings with Cuba or Cuban
nationals, without any geographic limitation.
All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as specifically

authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury ... by means of regulations,
rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise if... such transactions are by,
or on behalf of, or pursuant to the direction of [Cuba] or any national
thereof, or such transactions involve property in which [Cuba] or any
national thereof, has.., had any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct
or indirect.
31 C.F.R. § 515.201(a) (1997).
The CACR then continues to define "national" to include not only Cuban
citizens and business entities, but also foreign entities that are "directly or
indirectly" "owned or controlled by" Cuba or Cuban nationals; those who are
reasonably believed to "act directly or indirectly for the benefit or on behalf of"
Cuba or Cuban nationals; and most significantly, those whom the Secretary of the
Treasury "deems" to be a "national" of Cuba. 31 C.F.R. § 515.302 (1997). When
the Secretary of the Treasury makes such a designation, the individual or entity
becomes an SDN. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.305 - 515.306 (1997). Thus, the SDN
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primarily to identify individuals and entities outside of the
embargoed target destination, in this case Cuba, who are
nonetheless acting for the target destination. 16 In blacIdisting
these parties in third countries, the U.S. government effectively

brings indirect dealings through intermediaries within the scope
17
of its ban on direct dealings with the embargo target itself.

Parties that are in the United States, or amenable to U.S.
personal jurisdiction, do not need to be, and seldom are, named

in the SDN list because they already are obligated to follow the
embargo laws and regulations and may be directly punished for
any violation. 18
Thus, the value of the SDN designation to the U.S.
government is not as a sanction to punish those who are

designation extends the basic prohibition of the CACR to third parties who may
not otherwise be identified with Cuba or Cuban citizenship. See also American
Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d. 865, 867 n.2 (1984).
16.
The OFAC SDN lists have also sometimes been used to identify specific
parties uWhin an embargo target destination. For example, there are currently
more than thirty Cuban "SDNs" listed with addresses within Cuba itself. See 31
C.F.R. ch. V, app. B (1996). This practice, however, is criticized as being largely
redundant with the broader geographic control, Le., there is no need to
specifically list the names of parties in country X if all dealings with country X are
embargoed; whereas the listing of parties in countries A, B, and C who are acting
for country X may logically be of value in controlling indirect transactions with
country X. Alternatively, listing SDNs with addresses within the target country
may also be useful if the economic sanctions impose less than a complete
embargo, as is the case with OFAC's Narcotics Trafficking Regulations aimed at
Colombia. See Narcotics Trafficking Sanction Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 9959
(1997) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 536); infra notes 211-14 and accompanying
text.
17.
The embargo's prohibition on direct dealings with Cuba would be
considered a "primary" boycott, one which only affects transactions between the
belligerent parties. When this is extended to dealings with Cubans or Cuban
agents in third countries, and then further extended to third country nationals,
who may themselves deal with Cuba in order to reach indirect transactions with
the embargo target, the "primary" boycott becomes a "secondary" boycott. See
infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text

18.

That is not to say that parties in the United States never appear in an

SDN list. Such parties can be named to the list, as a prelude or adjunct to
imposing penalties for violating the controls. This may be particularly likely if the
entity to be added to the list is controlled by the embargoed target country, and
becomes a means to close down that particular business or freeze any assets
associated with that company or individual as part of the embargo program. This
is what happened to the Miami-based operations of Travel Services Inc. and
Havanatur, which were blacklisted under the terms of the Cuban embargo at the
same time Pierre Boileau was added to the SDN list. See supra note 13. Two
other Florida-based companies are on the Cuban SDN list: KOL Investments, Inc.
and American Air Ways Charters, Inc. See 31 C.F.R. ch. V, app. B. See also
Richard T. Meislin, Main Air Link Between U.S. and Cuba Shut Down, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 1982, at 3. Naming a U.S. party in the SDN list essentially closes that
business down because of the broad prohibitions found in the CACR on virtually
all kinds of financial dealing with SDNs.
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otherwise already obligated to comply with U.S. law; rather, its
real purpose is to extend the reach of the U.S. controls to those
who are otherwise beyond the reach of U.S. jurisdiction. By using
this blacklisting tool, the U.S. government attempts to influence
the behavior of those who are beyond its direct reach by ordering
those whom the government can reach to refrain from further
dealings with the blacklisted party. In fact, the third party
behavior abroad, which the U.S. government seeks to influence,
may be entirely legal, and even encouraged, by the jurisdiction in
which the actions actually occur. 19
From the U.S. perspective, however, doing business with a
blacklisted entity or person, such as Pierre in Canada, is deemed
to be the same as doing business with the target destination,
20
Cuba, even though the transaction occurs in a third country.
Additionally, the blacklisting means that all dealings with Pierre
are deemed to involve Cuba, whether or not he may be acting as a
Cuban agent for a given transaction.2 1 The distinction between
actually acting as a Cuban agent or acting in some other capacity
may well affect whether it is possible to obtain the U.S.
government's approval or authorization to proceed with a

However, it does not affect the
particular transaction.
requirement to actually seek the government's approval that is

19.
See infra notes 268-314 and accompanying text (discussing the
reaction to U.S. extraterritorial actions, especially the tightening of the U.S.
embargo of Cuba with the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms-Burton Act).
20.
See 31 C.F.R. § 515.302 (1997) (definition of "national"); 31 C.F.R. §
515.306 (1997) (definition of "specially designated national"). In the CACR, the
"term designated national ... mean(s) Cuba and any national thereof including
any person who is a specially designated national." 31 C.F.R. § 515.305 (1997).
The concept behind this awkward phraseology, identifying the country as the
individual, is mirrored in the regulatory definition of "foreign country," which
identifies the individual as the country. The regulation states that the "term
foreign country also includes . . . any person to the extent that . . . there is
reasonable cause to believe that such person is, or has been . . . acting or
purporting to act directly or indirectly for the benefit or on the behalf of the [state
or government of the foreign country]." 31 C.F.R. § 515.301(c) (1997). The
prohibition provision completes the circle by making clear that "the term Toreign
country designated under this part' and the term 'designated foreign country'
means Cuba .... 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(d) (1997).
21.
Once a party is designated as an SDN, the regulatory prohibitions in
31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201-202 (1997) are triggered by the party's status, and not by
the operation of agency principles to the particular tasks the party may be
performing for itself or others at any given time. Nonetheless, parties that are
neither Cuban nationals, nor deemed to be Cuban nationals by virtue of an OFAC
"designation" as such, can nevertheless still be brought within the terms of the
embargo under ordinary agency principles. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.301-302,
§ 515.306 (1997) (bringing "any person" who is reasonably believed to have acted
directly or indirectly for Cuba or Cubans within the CACR's respective definitions
of"foreign country," "national" or "specially designated national").

10
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22
triggered by Pierre's simply being named as an SDN of Cuba.
Thus, dealing with Pierre in Canada is the same as dealing
directly in or with Cuba, under the terms of the U.S. sanctions.
This makes sense when the intent and historical context of
sanctions programs, such as the Cuban embargo, are considered.
The Cuban sanctions, like most embargoes, are designed to
impose as complete a state of economic isolation as possible. The
concept of using a SDN-Iike blacklist to cut off indirect dealings
with the target destination is a direct outgrowth of U.S. efforts to
address "corporate cloaks" and "fronts" operating for the Axis
powers in World War Two, 23 with what was then called the
Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals. 2 4 In issuing this
list in 1940, the President declared that:

[a]ny person so long as his name appears in such list.... shall be

treated for all purposes under Executive Order No. 8389 [the
directive freezing enemy assets] as though he were a national of
Germany or Italy. All the terms and provisions of Executive Order
No. 8389... shall be applicable to any such person so long as his
name appears in such list, and to any property in which any such
person has or has had an interest, to the same extent that such
terms and provisions are applicable to nationals of Germany or
Italy and to property in which nationals of Germany or Italy, have
25
or have had an interest
The Treasury Department later stated: "it was recognized
from the inception of the freezing program that a control which
could reach only those who were actually citizens of the Axis
countries or of other countries under their domination would2 be
6
ineffective, and, indeed, naive in the light of Axis practices."

Authorization to proceed is typically obtained by requesting a "specific
22.
license" for an otherwise embargoed transaction from OFAC under 31 C.F.R.
§ 515.801(b) (1997). The CACR also contains broader "general licenses" that

authorize certain categories of transactions without the need for issuing
individual approvals, although there still may be record keeping or reporting
requirements associated with the use of one of these "general licenses." See 31
C.F.R. § 515.801(a), §§ 515.502-574 (1997).

Additionally, particularly when

dealing with third party transactions outside of the embargoed destination itself,
OFAC may issue notices or provide individual guidance

concerning the

applicability of the regulations that may indicate that the transaction is entirely
outside the scope of the embargo program.

23.

See Exec. Order No. 8785 § 5E, 6 Fed. Reg. 2898 (1941); MARTIN

DOMKE, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY IN WORLD WAR II, chs. X, XI (1943); MARTIN
DOMKE, CONTROL OF ALIEN PROPERTY 105-113 (Supp. 1947).
Proclamation No. 2497, § 2, 6 Fed. Reg. 3555 (1941).
24.
25.
Id.

26.
U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, ADMINISTRATION OF THE WARTIME FINANCE
AND PROPERTY CONTROLS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 32-33 (1942), cited in Carl F.
Goodman, United States Government Foreign Property Controls, 52 GEO. L.J. 767,
782 (1964).
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The list was designed "so that anyone entangled in the web of
27
Nazi influence could be subjected to the control."
Thus, these Treasury Department blacklists, from their
onset, were tools for economic warfare. 28 OFAC, as of the office
which administers the Cuban embargo, still views itself as
carrying out essentially a wartime mission. Its current director
has stated: "[Tihis is the other front ... [my staff members are]
men and women
an elite category of highly trained professional
29
devoted to waging economic warfare."
B. The Growth of Blacklistingin U.S. Trade Policy

1. Additional Blacklisting Tools in the Cuban Sanctions
The use of blacklisting in the Cuban sanctions goes beyond
expansive notions of "deemed nationality" for those who act on
behalf of Cuba or Cubans. By virtue of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,30 popularly known
as the Helms-Burton Act, 3 1 it also extends to imposing potential
civil liability for treble damages on those identified as
"trafficking"32 in property expropriated by the Castro regime in
Cuba,3 3 and also includes the denial of visas to such individuals

27.

Id.

It should also be noted that the World War Two controls and the
28.
Cuban embargo share a common legislative basis in the TWEA.
Keith Kendrick, In Economic Battle, Soldiers Fight on Carpet, WASH.
29.
PosT, Sept 19, 1990, at A21. This history also explains why OFAC often
contends that it is not a "trade control" agency like the Commerce Department's
Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) or the State Department's Office of
Defense Trade Controls (DTC). However, from the perspective of businesses and
others who must create procedures to comply with all of the various government
requirements, the OFAC programs are very much like the controls imposed by
BXA and DTC.
30.
22 U.S.C. § 6021-6091. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1611.

31.

The Act's popular name refers to its principal sponsors, Senator Jesse

Helms (R., North Carolina) and Representative Dan Burton (R., Indiana).
32.
The use of the term "trafficking' in the statute, with its connotation of

immoral activity such as drug dealing, was apparently intentional by the authors
of the legislation.
33.
Title MIIof the Helms-Burton Act authorizes private lawsuits by U.S.
nationals against those who traffic in confiscated property. See 22 U.S.C. §§
6081-6085. There is, however, a $50,000 threshold for claims against traffickers
in expropriated property, which led some to criticize the provision as benefiting
only wealthy Cuban 6migr~s, and calling the Act the "Bacardi Bill" because this
provision was authored by lawyers for the distillery. See Louis F. Desloge, The
Great Cuban Embargo Scam: A Little Known Loophole Wdl Allow the Richest Exiles
to Cash In, WASH. PosT, Mar. 3, 1996, at Cl; Stephen Fidler, The Long Arm of
American Law: U.S. Legislation Aimed at Punishing Fidel Castro has Angered
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or companies, as well as to the officers or principals of those
companies, as well as to their families.3 4 Although there is no
SDN-like public list to specifically identify "traffickers" in
confiscated property, there is an internal governmental procedure
for those subject to the visa restrictions.
Based upon information obtained either from the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission (FCSO) in the case of adjudicated
claims against Cuba,3 5 or from the claimants themselves in the
case of non-FCSC certified claims,3 6 the Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs makes a determination as to the
visa ineligibility or excludability of foreign persons connected with
trafficking in confiscated property after the effective date of Title

Washington's Trading Partnersand Left Mr. Clinton with a Dilemma, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 8, 1996, at 17.
President Clinton has exercised his discretion to temporarily suspend the
implementation of these provisions of the Act for consecutive six month periods
since its passage. See White House Press Office, Text of Clinton Letter on HelmsBurton Act, July 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, USNWR File; White
House Press Office, Text of Letter from President Clinton to Randng Members of
Congress, available in LEXIS, News Library, USNWR File; Statement on Action on
Title ITof the Cuban Liberty and DemocraticSolidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Docs. 1265 (July 22, 1996).
34.
Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act requires that the Secretary of State
deny visas to those who confiscate or traffic in confiscated property subject to the
Act; those who are officers, principals, or controlling shareholders in an entity
that confiscates or traffics in confiscated property subject to the Act; and to their
agents, spouses, and minor children. See 22 U.S.C. § 6091. The President's
discretion to suspend portions of the Helms-Burton Act does not extend to Title
IV. See 22 U.S.C. § 6085. These provisions are currently in force. See Guidelines
Implementing Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act
of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,655 (1996) [hereinafter Guidelines Implementing Title I].
35.
The U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) certified 5911
individual and corporate awards, totaling $1,799,548,568.69, under the Cuban
claims program it administered. See 1972 FCSC Ann. Rep. at 412.
36.
One of the more controversial aspects of the Helms-Burton Act is that
it is intended to benefit all U.S. nationals, including those who were not U.S.
citizens at the time their property may have been confiscated, i.e., it provides a
forum for Cuban nationals and refugees who acquired U.S. citizenship sometime

after the takings occurred. These individuals did not have standing to participate
in the FCSC process, and never received FCSC adjudicated awards for their
losses.
Some commentators regard this aspect of the Helms-Burton Act,
providing a U.S. forum for litigating disputes that occurred between the Cuban
government and Cuban nationals based upon their subsequent acquisition of
U.S. citizenship, as an expansion of the usual international rules of standing and
jurisdiction regarding whether a country may properly espouse a claim on behalf
of an individual. See, e.g., Paul K. Chudzicki, Comment, The European Union's
Response to the Libertad Act and the Iran-Libya Act: ExtraterritorialityWithout
Boundaries?, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 505, 539-44 (1997). See also U.S. Practice:
State Responsibility, 76 AM. J. INT'L. L. 836 (1982) (quoting Office of Legal Advisor,
U.S. Department of State letter on H.R. 2619 to Congressman C. J. Zablocki,
Chairman of House Committee on Foreign Affairs).
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Once the
IV of the Helms-Burton Act, March 12, 1996.37
determination is made, the individual's name, along with the
names of the individual's spouse and minor children are entered
into the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) "Visa
lookout" and "entry exclusion" systems, which results in the
denial of any visa application and revocation of any existing
visas.38 Although there are confidentiality provisions that limit
the disclosure of decisions regarding visa ineligibility or
excludability in individual cases,3 9 the government freely
discusses the names of the companies with whom the excluded
In this way, not only are the
individuals are affiliated. 40
individuals subject to visa restrictions by the operation of the INS
internal blacklists, but the public at large is put on notice that
those particular firms are deemed by the government to be
to civil liability
"traffickers" and therefore potentially subject
41
under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act as well.
The U.S. government acknowledges that, to date, thirteen
executives or officers of the Toronto-based Sherritt International
Mexican
the
of
officials
five
and
Corporation, 42
excluded
telecommunications firm Grupo Domos,4 have been
under Title IV of the Act. Thus, as some have noted, "denying

37.
38.

See GuidelinesImplementing Title IV,supranote 34.
Prior to making the actual determination, the individual is notified by

registered mail and given 45 days to divest themselves of any investment in
confiscated property or otherwise justify why he or she should not be subject to
exclusion. Consular Officers and the INS are directed to look solely to the INS
database entries in order to verify whether an alien is excludable. See id.

61 Fed. Reg. 30,656 (1996); Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
39.
§ 1202() (1994).
Part of the objective of Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act is to limit
40.
trafficking in confiscated property by making possession of such property
unattractive. See 22 U.S.C. § 6022(6).

There is, however, a slight difference between the definition of
41.
"trafficking" in the travel sanctions provision, Title IV, and in the civil liability
section, Title IlI. The Title IV visa exclusion provisions only apply to those who
deal in confiscated property after March 12, 1996. Compare 22 U.S.C. § 6023(1),
with 22 U.S.C. § 6091(b)(2).
The "45 day letter" was sent to nine individuals connected with
42.
Sherritt on July 10, 1996, and four other Sherritt officials were so notified on
March 17, 1997. Sherritt is reported as having assets in Cuba worth $250
million, including a joint venture with the Cuban government in a nickel mine
expropriated from a U.S. company in 1959. See Judith A. Lee, Conflict Over Cuba,
LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Sept. 9, 1996, at S37; U.S. Department of State Daily Press
Briefing, M2 PRESSWIRE, Mar. 17, 1997.

The "45 day letter" was sent to Grupo Domos officials on August 19,
43.
1996. Grupo Domos has a sizable stake in the Cuban national telephone
company, which utilizes property expropriated from AT&T. See Lee, supra note
42, at S37.
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Disney World to a few Canadian... children becomes part of the
U.S. strategy for defeating Castro." 44
Nevertheless, the visa blacklist has had an impact despite

having been fully invoked only with regard to two companies. The
government asserts that at least twelve companies have revised
their Cuban investment plans since Title IV went into effect, 4
and a number of major companies in the European Union (EU)
have been contacted, including Iberia, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya,
Repsol,
and
Tabacalara
in
Spain,
and
the
Italian
telecommunications company Stet,46 as well as at least one
company in Brazil, and another in Israel. 4 7
Thus, the
"extraterritorial" impact of the Helms-Burton travel restrictions, 48
while perhaps receiving less popular attention than the Title III
civil liability provisions, has caused great concern abroad, and
forms a significant part of the EU's complaint to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) regarding the U.S. Cuban policy. 4 9 The
Clinton Administration's promise to seek a waiver from the
mandatory provisions of the visa blacklist was in fact a key part of
the agreement negotiated in 1997, under which the EU would
temporarily refrain from pursuing its petition to the WTO for a
period of six months.5 0
2. Other U.S. Trade-Related Blacklists
When Congress decided to further tighten the Cuban
sanctions in 1996,51 its resort to the visa blacklist was a natural

44.
Crazy on Cuba: Helms-Burton Hurts U.S., Not Castro, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRIB., Metro Edition, July 12, 1996, at 20A.
45.
See Israeli Company Faces US Visa Ban for Investments in Cuba,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, International News, Jan. 3, 1997.
46.
See EU/US Ministers Emphasize Friendly Solution to U.S.-Cuba Row,
EUR. INFO. SERV., EUR. REP., Feb. 26, 1997.
47.
See Remarks of Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat, State
DepartmentBrieing,FED. NEWS SERV., July 16, 1997.
48.
It may be debatable whether rules on who can receive an entry visa to
visit the U.S. should properly be viewed as an extraterritorial or a purely domestic
control. In prepared press questions and answers to accompany the Guidelines
for Implementing Title IN, supra note 34, the State Department asserts that
"[c]ountries have the right to control their borders, and to exclude individuals
they determine to be undesirable" and that this is not an extraterritorial action.
See Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
InternationalLaw,91 AM. J. INTL L. 93, 98 (1997).
49.
For a discussion of the WTO case, see infra notes 387-95 and
accompanying text.
50.
See R.W. Apple, Jr., Split Over Cuba is Eased by U.S. and Europeans,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1997, at Al; Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the
U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, Apr. 11, 1997,
reprintedin 36 I.L.M. 529 (1997).
51.
See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1994).
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outgrowth of the increased use of blacklisting mechanisms as
part of U.S. trade policy generally, which began to accelerate
markedly in the 1980s. Trade controls and economic sanctions
themselves have increasingly been the government's tools of first
resort in dealing with a variety of diplomatic and foreign policy
issues as the second half of the century has progressed.5 2 As the
unusual position of overwhelming dominance the United States
held in world affairs immediately after World War Two abated, the
U.S. government sought alternately to lead, and sometimes
coerce, other nations into following its policies with a wide range
of economic sanctions and trade control programs.sa Sometimes
these programs were created as part of a multilateral effort; often
they were not.5 4 Moreover, unlike similar measures taken in

earlier times as a prelude or adjunct to hostilities, economic

sanctions and trade controls became ends in themselves. They
are now used to demonstrate that the government is "taking
action" to achieve diverse policy objectives s s ranging from
combating communism,5 6 or fighting the international drug

trade5 7 or terrorism,5 8 to protecting democracy and human
rights,5 9 for example. It is estimated that in the 1990s alone the

52.
Additionally, it should also be noted that U.S. economic sanctions and
trade control programs are typically created to address particular economic,
political, and diplomatic objectives, rather than as part of a concerted overall
trade policy. In fact, many of these measures have come to serve domestic
political requirements as much as, if not more than, any foreign policy objective.
See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE § 1.3 (1990).

53.
Compare, for example, the U.S. approach in the Cuban embargo with
the multilateral actions taken with regard to Iraq or the former Yugoslavia. See
infranotes 76 & 79 and accompanying text.
54.
Multilateral sanctions include those targeted at the former Yugoslavia,
Iraq, South Africa, and to a lesser extent those aimed at Iran and Libya. See, e.g.,
infra notes 70-71, 74, 76 & 79 and accompanying text. Unilateral sanctions
include the Cuban embargo and the sanctions that were aimed at Vietnam,
Cambodia, Nicaragua, and Panama. See, e.g., infra notes 64-66, 73 & 75 and
accompanying text
55.
Historically "most of these episodes (the imposition of economic
sanctions) foreshadowed, or accompanied, warfare. Only after World War I was
extensive attention given to the notion that economic sanctions might substitute
for armed hostilities as a stand alone policy. Even through World War II, the
objectives sought with the use of sanctions retained a distinctively martial
flavor ....
In the period following World War H, other foreign policy motives
became increasingly common..." GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY
HUFBAUER, SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED].

5 (2d ed. 1990)

[hereinafter

56.
The COCOM product-oriented trade controls are examples. See supra
note 10; infranotes 102-110.
57.
See, e.g., Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions Regulations, infra notes 96-

97.
58.
59.

See, e.g., Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, infranotes 94-95.
See, e.g., South African control program, infra note 71.

16

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:1

United States resorted to some form of economic sanctions on
60
more than seventy occasions.
a. Blacklists in U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs
Since the end of the World War Two, in addition to
establishing the embargo of Cuba in 1963,61 the United States
has imposed TWEA based economic sanctions targeted at China

(1950-1971),62 North Korea (1950-present), 63 North (1964-1994)64

and South Vietnam (1975-1994),65 and Cambodia (1975-1992).6,

60.
These 70 different uses of economic sanctions have been connected
with a variety of policy objectives and programs, including anti-narcotics (8), antiterrorism (14), environmental protection (3), human rights/democratization (22),
nuclear nonproliferation (9), political stability (8), and worker rights or the use of

prison labor (6).

They also involved 61 separate laws, targeting 35 different

countries. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, A CATALOG OF NEW U.S.
UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES 1993-1996, 1-2

(1997). See also Evelyn Iritani, U.S. Learns How to Anger Friends White Failingto
Influence Enemies, L. A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1997, at A6.
61.
A variety of controls were applied to Cuba beginning in 1960 as a
result of the nationalization and expropriation of various properties. Initially
these took the form of restrictions on various Cuban exports and imports. The
full embargo was imposed following the Cuban missile crisis. See 28 Fed. Reg.
6974 (1963).
See generally GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED: SUPPLEMENTAL CASE HISTORIES, 194-204 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter
HUFBAUER, SANCTIONS SUPPLEMENT].

62.
These sanctions actually began with a tightening of the controls on
exports of goods and technology with military significance under the Export
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 81-11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949), administered by the Commerce
Department as a result of the success of Communist forces within China. This
escalated into a full embargo in 1950 with China's support of the North Korean
invasion of South Korea. The sanctions were administered by the Treasury
Department, and "blocked" or froze virtually all types of financial transactions and
other dealings in a manner similar to the subsequent Cuban controls. See 15
Fed. Reg. 9040 (1950). The embargo was essentially lifted in 1971 in connection
with President Nixon's visit to China, although residual controls remained in
place until outstanding claims were settled in 1980. See 36 Fed. Reg. 8584
(1971); 36 Fed. Reg. 11,441 (1971); 45 Fed. Reg. 7224 (1980). See generally
HUFBAUER, SANCTIONS SUPPLEMENT, supranote 61, at 100-09.
63.
31 C.F.R. § 500 (1997).
See generally HUFBAUER, SANCTIONS
SUPPLEMENT, supranote 61, at 110-14.
64.
As was the case with the Chinese sanctions, the larger embargo of
North Vietnam was preceded by a tightening of the product oriented export
controls as early as 1954. The embargo itself was imposed ten years later, 29
Fed. Reg. 6025 (1964), prospectively lifted in 1994, 59 Fed. Reg. 5696 (1994), and
completely removed upon settlement of outstanding claims the following year, 60
Fed. Reg. 12,885 (1995). See 31 CFR § 500.578 (1997). See generally HUFBAUER,
SANCTIONS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 6 1, at 133-41.
65.
The.embargo of North Vietnam was extended to the entire country with
the fall of South Vietnam. 40 Fed. Reg. 19,202 (1975).
66.
The embargo of Cambodia, or Kampuchea, was established with the
rise of the National United Front under Prince Sihanouk and the Communist
Khmer Rouge. 40 Fed. Reg. 17,262 (1975). It was prospectively lifted in 1992, 57
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Each of these sanctions programs utilized the SDN blacklist tool.
67
In fact, since the Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR)
that OFAC created to administer these embargoes predate the
Cuban embargo regulations, they served as the model for the
blacklist provisions that bring Pierre Boileau within the scope of
the Cuban sanctions.
More recently the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA)68 provided the legislative basis 6 9 for economic
sanctions directed against Iran (1979-present),70 South Africa

Fed. Reg. 1872 (1992), and completely removed in 1994, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,558
(1994). See 31 CFR § 500.570 (1997). See generally HUFBAUER, SANCTIONS
SUPPLEMENT,
67.
68.
69.
sanctions.

supranote 61, at 412-16.

31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-901 (1997).
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994).
Other statutes have also supported the imposition of economic
For example, the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. §

287c (1994), mandates the imposition of sanctions in accordance with decisions
of the Security Council under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. This was used to
impose financial and trade restrictions on Rhodesia when the white-minority Ian
Smith government unilaterally declared its independence from the United
Kingdom in 1965 thereby thwarting steps toward self-determination in Southern
Rhodesia. U.N. Security Council Res. No. 232, December 16, 1966, called for
mandatory sanctions after a series of lesser steps failed, and then further
tightened the sanctions two years later with U.N. Security Council Res. No. 253,
May 29, 1968. The United States complied, imposing sanctions under Exec.
Order No. 11,322, 32 Fed. Reg. 119 (1966) and Exec. Order No. 11,419, 33 Fed.
Reg. 10,837 (1968). But see H.R. Rep. No. 95-59, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1977) reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 18, 19-20 (questioning the effect of the
Rhodesian sanctions in light of the Byrd Amendment to the Strategic and Critical
Materials Stock Piling Act of 1939, 50 U.S.C. 98 (1994), which authorized the
import of Rhodesian chrome from 1971-1977). The Rhodesian sanctions, 31
C.F.R. § 530 (1972), were prospectively lifted upon the accession of majority rule
and the creation of Zimbabwe in 1979, Exec. Order No. 12,183, 44 Fed. Reg.
74,787 (1979), and entirely removed in 1992, 57 Fed. Reg 1386 (1992). See
generally HUFBAUER, SANCTIONS SUPPLEMENT, supranote 61, at 285-93.
Since the time of the Rhodesian sanctions, the more common practice has
been to predicate the imposition of sanctions on multiple pieces of legislation.
For example, both IEEPA and the U.N. Participation Act were used for the
programs aimed at Iraq and Kuwait, Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, and Angola.
See infra notes 76, 78-80. IEEPA and the International Security Development
and Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9 (1994), together support the
second round sanctions aimed at Iran and the sanctions on Libya. See infra
notes 70 & 74. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 bolstered the
IEEPA-based sanctions on South Africa. See infra note 71.

70.

Following the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, President Carter

first imposed a ban on importing any Iranian oil, see Pres. Proclamation 4,702, 44
Fed. Reg. 65,581 (1979), and then tightened immigration and visa requirements
for Iranian nationals. See 44 Fed. Reg. 65,727 (1979). The next day the
President used his authority under IEEPA to "blocl all assets of the Iranian
government or its controlled instrumentalities which came within U.S.
jurisdiction. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979). The
Iranian Assets Control Regulations (IACR) followed immediately. See 44 Fed. Reg.
65,956 (1979); 31 C.F.R. § 535 (1997). It is interesting to note that "blocking"
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(1985-1991), 7 1 Namibia (1985-1990),72 Nicaragua (1985-1990),7 3
Libya (1986-present),74 Panama (1988-1990), 7 5 Iraq (1990-

assets with financial sanctions is a term of art referring to the ultimate effect of a
broad prohibition on all financial dealings or transfers affecting an embargoed
target. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 535.201 (1997). The term is not defined in the
regulations themselves, although there are references to "blocked," "blocking,"
and 'unblocking accounts or persons. See, e.g., 31 CFR §§ 535.217, 535.414,
535.508, 535.566 & 535.802 (1997). These limited blocking measures were then
expanded to include a broader trade embargo as the hostage crisis continued.
See Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (1980); Exec, Order No. 12,211,
45 Fed. Reg. 26, 685 (1980). Agreement was ultimately reached on the release of
the hostages and the return of the blocked assets with a complex arbitral process
administered by a bilateral Claims Tribunal at the Hague, and most of the IACR
controls were prospectively lifted in 1981. See Exec. Order No. 12,283, 46 Fed.
Reg. 7,927, (1981); 31 C.F.R. § 535.579 (1997). These Executive Orders and the
IACR represented the first use of IEEPA, as opposed to the TWVEA, to support
economic sanctions.

See generally HUFBAUER, SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra

note 55, at 153-62.
Iran is also subject to further sanctions under the Iranian Transaction
Regulations (ITR), 31 C.F.R. § 560 (1997), which now have greater impact than
the IACR. The ITR were initially implemented under the authority of the
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. §
2349aa-9 (1994), as a result of Iran's designation as a country supporting statesponsored terrorism. See Exec. Order No. 12,613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,940 (1987).
The ITR augmented a number of product oriented export restrictions imposed
under the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2405(m), with a series of import
restrictions on Iranian origin goods or services. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.201 (1997).
The ITR were bolstered, and their legislative basis expanded to include IEEPA, in
1995 when President Clinton banned contracts for the development of Iranian
petroleum resources, as well as "blocking" new investments, exports, re-exports,
financing, or brokering transactions for the benefit of the government of Iran or its
controlled instrumentalities with a series of Orders. See Exec. Order No. 12,957,
60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (1995); Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (1995);
31 C.F.R. § 560 (1997). The amended ITR also included a broadly worded
prohibition on those subject to the regulations talking any acts to evade or avoid
their application. See 31 CFR § 560.203 (1997). Additional restrictions on
investing more than $40 million in the development of Iranian petroleum
resources in any 12 month period were imposed with the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C. §
1701, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 541 (1996).
71.
See Exec. Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (1985). The South
African Transaction Regulations (SATR), 31 C.F.R. § 545 (1986), were imposed in
an effort to head off more sweeping sanctions then being proposed by Congress.
As initially promulgated, the SATR were largely patterned after United Nations
Security Council Resolution No. 569 of 1985. S.C. Res. 569, U.N. SCOR, 40th
Sess., 2602d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/569 (1985). Resolution No. 569 was then
the latest in a series of U.N. resolutions condemning the apartheid practices in
South Africa which extended back to 1962. It called for a broad economic
embargo on transactions with the South African government, after years of more
limited measures. The United States had followed these earlier U.N. measures by
initially imposing limited product oriented trade restrictions on exports of arms
and related equipment and later on all exports, to the South African military and
police. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.4 (1964); 43 Fed. Reg. 7311 (1978). The IEEPA-based
sanctions issued in 1985 expanded the product oriented trade controls to ban
most computer exports to the apartheid enforcing agencies, as well as most
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exports of nuclear goods and technology, severely limited the ability of U.S.
financial institutions to extend credit to the South African government, and
prohibited the importation of South African arms, military vehicles, or
See 50 Fed. Reg. 46,726 (1985). The 1985 controls were
Krugerrands.
substantially modified and broadened the following year, in accordance with the
congressionally-mandated program of sanctions found in the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA), Pub. L. No.99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986).
See also Exec. Order 12,571, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,505 (1986); 51 Fed. Reg. 41,906
(1986); 51 Fed. Reg. 46,853 (1986).
However, even the post-CAAA sanctions fell short of the sweeping prohibitions
found in the TWEA based programs under the FACR and CACR, focusing more on
various specific types of prohibited transactions rather than imposing a blanket
prohibition on all dealings with South Africa or South African nationals. See
generally HUFBAUER, SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 55, at 221-48.

They

did include a variety of limitations on new investment and loans, and wider bans
on imports or exports directly or indirectly involving the government of South
Africa, apartheid enforcing agencies, or government controlled or subsidized
entities known as "South African Parastatal Organizations." See id.; 31 C.F.R. §§
545.208, 545.315 (1986). Additionally, unlike the earlier sanctions programs
where the blacklists were maintained by Treasury, the publication of the names of
the blacklisted Parastatal Organizations was a responsibility of the Secretary of
State. See State Department Public Notice No. 983, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,912 (1986),
revised by State Department Public Notice No. 1007, 52 Fed. Reg. 9982 (1987).
Similarly, the Commerce Department blacklisted a number of "South African
Entities Enforcing Apartheid" as an adjunct to its product oriented trade and
export controls. See 52 Fed. Reg. 27,798 (1987). This reflected the complex
delegations of authority to the Treasury, Commerce, and State Departments
which were required to carry out the policy toward South Africa mandated by the
CAAA and Executive Orders.
The SATR were prospectively lifted in 1991, 56 Fed. Reg. 32,056 (1991),
although products subject to the U.N. arms embargo, and certain U.S. unilateral
controls on dealings with the military and police, remained controlled until the
U.N. lifted its arms embargo three years later. See S.C. Res. 919, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3379th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/919 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 30,684,
(1994). The last remaining restrictions, affecting dealings in gold coins, were
removed in 1995. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
72.
Namibia, as part of South Africa, was initially caught in the sanctions
that were aimed at dealings with the government of South Africa. It was removed
from the scope of the SATR in March 1990 following Namibian independence. 55
Fed. Reg. 10,618 (1990).
73.
See Exec. Order No. 12,513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985). The
Nicaraguan Transaction Control Regulations (NTCR), 50 Fed. Reg. 19,890 (1985)
(codified at 31 C.F.R. § 540 (1986)), were imposed as part of the Reagan
Administration's opposition to the Sandinista government of President Daniel
Ortega. They were lifted prospectively following the election of the Chamorro
government in 1990, 55 Fed. Reg. 28,613 (1990), and removed entirely in 1995,
60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).

See generally HUFBAUER, SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED,

supranote 55, at 175-91.
Unlike the FACR or CACR, however, the NTCR were largely trade
(import/export) restrictions, which lacked the broad general prohibition of the
other programs. They incidentally used a specific prohibition which affected
direct dealings with Nicaraguan registered vessels and aircraft, but unlike some of
the other programs, for example, the ISR, infranote 76, and the FRYSR infra note
79, the NTCR did not specifically employ a blacklist for those vessels and aircraft.
See 31 C.F.R. §§ 540.206-207 (1986). But see 31 C.F.R. § 540.208 (1986) (placing
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present),7 6 Kuwait (1990-1991), 77 Haiti (1991-1994),78 the former

Yugoslavia (1992-1996), 7 9 Angola (1993-present), 80 Burma (1997-

broad prohibitions on engaging in "related transactions" that might result in
violations of the NTCR). Thus, the NTCR were more directed at embargoing direct
transactions between the United States and Nicaragua than was the case with
many other OFAC sanctions programs.
74.
As is often the case, the economic sanctions imposed on Libya were
preceded by a tightening of the product oriented export controls dating back to
1978 when military sales were suspended because of Libyan support for
international terrorism. These trade sanctions were expanded to a wider range of
goods as tensions escalated through the early 1980s, and particularly focused on
goods and technology used in the petroleum industry. See, e.g., 47 Fed. Reg.
11,248-49 (1982); 49 Fed. Reg. 10,247-48 (1984); 50 Fed. Reg. 3,740-43 (1985).
After a series of terrorist incidents involving Libya, which cumulated in the
Palestinian attack at the Rome airport in December 1985, for which Abu Nidal
claimed a "considerable amount of financing and assistance" from Momar
Gadhafi, President Reagan invoked IEEPA to impose a broad trade and financial
embargo of Libya. See HUFBAUER, SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supranote 55 at 140-

52. Additional authority for President Reagan's actions was predicated upon the
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. §§
2349aa-8, 2349aa-9 (1994), which would be used the following year to support
the ITR, supra note 70, as well as the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1514
(1994).
Two Executive Orders were issued in quick succession in January 1986,
which provided the basis for the Libyan Sanctions Regulations (LSR). See Exec.
Order No. 12,543, 51 Fed. Reg. 875 (1986); Exec. Order No. 12,544, 51 Fed. Reg.
1235 (1986); 31 C.F.R. § 550 (1997). The LSR froze or "blocked" all manner of
property interests of the government of Libya and its controlled entities that came
within the possession or control of "U.S. Persons," in addition to restricting
imports and exports. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.200 (1997). In this regard, the LSR are
more similar to the TWEA based sanction programs than is the case with the

NTCR, supra note 73, or even the SATR, supranote 71. The LSR was also the
first IEEPA based sanctions program to include a regulatory definition of a
"blocked account' or "blocked property" as "any account or property in which the
government of Libya has an interest, with respect to which payments, transfers or
withdrawals or other dealings may not be made or effected except pursuant to an
authorization or license.. . "thereby highlighting the importance of being within
or without the definition of "Government of Libya." 31 C.F.R. § 550.316 (1997).
Additional restrictions on investing more than $40 million in the development of
Libyan petroleum resources in any 12 month period were imposed with the Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1991). See also infra
note 86.
75.
See Exec. Order No. 12,635, 53 Fed. Reg.12,134 (1988).
The
Panamanian Transaction Regulations (PTR), 53 Fed. Reg. 20,566 (1988), were
imposed as part of the Reagan Administration's efforts to isolate and undermine
the regime headed by General Manuel Noriega because of involvement with drug
trafficking. The PTR were lifted prospectively in 1990 following the U.S. incursion
which removed General Noriega from power, see 55 Fed. Reg. 3560 (1990), and
removed entirely in 1995, see 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995). See generally
HUFBAUER, SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supranote 55, at 249-67.

76.
As a result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, President
Bush issued two Executive Orders, one restricting imports and exports to Iraq
and 'blocking" Iraqi government property, see Exec. Order No. 12,722, 55 Fed.
Reg. 31,803 (1990), and another "blocking" Kuwaiti government property as a

19981

BLACKLISTING AND SECONDARY BOYCOTTS

protective measure to limit looting by Iraq, see Exec. Order 12,723, 55 Fed. Reg.
31,805 (1990). The U.N. immediately condemned the Iraqi invasion, see S.C. Res.
No. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990), and
called for mandatory embargo of Iraq by all member nations, see S.C. Res. 661,
U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990). This was
supported by a naval blockade, see S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR 45th Sess., 2938th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990), restrictions of food and humanitarian
shipments, see S.C. Res. 666, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2939th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/666 (1990), and an air embargo, see S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR 45th
Sess., 2940th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/667 (1990), as a prelude to the Gulf War.
Although the initial U.S. and U.N. embargoes were quite similar, the U.S.
sanctions were brought into line with the U.N. actions by Exec. Order No. 12,724
with regard to Iraq, see 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (1990), and No. 12,725 with regard to
Kuwait, see 55 Fed. Reg. 33,091 (1990), thereby grounding the controls both in
IEEPA and the U.N. Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287c (1994).
The Iraqi Sanctions Regulations (ISR), 31 C.F.R. § 575 (1997), and the
separate but related Kuwaiti Assets Control Regulations (KACR), 31 C.F.R. § 570
(1991), utilize the full range of sanctions tools available to the government in a
manner not seen since the TWEA based FACR and CACR. They employ a
combination of financial sanctions (asset blocking),
trade sanctions
(export/import controls), travel restrictions, and contract restrictions, together
with a broad prohibition on those subject to the regulations taking steps to evade
or avoid the prohibitions. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S.
TRADE § 9A.2.1 (Supp. 1996). Following the liberation of Kuwait, the KACR were
prospectively lifted in 1991, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,450 (1991), and entirely removed in
1995, 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995). The ISR remain in effect.
77.
See 31 C.F.R. § 570 (1996); 56 Fed. Reg. 12,450 (1991); 60 Fed. Reg.
33,725 (1995).
78.
The Haitian sanctions are unique in that they were applied, removed,
and then reapplied during the course of the same crisis. With Exec. Order No.
12,775, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,641 (1991), President Bush invoked IEEPA to impose
"blocking" sanctions against the government of Haiti following the coup, which
ousted the then recently elected President Aristide. The blocking measures were
expanded, after the OAS condemned the coup in Resolution 2/91 of October 1,
1991, with Exec. Order No. 12,779, 56 Fed. Reg. 59,975 (1991). Together the two
orders imposed a broad range of financial and trade sanctions on the de facto
Haitian government and its various instrumentalities, along with the now
standard prohibition against "evasion" of the regulatory requirements. The OFAC
Haitian Transaction Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 580 (1992), which embodied the
controls created by the Executive Orders, were issued in March 1992. See 57
Fed. Reg. 10,820 (1992). Later in August 1993, U.N. Security Council Res. 861
called for the suspension of some of the sanctions based upon the Governor's
Island Agreement for the return of the elected president S.C. Res. 861, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3271st mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/861 (1992). See 58 Fed. Reg.
46,540 (1993). When the return did not occur as scheduled, however, the U.N.
called for the reimposition of the sanctions. See S.C. Res. 873, U.N. SCR, 49th
Sess., 3291st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/873 (1993); Exec. Order No. 12,853, 58
Fed. Reg. 35,843 (1993). Further measures were taken when the issue remained
unresolved the following year. See S.C. Res. 917, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3376th
mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/917 (1994). When the democratically elected President
Aristide returned to Haiti, the sanctions were suspended, see Exec. Order No. 12,
932, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,403 (1994), and 59 Fed. Reg. 51,066 (1994), and finally
removed in June 1995. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
79.
Exec. Order No. 12,808, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,299 (1992), was issued
following the breakup of Yugoslavia, blocking property of the governments of
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present),8 l and Sudan (1997-present).8 2 Unlike the various Asian
sanctions, which were administered with a single common set of
regulations, 8 3 entirely new and separate regulations were created
for each of these various sanctions programs.8 4 One common
is that virtually all of them employ some sort of
element, however,
85
blacklist tool.
The terminology associated with each blacklist varies, as the
government slightly restructures the basic economic sanctions
mechanisms each time it drafts a new program. The purpose of
the blacklist within each program, however, remains unaltered-

Serbia and Montenegro (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or FRY) when their
troops seized territory within Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Simultaneously,
U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 757, S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3082d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992), called for a broad range of trade and
financial sanctions to be directed at the FRY, resulting in the issuance of Exec.
Order No. 12,810, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,347 (1992), and Exec. Order, No. 12,831, 58
Fed. Reg. 5253 (1993), imposing additional controls to limit trade and then to
expand the blocking measures to companies and FRY controlled entities, thereby
bringing the U.S. sanctions in line with the U.N. measures. When the U.N. called

for still further sanctions, see S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3200th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (1993); S.C. Res. 942, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3428th mtg.
(1994), to tighten the embargo as the situation in the former Yugoslavia
deteriorated, the United States followed suit, adjusting its own sanctions to block
trade and financial dealings with the Serbian controlled portions of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. See Exec. Order No. 12,846, 58 Fed. Reg. 25,771 (1993); Exec.
Order No. 12,934, 59 Fed. Reg. 54,117 (1994). The blocking measures directed at
Serbia and Montenegro were prospectively lifted in January 1996, as a result of
the Dayton Peace Accords, see 31 C.F.R. § 585.525 (1997), but were not similarly
lifted for the Serbian controlled areas of Bosnia until May, when the Serb forces
withdrew. See 31 C.F.R. § 585.527 (1997).
Sanctions were imposed on dealing with the National Union for the
80.
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) under Exec. Order No. 12,865, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,005 (1993), in accord with U.N. Security Council Res. No. 864. S.C. Res.
864, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3277th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/864 (1993). The
UNITA Sanctions Regulations are essentially limited to imposing an arms
embargo and prohibiting actions to facilitate the sale of arms or petroleum
products to UNITA or Angola. See 31 C.F.R. § 590 (1997).
The government of Burma, or Myanmar, was sanctioned in May 1997,
81.
for its "large scale repression of the democratic opposition" by the imposition of a
prohibition on any new investment in the country under Exec. Order 13,047, 62
Fed. Reg. 28,301 (1997). These restrictions on investment in Burma represents
the most recent use of IEEPA to support sanctions. No regulations have been
issued for this program as of yet.
See Exec. Order No. 13,067, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,989 (1997).
82.
The embargoes of China, Vietnam, and Cambodia were all
83.
administered by OFAC under the FACR. See supranotes 62-66.
See supranotes 70-80.
84.
Only the Burma program, for which no regulations have been issued
85.
as of yet, lacks a clear blacklist tool as part of its sanctions. See supra note 81.
However, if and when regulations are issued to implement the requirements of the
President's Executive Order, based upon OFAC's past practice with other
sanctions programs, it is likely there will be some sort blacklist to help identify in
which projects, companies, or areas investment will be prohibited.
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to extend the reach of the sanctions beyond just the geography
associated with the target country to reach specific individuals or
organizations within, or without, that geography. Accordingly,
the term "Specially Designated National" gradually disappeared
86
from the regulations
and was replaced with references to
acontrolled,"8 7 "blocked,"8 8 or "governmental"8 9 entities, or with

86.
Interestingly, while the term SDN may no longer appear in the
regulations themselves, it became sufficiently well-recognized as a term of art to
be included parenthetically in the captions of the blacklists used with the Libyan
and Iraqi embargo programs.
As the Libyan sanctions developed over time, they used an SDN list to extend
the reach of the controls, see Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 550,
app. B (1991), as well as a list of "Organizations Determined to be Within the
Term "government of Libya." See 31 C.F.R. pt 550, app. A (1991). In so doing, the
LSR combined both the SDN mechanism of the TWEA based FACR and CACR,
with the "blocked" persons or organizations approach, based upon a flexible
definition of who acts for a target government, begun with the IEEPA based

IACR/ITR. Compare 31 C.F.R. § 535.301 (IACR definition of"Iran" and "Iranian"),
and § 560.304 (ITR definition of "government of Iran"), with § 550.304 (LSR
definition of "government of Libya") (1997). The LSR themselves, however, neither
mention the SDN mechanism nor define the term, as was done in the FACR and
CACR. The SDN terminology only appears in the notices publishing the Libyan
blacklist or its updates, along with the explanation that "individuals determined
to be 'specially designated nationals' . . . thus fall within the definition of

'government of Libya' found in § 550.304(a) of the regulations, and are subject to

all prohibitions applicable to other components of the government of Libya." 31
C.F.R. § 550 (1997). The Libyan blacklists are now consolidated at 31 C.F.R. ch.
V, apps. A & B (1997).
As with the LSR, see supranote 74, the PTR, see supranote 75, and arguably
with the IACR/ITR, see supranote 70, OFAC blacklisted a number of individuals

and entities by defining them to be part of the sanctioned Iraqi or Kuwaiti
government targeted by these regulations. See 31 C.F.R. § 570.306(d) & App. A
(1991) (listing "Kuwaiti Governmental Entities"); Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 31

C.F.R. § 575 apps. A & B (1991) (listing "Individuals and Organizations
Determined to Be Specially Designated Nationals of the Government of Iraq" and
"Merchant Vessels Registered, Owned, or Controlled by the Government of Iraq or
by Persons Acting Directly or Indirectly on Behalf of the Government of Iraq"). As
with the LSR and PTR, the SDN mechanism was neither explicitly used nor
defined in the ISR. The focus of 31 C.F.R. § 575.306 (1997) is on identifying what
persons or organizations should be "blocked" as part of the respective target
governments, but the SDN term nevertheless is used in captioning the blacklist
itself and in the Federal Register notice describing the blacklist. The Iraqi
blacklist now appears at 31 C.F.R. ch. V, apps. A & B (1997).
87.
Blacklisting of "controlled entities is most clearly seen in the
sanctions directed at the former Yugoslavia, which listed both "controlled entities"
and "vessels," and Iran, which loosely blacklisted Iranian controlled banks, but
the term also permeates several of the other sanctions programs such as the
Iraqi, Kuwaiti and Sudanese sanctions programs. See supra notes 76-77, 79 &
82.
Rather than using the SDN or "blocking" terminology in the Yugoslav
sanctions, OFAC published an extensive list of "Controlled Yugoslav Entities" in
July 1992. See General Notice No. 1, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,051-02 (1992). This was
several months prior to the publication of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) Sanctions Regulations (FRYSR), which did not occur
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until March 1993. See 31 C.F.R. § 585 (1993), 58 Fed. Reg. 13,199 (1993).
General Notice No. 1 was predicated on the authority of the Director of OFAC to
make a determination that a "person or organization" should be included within
the definition of the "Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia &
Montenegro)" or those "purporting" to act on their behalf, even though that grant
of authority was not expressly made in either of the Executive Orders establishing
the sanctions program. See supra note 79. It was only in the subsequently
issued regulations that the Director of OFAC was expressly vested with the
authority to blacklist entities in this manner. See 31 C.F.R. § 585.311 (1997).
OFAC was, however, implicitly able to make the designations. See Milena Ship
Management Co, Ltd v. Newcomb, 804 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. La. 1992), aff'd, 995
F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1993) (refusing a request for an injunction by a listed entity).
Nevertheless, General Notice No. 1 blacklisted a few hundred names as
"Controlled Yugoslav Entities" without providing addresses or other identifying
information, which made the list of questionable utility. For example, one of the
"blocked" entities on the list was simply identified as "Global" and another as
"SBS." See 57 Fed. Reg. 32,051, 32,053-54 (1992). Addresses were added later,
see 59 Fed. Reg. 59,460 (1994), corrected by 59 Fed. Reg. 61,656 (1994), and the
Yugoslav blacklist expanded to also include the names of Bosnian Serb Civilian
and Military Authorities as the sanctions themselves were expanded. See 60 Fed.
Reg. 19,448 (1995). The Controlled Yugoslav Entities and Bosnian Serb names
now appear with addresses in 31 C.F.R. ch. V, apps. A & B (1997).
Another type of blacklist was also used with the FRYSR, one which blacklisted
vessels controlled by sanctioned parties, irrespective of the registry or flag the
vessel might fly. See Exec. Order No. 12,831, 58 Fed. Reg. 5253 at § l(b)(2)
(1993); 31 C.F.R § 585.418 (1997). Vessels have been blacklisted under other
programs, such as the CACR or the ISR, when owned or controlled by sanctioned

governments, SDNs, or blocked entities, but the FRYSR was the first program to
formalize this particular type of blacklist in its regulations. The combined list of
blacklisted vessels is currently found at 31 C.F.R. ch. V, app. C (1997).
The two sets of Iranian sanctions regulations, the IACR and the ITR both
permit the blacklisting of individuals or entities, but attempt to simplify the
complex definitions of "foreign country," "national," "designated national," and
"specially designated national" used in the earlier TWEA sanction programs.
Instead, the Iranian sanctions authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to simply
designate persons or organizations who are deemed to be Iranian, Iranian
controlled entities, or part of the government of Iran for the purposes of the
sanctions. Compare31 C.F.R. §§ 535.301, 560.303 & 560.304, with §§ 500.301,
500.302, 500.305 & 500.306 (in the FACR), and §§ 515.301, 515.302, 515.305 &
515.306 (1997) (in the CACR). This designation functions much as the SDN
designation would, triggering the various "blocking" measures and other
regulatory requirements found in the IACR/ITR.
Despite having gone to these lengths to simplify the blacklist designation
process, the U.S. government has not utilized this tool. Rather than specifically
designating or defining persons or organizations as within these definitions and
thus clearly sanctioned for all purposes, the government issued a list of 84

"Banks Controlled by the Government of Iran" located both within Iran and in
various locations around the world. This list was initially released prior to the
1995 expansion of the coverage of the Iranian Transactions Regulations, as an
Annex to General License No. 3 dealing with the "Exportation of Services: Iranian
Accounts at U.S. Financial Institutions." See 60 Fed. Reg. 40,881, 40,882 (1995).

While General License No. 3 was subsequently embodied in the ITR, see 31 C.F.R.
560.517 (1997), the status of the listed banks is somewhat confusing. They are
not themselves "blocked," but transactions with these banks are constrained by
the ITR, and the names of these banks were added to the consolidated OFAC list
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of "Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons" on May 20, 1997, but
their names have yet to be incorporated into 31 C.F.R. ch. V, apps. A & B (1997).
See <http://ftp.fedworld.gov/pub/tel/tl ledittxt>.
88.
The term "blocked," like "controlled," is loosely used with most of the
sanctions programs, both to identify sanctioned persons or organizations and to
explain the effect of the sanctions. It is most clearly used to identify sanctioned
parties in the Haitian and Angolan sanctions, but also figured prominently in the
Kuwaiti blacklist. See supranotes 76, 78 & 80.
The Haitian Transaction Regulations made extensive use of blacklisting in the
form of "blocking persons or organizations who were deemed to be part of the de
facto regime in Haiti under 31 C.F.R. § 580.303 (1992). This was similar to the
LSR, PTR, and KACR provisions defining who was deemed to be part of the
targeted "government." See supra notes 74, 75 & 76. However, the voluminous
list of names of "Blocked Persons of the De Facto Regime in Haiti," see 58 Fed.

Reg. 40,043 (1991), 31 C.F.R. § 580 app. A (1993), consisted mostly of the names
of organizations located in Haiti, or individuals located in Haiti and serving in the
Haitian military or government after the coup. The individuals were 'unblocked"
when a settlement appeared possible, although the organizations remained
subject to blocking. See 58 Fed. Reg. 46,540 (1993). Many of the individuals
were "blocked" again when the Governors Island Agreement collapsed, see 58
Fed. Reg. 54,024 (1993), and others were added as President Aristide's return
The sanctions were
was further delayed, see 59 Fed. Reg. 16,548 (1994).
belatedly and retroactively lifted by OFAC in December 1994, in accordance with
the President's Exec. Order 12,932 dated October 14, 1992. See 59 Fed. Reg.
66,476 (1994).
In accordance with what was standard practice by 1993 when the UNITA
(Angola) Sanctions Regulations were issued, see supra note 80, the Director of
OFAC is authorized to designate persons or organizations as being within the
definition of the embargo target, in this case UNITA, see 31 C.F.R. § 590.307
(1997), and "blocked" as a result of that determination. No such designations
have been made under the UASR.
Defining a party to be to be "governmental" or a "government entity" is
89.
basic to the blocking mechanisms of many of the IEEPA based economic
sanctions programs. Its use as a blacklisting tool is particularly seen in the
Panamanian and Kuwaiti sanctions.
The PTR, like the LSR, included an SDN-like blacklist mechanism, but not the
"specially designated national" terminology, instead permitting the Director of
OFAC to determine who was to be defined as part of the Noriega regime targeted
See Panamanian Transaction Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §
by the sanctions.
This was required because there were in effect two
565.304(a)(4) (1988).
"governments" of Panama, the Noriega regime and the U.S. recognized
government in exile. Accordingly, OFAC published two separate blacklists under
the PTR, one designating "Panamanian Governmental Entities" subject to
sanctions, see 53 Fed. Reg. 20,566 (1988), and one listing "Persons and
Organizations Acting on Behalf of the Noriega/Solis Regime," see 54 Fed. Reg.

36,272 (1989). Both of these blacklists were used to expand the definition of the
"government" subject to sanctions under the PTR, in a manner not dissimilar to
that used in the LSR, but virtually all the persons or organizations listed were
located within Panama itself. The PTR were removed entirely in 1995. See 60
Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
Similarly, OFAC blacklisted a number of individuals and entities by defining
them to be part of the Kuwaiti government targeted by the protective blocking and
freezing measures of the KACR. See 55 Fed. Reg. 49,856 (1990); 31 C.F.R. § 570,
app. A (1991) (listing "Kuwaiti Governmental Entities"). This list neatly highlights
the interrelated nature of the various terms OFAC has used with its different
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more elaborate terms or titles tying the blacklisted individual or
organization to a specific part of a target government. 90 The
function of the designation under whatever term is used, however,
remains the same-to expand the reach of the controls by
defining who or what is part of the embargo target, by individual
name. 9 1 The perceived success of these programs among policy
makers led the government to extend the use of blacklisting to
trigger economic sanctions to its logical conclusion in two other

recent IEEPA sanctions programs, which simply blacklist certain

persons or organizations without regard to geography or,
arguably, to any particular target government at all.
In relatively short succession in 1995, and not long before

Congress enhanced the traditional SDN mechanism in the Cuba
controls with the visa blacklist provision in the LIBERTAD Act,
President Clinton announced two new sets of economic sanctions
focused on those involved with international terrorism,9 and also

blacklists, by subdividing the Kuwaiti Governmental Entities into those that are
"Controlled" and therefore "Blocked," those that are "Controlled" but nevertheless
"Licensed to Operate" and those that are "Not Controlled" and for which there are
"No Restrictions" under the regulations. Id. The blocking effect of these
designations was lifted in 1991, see 56 Fed. Reg. 12,450 & 26,034 (1991), and
the KACR were entirely removed in 1995, see 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (1995).
90.
Identifying the blacklisted individual or organization with a precise
part of a sanctioned government is clearly seen in the South African sanctions
under the CAAA, where the State Department published an extensive list of
"South African Parastatal Organizations" and where the Commerce Department
published its list of "South African Entities Enforcing Apartheid." See supra note
71. With the IEEPA based sanctions programs, it is most evident in the
Panamanian sanctions but also appears in the Libyan and Iranian programs.
OFAC published two separate blacklists under the PTR, one of which
attempted to specifically identify "Persons and Organizations Acting on Behalf of
the Noriega/Solis Regime," see 54 Fed. Reg. 36,272 (1989). Similarly, one of the
two appendices created for the Libyan program was a list of "Organizations
Determined to be Within the Term 'Government of Libya.' " See 56 Fed. Reg.
20,540 (1991) (creating 31 C.F.R. § 550, app. A) (1991). In a slightly different
sense, the list of "Banks Controlled by the Government of Iran" also acts as a
similar designation, trying to reach a subset of a targeted sanctioned government.
See supra note 70; Annex to General Notice No. 3, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,881, 40,882
(1995).
91.
Sometimes this level of particularity is found in the sanctions
regulations themselves, without resort to the use of a separate blacklist For
example, the UASR, see supra note 80, specifically define the target, UNITA, to
include "Free Angola Information Services, Inc." See 31 C.F.R. § 590.307(a)(3)
(1997). Similarly, the majority of the IEEPA based sanctions programs since the
mid 1980s have included specific references to various agencies as part of their
definition of the sanctioned "government," most commonly including the
appropriate "central bank." See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 550.304 (LSR); 570.306,
575.306 & 575.307 (ISR); 585.311 (1997) (FRYSR).
See "Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt
92.
the Middle East Peace Process," Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079
(1995).
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on those involved with narcotics trafficking.9 3 This led to the
creation of the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations 94 to deal with
"Specially Designated Terrorists" (SDTs),95 and the Narcotics
Trafficking Sanctions Regulations 96 to deal with "Specially
Designated Narcotics Traffickers" (SDNTs).9 7 These executive
orders and regulations adopted the asset "blocking" techniques
previously associated with economic embargoes aimed at isolating
other countries and applied them, after largely removing the
traditional "geographic" basis for the sanctions, 9 8 directly against
certain specified persons and organizations in an effort to address
two of the more intractable political issues of recent years. 9 9 Both
programs block all property within the reach of U.S. jurisdiction
in which the designated persons or organizations have any
interest whatsoever, 1t and broadly prohibit any attempts by
those subject to U.S. jurisdiction to engage in unlicensed dealings
parties, or to evade or avoid the programs'
with the blacklisted
101
restrictions.
This represents a significant move away from the use of
blacklisting as embodied in the World War Two economic

See 'Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions with Significant
93.
Narcotics Traffickers," Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,579 (1995).

94.

31 C.F.R. § 595.101-595.901 (1997).

95.

In an Annex to Exec. Order 12,947, President Clinton identified 12

Middle Eastern terrorist groups whose activities threatened the peace process.
The list of SDTs is comprised of these 12 groups, along with other groups and
individuals designated by the Secretary of State, and others determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury to be owned or controlled by any of the foregoing. See
31 C.F.R. § 595.311 (1997). The list of SDTs is consolidated into the other OFAC
blacklists. Id ch. V, apps. A & B.
31 C.F.R. § 536.101-536.901 (1997).
96.

97.

In an Annex to Exec. Order 12,978, President Clinton identified four

principal figures in the Cali drug cartel. These four individuals, along with others
designated by the Secretary of the Treasury as being significantly involved in
Colombian drug trafficking activities, and those who are owned or controlled by
such individuals, comprise the list of SDNTs. See 31 C.F.R. § 536.312 (1997).
The list of SDNTs is consolidated into the other OFAC blacklists. Id. ch. V, apps.

A&B.
The SDTs are truly international, involving groups and individuals
98.
from many countries around the world, although there is a rudimentary
'geographic" element to the TSR in that the SDT designation is predicated upon a
potential threat to the peace process in the Middle East See 31 C.F.R. § 595.311
(1997). The SDNTs are more localized, at least currently, in that they are all
associated with the Call drug cartel based in Colombia and to that degree the
NTSR also contain a rudimentary "geographic" element. See i.d. § 536.312.
One might question the practicality of blacklisting some of these
99.
persons or organizations, such as Abu Nidal or the Black September
Organization, which presumably operate in secret or conceal their identities at
least when dealing with U.S. parties and financial institutions.
See 31 C.F.R. §§ 536.201 & 595.201 (1997).
100.
See i. §§ 536.204 & 595.205.
101.
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sanctions, where it was a secondary tool augmenting the

sanctions on a particular target country by bringing "corporate
cloaks" and "front companies" within the ambit of the primary
controls, to a point where blacklisting of specific persons and
organizations has itself become the government's primary tool to
achieve its desired objectives. Additionally, the new sanctions
also highlight how the objectives behind the use of economic
sanctions themselves have changed over time. It represents a
marked shift, from seeking the practical economic isolation of a
target country as a substitute for warfare, to demonstrating
leadership or staking out the "moral high ground" for both
domestic and international political purposes, with less concern
for the practical ability of the particular sanction to actually
control its intended object (e.g., terrorism or narco-trafficking).
This experience with economic sanctions, in turn, demonstrated
the usefulness of blacklisting to other parts of the U.S.
government, which also wanted to be seen taking action on
troublesome issues on both a practical and political level.
b. Blacklists in U.S. Trade Control Programs
Blacklisting has progressed from simply being one of several
tools used by various trade control agencies to ensure compliance
with their requirements and punish those who violate their rules,
to being a significant part of entirely new controls being
formulated by policy makers, importing many of the techniques
developed by OFAC in its financial and economic sanctions
programs into the traditionally commodity-oriented world of trade
controls.
The government's principal trade control agencies, 1°2 the
Commerce Department and the State Department, have long used
blacklisting to enforce their basic regulatory controls on exporting
goods, services, and technology from the United States. The

102. There is no single agency or department responsible for U.S. trade
controls. On the contrary, there are a variety of agencies involved in regulating
U.S. exports and foreign trade, usually depending upon the goods or technology
being transferred. These include the Department of Agriculture (tobacco seeds
and plants), the Drug Enforcement Agency (narcotics and dangerous drugs), the
Department of Energy (natural gas, nuclear, and electric power), the Food and
Drug Administration (drugs, biologics, and medical devices), the Department of

the Interior (endangered fish and wildlife, migratory birds, and Bald and Golden
Eagles), the Maritime Administration (large watercraft), the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (nuclear equipment and material), and the Patent Office (technology
contained in patent filings). See Other U.S. Government Departments and
Agencies with Export Control Responsibilities, 15 C.F.R. pt. 730, supp. 3 (1997).

The vast majority of export and trade related matters, however, are the
responsibility of the Departments of Commerce and State.
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Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration (BXA)
and State's Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) administer
broad, primarily product-oriented regulations, which control trade
based upon the capabilities of the particular products or
technologies being exported or disclosed to foreign nationals.

DTC controls "defense articles" or "munitions" under the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 10 3 and BXA
controls civilian products under the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR).' 0 4 In either case, the precise controls are
based upon the classification of the particular products, services,
or technology under their respective regulatory control lists.' 0 5
Virtually all goods and technology that move in international
trade are addressed in some fashion by these two control lists.'0 6
Persons or organizations who fail to comply with these controls
by, for example, not obtaining an export license when required, or
who do not meet the requirements for an exception to a licensing
requirement,' 0 7 are subject to a variety of criminal,

08

civil, 10 9

103. The ITAR, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-128 (1997), were issued under the
authority of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2778-2799.
104. The EAR, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-774 (1997) were issued under the authority
of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420 (EAA), which must
be renewed periodically. The EAA expired in 1994, and since that time the EAR
have been administered under temporary extensions pursuant to the president's
authority under IEEPA. See "Continuation of Export Control Regulations," Exec.
Order No. 12,924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437 (1994); "Administration of Export
Controls," Exec. Order No. 12,981, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,981 (1995); "Continuation of
Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations," 61 Fed. Reg. 42,527 (1996);
and Amendment to Executive Order No. 12,981, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,079 (1996).
105. DTC controls products, services, and technology, described in the
United States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. § 121 (1997), and BXA controls products,
service, and technology described in the Commerce Control List, 15 C.F.R. § 774,
supp. 1 (1997).
106. See Fitzgerald, supra note 10, at ch. 14, § B(2)(b)(2) (1996).
107. For a discussion of the various requirements associated with trade
under the EAR and ITAR, see generally id.
108. Criminal violations of the Arms Export Control Act are punishable by
up to ten years imprisonment and fines up to $1 million. See 22 U.S.C. §
2778(c); 22 C.F.R. § 127.3 (1997).

Criminal, willful violations of the EAA are punishable by up to ten years
imprisonment, organizational fines up to the greater of $1 million or five times the

value of the goods, or individual fines up to $250,000. See 50 U.S.C. App.
2410(b); 15 C.F.R § 764.3(b)(2) (1997). "Knowing" violations and "attempted"
violations of the EAA are punishable by up to five years imprisonment and fines
up to the greater of $50,000 or five times the value of the goods. See 50 U.S.C.

App. 2410(a); 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(b)(1) (1997).
As the EAR are currently operating under the president's authority under
IEEPA, see supra note 104, violations would be punished by reference to that
statute until the EAA is renewed or reenacted. IEEPA provides for criminal
penalties of up to ten years imprisonment and fines up to $50,000. See 50 U.S.C.

§ 1705 (1997).
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and administrative penalties. 1 10
The principal administrative
penalty is being named in one of the blacklists identifying parties
who have lost their rights to make or receive their exports from
the United States, or from other parties subject to U.S.

jurisdiction.
The Commerce Department calls its blacklist the "Denied

Persons List" (DPL)1 1 1 because persons or organizations listed in

the DPL have been denied 112 their ability to make or receive
exports of goods or technology subject to U.S. jurisdiction. 11 3 The
Under Secretary for Export Administration issues the denial order

following proceedings before an administrative law judge. 1 14 BXA
also has the ability to order the temporary denial of export
privileges if it believes that a violation of its regulations is

109. Civil penalties under the Arms Export Control Act include fines up to
$500,000. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(e); 22 C.F.R. § 127.10 (1997).
Civil penalties under the EAA include fines up to $100,000, without any
showing of "knowledge" or "intent" to violate the export regulations. See Iran Air
v. Kugelman, 969 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The maximum fine is $10,000 ff
the item is not controlled for "national security" reasons. See 50 U.S.C. App.
2410(c); 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(a)(1) (1997).
As the EAR are currently operating under the president's authority under
IEEPA, see supra note 104, violations would be punished by reference to that
statute until the EAA is renewed or reenacted. IEEPA provides for civil fine of up
to $10,000. See 50 U.S.C. § 1705; 61 Fed. Reg. 54,936 (1996).
110. While the principal administrative sanction is a loss of export privileges
by being named a "denied party" by BXA or "debarred" by DTC, see infra notes
111-22 and accompanying text, other administrative sanctions for violating the
export controls are also available, such as civil forfeiture proceedings under the
EAA and EAR, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411(g); 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(c)(2)(I) (1997), or under
the Customs Services' statutory detention and seizure powers under the
Espionage Act of 1917, 22 U.S.C. § 401.
111. The DPL is referenced in 15 C.F.R. pt. 764, supp. 2 (1997). The names
of parties being added to the list appear periodically in the Federal Register. This
list used to be referred to as the Table of Denial Orders or TDO, but this
terminology caused confusion with the term Temporary Denial Order.
112. While there is a great deal of discretion in determining precisely what
privileges will be lost, and for how long, the standard terms of a denial order are
set forth in Standard Terms of Orders Denying Export Privileges, 15 C.F.R. pt.
764, supp. 1 (1997). Denial periods ranging up to 35 years have been issued, see
Actions Affecting Export Privileges: Globe Computers et al., 54 Fed. Reg. 9537 (1989); 54
Fed. Reg. 13,715 (1989), and it was not uncommon to see denial orders of indefinite (te.,
virtually permanent) duration in the 1980s. See also Denied Persons Ust, 15 C.F.R. pt.
764, supp. 2 (1997), avaflabe at <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Text/l deniaLtxt>.
113. No one subject to U.S. jurisdiction may engage in an export related
transaction which directly or indirectly benefits a "denied party." See 15 C.F.R. §
764.3(a)(2). This includes "ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering,
storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing or otherwise
servicing... any transaction . . . that is subject to the EAR." See "Standard
Terms of Orders Denying Export Privileges," 15 C.F.R. pt. 764, supp. 1 at (b)B.
114. See Administrative Enforcement Proceedings, 15 C.F.R. § 766.1766.23 (1997).
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imminent. 1 15 The primary use of denial orders, however, is as a
penalty or sanction after a violation has occurred. 1 16
DTC's administrative sanctions process has a similar effect,
but proceeds differently and results in persons or organizations
being "debarred," rather than "denied," from exporting or
x7
receiving goods or technology controlled under the ITAR."
Parties may be debarred by order of the Director of DTC following
administrative hearings, 1 18 or upon conviction of violating any of
the trade related laws, 1 19 including the EAA, IEEPA, and
TWEA. 120 In a similar manner to BXA under the Commerce
regulations, DTC also has the ability to temporarily suspend
privileges under the ITAR when "reasonably necessary to protect
world peace or the security or foreign policy of the United
States." 12 1 Debarment remains, however, like the Commerce

denial order, primarily a sanction for violating the regulatory
122
requirements of the State Department's trade controls.

This was the extent of the blacklisting mechanisms used in
connection with trade controls until the advent of President

115. See 15 C.F.R. § 766.24 (1997). Export privileges may be suspended
with only a suspicion that a violation has or will occur. See, e.g., Action Affecting
Export Privileges: Delft Instruments N.V., 56 Fed. Reg. 8321-02 (1991). These
temporary denial orders may not exceed 180 days in duration, but may be
renewed indefinitely.
116. The violation which triggers the denial order does not necessarily have
to be a violation of the EAA. BXA has the ability to issue a denial order for
violations of any trade-related act or regulation. Thus, a Commerce denial order
could be issued as a collateral sanction for an ITAR violation, for example. See 15
C.F.R. § 766.25 (1997). Convictions in the United States or abroad can support
this type of denial, and the parties may be collaterally estopped from challenging
the facts in any subsequent proceedings. See, e.g., Action Affecting Export
Privileges: Japan Aviation, 57 Fed. Reg. 9533 (1992); In re Ahberg Oy, 55 Fed.
Reg. 8,504 (1990); Spawr Optical Research, Inc. v. Baldrige, 649 F. Supp. 1366
(D.D.C. 1986). This type of denial order may not exceed ten years in duration.
117. DTC's debarment authority is embodied in 22 C.F.R. § 127.7 (1997).
The typical duration for a debarment is three years. See id. § 127(a).
118. This is referred to as "administrative debarment." See 22 C.F.R. §§
127.7(b)(2) & 128.10 (1997). Administrative debarment orders are effective until
rescinded.
119. This is referred to as "statutory debarment," see 22 C.F.R. § 127.7(c)
(1997), and is roughly analogous to Commerce's "collateral sanction" provision,
15 C.F.R. § 766.25. The standard duration for a statutory debarment is three
years, but exporting privileges are not automatically reinstated. The statutorily
debarred party may be required to apply for reinstatement. See 22 C.F.R. §
127.10(b)(2).
120. 22 C.F.R §§ 120.27 & 127.7 (1997).
121. 22 C.F.R. § 127.8. This interim suspension cannot exceed 60 days
unless other proceedings are instituted. Id. § 127.8(a).
122. It should be noted that the same term, "debarment," is also used to
refer to companies who have lost their contracting rights with the federal
government, see 48 C.F.R. § 9.400 (1997), which in and of itself is grounds for
being debarred by DTC. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(5).
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Bush's Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) in
1990.123
EPCI marked a fundamental shift in focus of the
traditional export control system, de-emphasizing licensing
requirements based upon the strategic threat of particular
products and technologies, in favor of a much greater focus on
controlling the behavior of parties subject to U.S. jurisdiction with
regard to dealings with their customers. While continuing to
12 4
control the actual "weapons of mass destruction" themselves,
the EPCI nonproliferation initiative adds new obligations based
upon what exporters and vendors "know" about the parties with
whom they are dealing, and what these parties will do with the
products they acquire.
The regulations were revised to make the export of virtually
any item a licensable transaction, if it involved a "bad" customer

or a "bad" end use by an otherwise acceptable customer. 12 5 With
the EPCI initiative, the government thus moved the decision
about what-was a permissible or impermissible transaction out to
the exporters themselves, based upon their knowledge of their
customer and their customer's activities, on the theory that the
exporters were closer and knew more about what was being done
with the goods and services they were selling than any
government licensing official would ever know. In this manner,
the export of the most innocent products, such as pencils or
paper clips, becomes licensable and must be reviewed in advance
by the government if destined for a "known" weapons proliferator
or weapons proliferation project. The same transaction with a
heretofore benign customer similarly becomes licensable if the
exporter or vendor "knows" the items will contribute to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their associated
missile delivery systems.' 2 6
These new requirements also

123.

Exec. Order No. 12,735, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,587 (1990).

124.

See, for example, the Commerce controls on chemical precursors

which are useful in constructing chemical weapons, 15 C.F.R. § 742.2(a)(2)
(1997),

biological agents

and viroids, id. §

742.2(a)(1),

chemical/biological

weapons production equipment, id. § 742.2(a)(3), missile related equipment and
technology, &d.§ 742.5, specified nuclear related items, id. § 742.3, the Energy

Department controls on nuclear power generation equipment, 10 C.F.R. § 110
(1997), and the State Department controls on actual weaponry sulch as
toxicological agents, United States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1997),

Category XIV, and its Missile Technology Control Regime Annex, id. § 121.6.
125. This is neatly stated in "General Prohibition Five-Export or Reexport to
Prohibited End Uses or End Users": "You may not, without a license, knowingly
export or reexport any item subject to the EAR to an end user or end use that is
prohibited by part 744 of the EAR." 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(5) (1997).

126. This is colloquially referred to as a "catch-all" control. These
knowledge based export control requirements on "end uses" and "end users" are
set forth in the EAR.
15 C.F.R. §§ 744.2-744.5 (1997).
Additional purely
"behavioral" restrictions on the activities of U.S. persons that might support
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highlight a fundamental shift in what was the historic objective of
the U.S. trade controls, restricting dealings with the Cold War
Communist bloc countries. The new focus of the controls is the
spread of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their
associated weapons systems to anyone, anywhere, who would not
similarly control these items or technologies 127 under one of the
several control regimes that grew up as the Cold War came to an

end. 128
Blacklisting is used to significantly augment these EPCI
nonproliferation controls on transactions with suspect end-uses
or end-users. A government declaration that someone or some
organization is involved in weapons proliferation activities

affirmatively conveys the "knowledge" required to trigger the trade
controls.129 This type of blacklisting can occur in a number of
ways. The State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
periodically names foreign parties as being involved in weapons

weapons proliferation, even when not involving export activities, are found. Id. §
744.6.
127. An added complication is that, particularly with chemical and
biological weapons, there are relatively few key products or technologies which, if
"choked off," would prevent the spread of such weapons of mass destruction. To
the contrary, the same sorts of products and technology that contribute to
developing many pharmaceuticals or fertilizers can also produce weapons, if
misused. It is for this reason that EPCI places such emphasis on the exporter's
or vendor's knowledge of its customer and its customer's activities in determining
whether the transaction is permissible, rather than relying upon a mandatory
licensing system where remote bureaucrats make the decisions.
128. The principal weapons nonproliferation control regimes are the
Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Nuclear
Supplier Group Dual Use Regime (NSG). The Australia Group was formed in
1985 and now consists of 30 industrialized countries who multilaterally address
the spread of chemical and biological weapons, and who helped formulate the
Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons
Convention. The MTCR, established in 1987, now consists of 28 countries who

have multilaterally agreed to control missile delivery systems.

The NSG was

established in 1992 as an informal group of 34 countries multilaterally controlling
commodities that have utility for nuclear weapons, thereby augmenting the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
ExPoRT ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1996, at 11-22-27 (Jan. 16, 1996)
[hereinafter BXA ANNUAL REPORT].
129. Additionally, the government sometimes designates an entire country
or area as presenting a high risk for proliferation related activities, rather than
identifying particular persons or organizations, thereby triggering the controls on
a large scale. See, for example, the "destinations of concern" for the Missile
Technology Control Regime for country group D:4, 15 C.F.R. § 740 supp. 1 (1997),
the "destinations of concern" for chemical and biological weapons proliferation for
country group D:3, id., and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Special Country List for
country group D:2, id. While significant from a trade control perspective, this
type of designation is not the sort of particularized "blacklisting" with which this
Article is concerned.
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proliferation in the Federal Register. 130
Additionally, by
identifying certain missile "projects of concern" in the Commerce
regulations themselves, an indirect form of blacklisting occurs,
affecting those persons and organizations associated with the
specified projects.131
More pertinent, however, is the authority the regulations
implementing EPCI gave to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Export Administration at Commerce to individually "inform"
exporters and vendors that transactions involving particular
customers required licenses because of the government's
concerns over proliferation-related activities by that end user.132
This could even be done orally, if followed up in writing within two
working days. 13 3 In part because of concerns that an exporter
might be disadvantaged if its competitors were not similarly
"informed" of the government's blacklisting of a customer in this
fashion,1 34 Commerce recently amended the regulations to
include an "Entities List," which publicly names parties
sanctioned under the EPCI controls.1 35 This list now blacklists
fifteen entities located in five countries for trade control purposes
because of proliferation related concerns. 136
These persons and organizations, unlike those listed on the
Debarred List or the DPL, may not have engaged in any conduct
proscribed by the regulations. To the contrary, the activities that
the persons and organizations are conducting and that cause the

130.

For example, nationals of Austria, Germany, Italy, Russia, Switzerland,

and Thailand were identified as being involved in the proliferation of chemical or
biological weapons in a series of announcements which appeared at 60 Fed. Reg.
62,526 (1995); 60 Fed. Reg. 30,148 (1995); 60 Fed. Reg. 13,201 (1995); 59 Fed.
Reg. 10,663 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 40,956 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 44,222 (1994); 59

Fed. Reg. 61,648 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 65,837 (1994). Not only are individuals
identified in this manner, but sometimes foreign government agencies are also
included. See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. 29,785 (1996); 58 Fed. Reg. 45,408 (1993)
(listing a number of government ministries in China, Iran, North Korea, and
Pakistan that are involved in missile proliferation activities).
131.
See 15 C.F.R. § 744 supp. 1 (1997).

132.

15 C.F.R. §§ 744.2(b), 744.3(b), 744.4(b), 744.6(b) (1997).

133.

Id.

134.

The National

Security

Council declared

that it

would

be

the

government's policy to publish in the Federal Register the names of customers
who have been the subject of an "informed" notification in 1992. See NSC letter
to the Executive Secretary of the Industry Coalition on Technology Transfer
(ICOTT), Mar. 11, 1992, reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, COPING WITH U.S.

ExPoRT CONTROLS 1993, at 193 (1993). Commerce subsequently affirmed that it
was working toward some sort of publication mechanism, see 61 Fed. Reg.
12,714, 12,722 (1996), but this did not occur until six years after EPCI, in 1997.
135.
See 62 Fed. Reg. 4910 (1997) (creating Supp. No. 4 to 15 C.F.R. § 744)
(1997).
136.
See id.
The updated Entities List is also available at
<http://www.bxa.doc.gov/entities.htm>.
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U.S. government concern may be entirely legal where they are
performed, and may even be actively encouraged by the local
governments. These individuals and organizations are not being
sanctioned for violating the U.S. regulations. They are being
blacklisted because of the U.S. government's concerns over their
activities abroad running contrary to U.S. policies regarding the
potential spread of weapons of mass destruction, and a desire to
demonstrate leadership or to be seen as "taking action" to address
difficult issues. Thus, in the EPCI controls the U.S. government
is seen importing the classic blacklisting tool from its financial
sanctions programs to help it extend its trade controls to
influence or coerce behavior beyond the direct reach of its
jurisdiction.
C. Application of U.S. Sanctions and Trade Controls Abroad
Seeking to influence the behavior of others beyond the reach
of U.S. jurisdiction, through either leadership or coercion, is one
of the basic functions of blacklists in U.S. trade control policy.
The United States wants Pierre Boileau in Canada to decide that
it is more important to have access to U.S. products, technology,
and markets than it is to be involved with Cuba, and therefore to
alter or abandon his relationship with Cuba. The government
seeks to influence this decision by controlling the behavior of
those within the United States and, in an effort to bring as much
pressure to bear as possible, U.S. affiliated parties abroad as well.
This raises a separate, but related issue: whether parties outside
of the United States can be required to adhere to U.S. financial
sanctions and trade controls, which may have no counterpart in
the local laws where they are operating. More simply, must
America Online Canada honor the U.S. blacklisting of Pierre
Boileau?
The United States would clearly regard its own citizens and
residents as bound by the terms of the Cuban embargo, and also
U.S. based companies such as America Online, Inc. As U.S.
nationals or companies, they all would be fully obligated to follow

U.S. laws and regulations, whether operating in the United States
or abroad.1 3 7

137.

More significantly, however, the United States

International law, as reflected in the Restatement of Foreign Relations

Law, generally recognizes four bases for a state's "jurisdiction to prescribe," all of
which are subject to a reasonableness limitation. These overlapping bases are
the "territorial" principle (a state may proscribe activity occurring within its

boundaries), the "effects" principle (a state may proscribe activity having an effect
within its territory), the "nationality" principle (a state may proscribe activities of
its nationals, wherever located), and the "security" principle (a state may

proscribe activities affecting its national security).

Regulating the activity of
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would also regard America Online Canada as being subject to the
terms of the U.S. embargo of Cuba.
Although a Canadian company that conducts its business in
Canada, America Online Canada is a controlled subsidiary of a
U.S.-based corporation. The Cuban sanctions are specifically

designed to reach to the farthest possible limits1 3 8 of U.S.

legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction, 139 as are all the TWEAbased economic sanctions. 14 ° By definition, foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. companies, or those that are "controlled in fact" by U.S.

nationals or companies, are considered to be "persons subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States." 14 1 Of course, the Canadian
government may have its own view as to whether a domestic
company such as America Online Canada should be following the
dictates of U.S. or Canadian law with regard to Cuba. 142
1. Economic Sanctions and Foreign Subsidiaries or Branches
Given the wartime origins of TWEA, and the circumstances
that historically

were associated

with

the use of economic

sanctions, broadly requiring U.S. affiliated parties outside the
country to support and follow such sanctions makes sense and is

citizens, residents, or companies formed under a state's laws would be a classic
application of the "nationality" principle supporting jurisdiction to proscribe. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402, 403
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW].
138. See, for example, the basic prohibitions in the CACR which extend to
all dealings, "direct or indirect," between Cuba, Cuban nationals, or Cuban SDNs,
and "any person (including a banldng institution) subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States." 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201(a)(1) & 515.201(b)(1) (1997). The
prohibitions also extend to "any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States" in which Cuba, Cuban Nationals, or Cuban SDNs have or had "any
interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect." Id.
139. The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law conceptually
distinguishes, under international law, between a state's power to legislate or
proscribe-the "authority to make its substantive laws applicable to particular
persons or in particular circumstances"-and its ability actually to enforce those
laws. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 401, intro. to pt. IV. The
state's jurisdiction to proscribe is subject only to a "reasonableness" limitation.
See id. § 403.
140. The basic prohibitions in the FACR are similar to the CACR. Compare
31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201(a) & 515.201(b), with 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201(a) & 500.201(b)
(1997).
141. The term "person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" is
defined in the CACR to include (1) U.S. citizens and residents, (2) "persons within
the U.S." (which itself is a defined term within the regulations), (3) corporations
organized under the laws of the U.S., and (4) "any corporation, partnership, or
association, wherever organized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by"
U.S. citizens, residents, or corporations. 31 C.F.R. § 515.329 (1997) (emphasis
added). The same definition appears in the FACR. See id. § 500.329.
142. See infra notes 268-86 and accompanying text.
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a necessary corollary to an effective set of controls. 43 In fact, the
regulatory definition which brings controlled foreign subsidiaries
within the scope of "persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States"14 is traceable directly to a Treasury Department
14 5
notice issued during the early months of World War Two.
Nevertheless, the legitimate, reasonable use of such a broad claim
of regulatory power was recognized as being confined to unusual
TWEA itself limited the exercise of the
circumstances.
extraordinary powers it conferred upon the president initially to
wartime, although this was later expanded to include "any other
period of national emergency declared by the President."'"
Blacklisting is very easy to employ, and very amenable to
targeting specific parties abroad who might otherwise be beyond
the reach of U.S. processes, which makes it an attractive tool for
policy makers and regulators. The government merely needs to
add individuals and organizations to a list in order to have
"control" and be seen to be acting on an issue. The risk is that
overuse of these measures generates conflict with other
governments who perceive their own jurisdiction and sovereign

interests as being impinged upon by the U.S. rules.

This is

particularly likely to occur when multilateral agreement on the
object of the control is lacking.14 7
An increased U.S. sensitivity to the strength and legitimacy of
the objections of foreign governments to the assertion of
jurisdiction over non-U.S. companies, perhaps albeit combined
with declining U.S. political and economic hegemony, led the
United States to back away from the expansive approach it
claimed in the TWEA-based programs as new economic sanctions

143.
144.

See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
TWEA's broad grant of authority to the president to take action with

regard to "any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States" is not further defined within the statute itself. See 50 U.S.C.
app. § 5(b)(1) (1994).
145. U.S. Treasury Public Circular No. 18, 7 Fed. Reg. 2503 (1942).
146.

50 U.S.C. app. § 5b (1994).

Originally, TWEA granted the president

broad powers to regulate foreign exchange, transactions in gold or silver, and
transfers of credit, evidences of indebtedness, or property, but only during
wartime. See 40 Stat. 411, 414 (1917). The "national emergency" provision was
actually added to TWEA to approve retroactively the "emergency" President
Roosevelt declared in 1933 to justify the imposition of a mandatory "Banidng
Holiday" as one of his first official acts. See Pres. Proc. No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1968
(Mar. 4, 1933); 48 Stat. 1 (Mar. 9, 1933). This "national emergency" language was
removed from TWEA, except with regard to pre-existing programs, in 1977 with
the passage of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1621, 1622,
1631, 1641 & 1651 (1994), and IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1994). See supra
text accompanying note 68.
147. See infranotes 266-399 and accompanying text.
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were created in the late 1970s and 1980s.1 48 By that time,
Congress was also concerned that the Korean War era "national
emergency" 14 9 was too "stale" to confer extraordinary powers
Congress
Upon investigation,1 5 1
upon the President.1 5 0
determined that not one but four ongoing "emergencies" delegated
broad extraordinary powers to the President,1 5 2 which Congress
then attempted to curtail with new legislation.15 3 One result of
this effort was the passage of IEEPA, 1" which removed the
"national emergency" authority from TWEA entirely,1 5 5 except for
TWEA once again to
the then existing programs,1 5 6 confining
15 7
authority.
of
grant
war-time
a
being
148. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text; infra notes 364 & 373
and accompanying text.
149. The "emergency" was President Truman's declaration used to support
the imposition of economic sanctions on China at the time of the Korean War.
Pres. Proc. No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9092 (1950). President Truman's declaration
remains the basis for the FACR and CACR in effect today. See Presidential
Determination No. 96-43, 61 Fed. Reg. 46,529 (1996).
150. The courts, however, have rejected arguments that a "stale"
declaration of an emergency is insufficient to trigger the delegation of
extraordinary power to the President, leaving it up to Congress to "speal on the
matter. See Welch v. Kennedy, 319 F. Supp. 945, 947-48 (D.D.C. 1970).
151. The Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National
Emergency was created in January 1973. S. Res. 9, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Various investigations into the use of presidential emergency power proceeded
through 1976, as one outgrowth of the realignment of executive and legislative
power in the aftermath of both Watergate and Vietnam. See HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMMERCE, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
TRADING WITH THE ENEMY: LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIvE DOCUMENTS CONCERNING
REGULATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN TIME OF DECLARED NATIONAL

EMERGENCY, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1976).
152. These included President Roosevelt's Bank Holiday emergency,
Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1691 (1933), President Truman's Korean Conflict
emergency, Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (1950), President Nixon's
emergency relating to work stoppage by Postal Service employees, Proclamation
No. 3972, 3 C.F.R. § 473 (1970), and President Nixon's balance of payments
emergency, which was used to support supplemental duties on imports,
Proclamation No. 4074, 3 C.F.R. § 60 (1971).
153. The initial result was the passage of the National Emergencies Act of
1976, 50 U.S.C. § 1601, 1621, 1622, 1631, 1641 & 1651 (1994), which
terminated all presidential powers granted by virtue of past declarations of
emergencies, but which exempted, inter alia, emergencies declared under TWEA.
See 50 U.S.C. § 165 1(a)(1) (1994).
154. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994).
155. See Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(a), 95th Cong. (1977) (strildng the
"during any other period of national emergency declared by the President"
language from TWEA § 5(b); 50 U.S.C. App. § 5, Historical Notes (1994)).
156. Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b), 91 Stat. 1625 (1977), authorized the
continuation of the then existing programs until 1978, and the president's ability
to annually renew them from 1978 forward. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 5, Historical
Notes (1994); Presidential Determination No. 96-43, 61 Fed. Reg. 46,529 (1996).
157. Other than the procedural mechanisms for triggering their application,
the actual grants of authority to the president under TWEA and IEEPA are very
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Rather than limiting the President in practice, separate
"emergencies" declared under IEEPA supported the imposition of
more economic sanctions programs in the past twenty years than
were created in the seventy years prior to the amendment of
However, while the statutory language
TWEA in 1977.158
the president to act with regard to
empower
broadly
continues to
any property or persons "subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States," 15 9 the actual sanctions imposed under IEEPA have
generally taken a more limited approach. Rather than seeking to
reach the farthest limits authorized in prescribing the behavior of
U.S. affiliated foreign companies, most of the IEEPA economic
sanctions only impose obligations upon "U.S. persons." 160 The
typically
the "U.S. person" term
that
is
distinction
excludes foreign controlled subsidiaries of U.S. companies,
although it does include overseas branches (entities that lack any
status as a foreign juridical person) within its ambit. 16 1 This shift
was not immediately apparent when IEEPA supplanted TWEA as
the basis for the U.S. economic sanctions programs. There was
neither an immediate nor a uniform departure from the prior
practice. Instead, foreign concerns regarding the extraterritorial
application of U.S. economic sanctions were gradually

accommodated as the various sanctions became more tailored

similar. TWEA does differ from IEEPA in authorizing the wartime expropriation or
"vesting" of enemy property in the government, as well as broad powers to
regulate domestic transactions, and the ability to seize bullion and records.
Compare 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(1) (1994), with 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (1994).
Compare supra notes 70-81, with supra notes 61-67 and
158.
accompanying text.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(l) (1994).
159.
160. The definition of "U.S. persons" is essentially the same in the IEEPA
based economic sanctions and in the Commerce Department's special trade
controls regulating the activities of "U.S. persons" that might contribute to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by others in third countries under
the EAR. See 15 C.F.R. § 744.9(b) (1997).
Nonetheless, the definition of "U.S. persons" used in the IEEPA based
economic sanctions and the EAR's nonproliferation controls should not be
confused with the same term as used in the Export Administration Act
Amendments of 1977, which introduced a number of prohibitions regarding U.S.
participation in the Arab League's boycott of Israel. See infra notes 246-65 and
accompanying text. The definition of "U.S. person" used in the antiboycott law
includes controlled-in-fact foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies and is therefore
substantially the same as "persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction" under the OFAC
economic sanctions programs. See Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235, 50 U.S.C.
App. § 2407 (now codified at 15 C.F.R. § 760.1 (1994)).
This only serves to highlight that when dealing with the various U.S. trade
control programs even common terms can have arcane implications, which are
not consistently applied from program to program.
See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 550.308 (LSR); § 560.314 (ITR); § 570.321
161.
(KACR); § 575.321 (IACR); § 585.317 (FRYSR); § 595.315 (1997) (TSR); and Exec.
Order No. 13067 § 4(c), 62 Fed. Reg. 59989 (1997) (Sudanese controls).
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and targeted at less stringent objectives than the complete and
total isolation of the "enemy," as was the case under TWEA.
The first round of Iranian controls, and the initial use of
IEEPA to support sanctions in 1977, still used the "persons
subject to U.S. jurisdiction" approach, 16 2 but limited its controls
in practice with several regulatory
authorizations or
interpretations. For example, foreign branches and subsidiaries
of U.S. banks and other companies were directed to deposit
Iranian assets and property into blocked accounts with the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York,16 3 but only if they were
denominated in U.S. dollars. 16 4 The South African IEEPA and
CAAA based sanctions tried to maintain a middle ground. They
defined U.S. persons and nationals to exclude overseas
subsidiaries, 165 but then included a defiition of "affiliate"
covering both branches and subsidiaries, 16 6 which in turn was
tied to special prohibitions on U.S. nationals' involvement or
approval of actions by their affiliates. 167 The 1985 Nicaraguan
sanctions were a limited set of controls largely focused on direct
import and export transactions with the United States. They
attempted to avoid concerns over the extraterritorial application of
the sanctions with a different approach, by including a specific
provision clarifying that third country 'offshore" transactions
were not caught by the sanctions merely because of the
involvement of a U.S. national, if no trade between the United
States and Nicaraguan trade was at issue.1 6 8 The Panamanian
sanctions imposed in 1988 were also quite limited, excluding even
overseas branches from their coverage, unless the branch was
actually located in Panama. Overseas branches in third countries
were not obligated to abide by the U.S. sanctions under the
Panamanian regulations. 169
Each of these represented an
attempt by government regulators to devise a mechanism that
balanced the U.S. policy objectives behind a particular set of
sanctions with increasing opposition to attempts to dictate the
actions and behavior of U.S. affiliates abroad. This effort resulted

162. See 31 C.F.R. § 535.329 (1997).
163. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.201 & 535.212 (1997).
164. See 31 C.F.R. § 535.566 (1997).
165. See 31 C.F.R. § 545.313 (1987).
166. See 31 C.F.R. § 545.310 (1987).
167. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 545.408 (1987) which interpreted the SATR as
preventing U.S. nationals from approving loans or investments in South Africa
made by their overseas affiliates.
168. See Transactions Relating to Unprohibited Offshore Transactions, 31
C.F.R. § 540.410 (1985).
169. See 31 C.F.R. § 565.307 (1988). The same approach was taken in the

Rhodesian Sanctions Regulations issued under the U.N. Participation Act in the
1970s. See 31 C.F.R. § 530 (1976).
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in an approach that considers foreign subsidiaries, with a
separate juridical existence, as generally beyond the reach of U.S.
controls, while it considers foreign branches, which are merely
parts of a U.S. based company, as subject to the same controls as
170
companies operating in the United States.
The U.S. ability and willingness to ameliorate the
extraterritorial reach of its economic sanctions following the
passage of IEEPA related to two factors. Firstly, a more limited
political objective underlies several of the more recent sanctions,
particularly in those programs focused on targets in this
17 1
hemisphere (e.g., Nicaragua, Panama, Haiti, Narco-Terrorists).
Secondly, many of the targets that otherwise might have been
subjected to more expansive sanctions were also the subject of
sanctions programs by other countries, acting pursuant to
directives from the U.N. Security Council' 72 (e.g., South Africa
and Namibia, Iraq and Kuwait, the former Yugoslavia, Angola,
Where there is
and to a lesser degree, Libya and Iran).17 3
substantial multilateral cooperation on sanctioning a particular
target country, there is less practical need for broad
extraterritorial controls by any one country such as the United
States, and perhaps less justification as well.
2. Trade Controls and Re-exports
U.S. trade controls generate similar concerns regarding their
extraterritorial application, 17 4 but in a slightly different fashion.

170.

See supranote 161 (definition of "U.S. person" found in the provisions

of the LSR, ITR, KACR, IACR, FRYSR, TSR, NTSR, and Sudanese controls).
171.
See supranotes 73, 75, 78 & 94 and accompanying text.
172.
It should be noted that even where the U.N. has called for sanctions,

the U.S. sanctions programs are often more stringent or go beyond the action
sought by the U.N., as with the South African, Iranian, and Libyan sanctions, for
example. In other cases, the U.S. sanctions preceded action by the U.N., as was
the case with the sanctions on Iraq/Kuwait and on the former Yugoslavia.
173. Also note that the U.N. Participation Act provides a coordinate basis for
the U.S. sanctions in each of these cases. See supra notes 70, 71, 74, 76, 77 &
80 and accompanying text. It would not be correct, however, to assume that
IEEPA is no longer used as the sole basis for sanctions. The blocking of terrorist
assets in January 1995, under Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (1995)
and the addition of new restrictions on contracts to develop Iranian petroleum
resources under Exec. Order No. 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (1995) in March
1995 were ordered solely on the President's authority under IEEPA.
174. Extraterritoriality is perhaps a greater problem under the EAA and the
EAR than under the AECA and the ITAR, where "foreign persons" are ineligible to
Businesses
register as manufacturers or exporters of "defense articles."
incorporated or established outside of the United States are considered as
"foreign persons." See 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1(c), 120.16 & 122.1 (1997). The ITARis
thus structured to focus much more narrowly on U.S. nationals, residents, and
companies than are the EAR or the OFAC sanctions programs. For example, the
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Portions of the Export Administration Act (EAA) and EAR do

expressly apply to foreign subsidiaries1 7 5 in the same manner as

TWEA and the TWEA based sanctions programs. Other portions
of the EAA use the same "U.S. person" approach 1 7 6 that is now
commonly used with the IEEPA based sanctions. Most of the
issues surrounding the extraterritorial application of the trade
controls, however, are generated by an aspect of the regulations
that is unique to the United States. The EAR, and to a slightly
lesser extent the ITAR, 177 purport to control the re-export of U.S.
origin products and technology abroad by non-U.S. parties. In
essence, the re-export provisions create controls based not upon
the nationality of the parties involved, but upon the "nationality"
of the goods or technology that are the subjects of the
This applies both to transactions abroad in
transaction. 17 8

ITAR expressly tries to impose the maximum amount of responsibility upon the
initial (registered) exporter when it states:
Any person who is granted a license or other approval under this
subchapter is responsiblefor the acts of employees, agents, and al other
authorized persons to whom possession of the licensed defense article or
technical datahas been entrustedregarding the operation, use, possession,
transportation and handling of such defense article or technical data
abroad.
22 C.F.R. § 127.1 (1997) (emphasis added).
This is immediately supplemented by language to address the possibility of
"unauthorized transfers." All "persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction" are required to

follow the requirements of the ITAR when dealing with "defense articles" whenever
they may be encountered abroad. Id. "All persons abroad subject to U.S.
jurisdiction who obtain temporary custody of a defense article... irrespective of
the number of intermediate transfers, are bound by the regulations of this
subchapter in the same manner and to the same extent as the original owner or
transferor." Id. But see infra note 177.
This is seen in the broad reach of the antiboycott provisions in the
175.
EAA, see 50 U.S.C. App. § 2407 (1994), and in the EAR, see 15 C.F.R. § 760.1(b)
(1997), which apply equally to foreign branches and controlled subsidiaries of
U.S. based firms. Unlike the IEEPA sanctions programs, however, the antiboycott
provisions refer to controlled U.S. affiliates as "U.S. persons." Id.
176.
See supranote 160.
177.
Despite its stronger focus on confining its controls to the registered
U.S. national manufacturers and exporters of munitions, the ITAR attempts to
control re-exports of defense articles by declaring that:
It is unlawful... to conspire to export, import, reexport, or cause to be
exported, imported or reexported, any defense article . . . for which a
license or written approval is required by this subchapter without first
obtaining the required license or written approval from the Office of
Defense Trade Controls.
22 C.F.R. § 127.1(a)(3) (1997) (emphasis added).
178. This is unique to the U.S. EAR, and not a recognized application of the
"nationality principle" as a basis for the exercise of proscriptive jurisdiction under
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products containing more than a de minimis amount of U.S.
parts,1 7 9 and also to the foreign-produced "direct products" of
certain U.S. technology or software,1 8 0 even when they consist
entirely of foreign parts.
These re-export provisions also indirectly tie into the trade
control blacklists. If the parties to an unapproved re-export are
unaffiliated with the United States and therefore beyond U.S.
jurisdiction for enforcement purposes, the re-export provision
nevertheless provides a basis for the United States to assert that
a violation of its controls has occurred. It can then proceed to

administratively sanction those involved with the violation by
naming them to the State Department's Debarred List or the
Commerce Department's DPL, even though they are otherwise
beyond the reach of other U.S. enforcement processes. Moreover,
the United States may order those who are subject to U.S.
jurisdiction to cease dealing with the "wrongdoers."1 8 1
For
example, a company in Singapore that re-exports items that the
United States deems to be subject to its regulations without the
necessary authorizations or approvals may find itself blacklisted
and effectively cut off from access to U.S. products, technology,
and markets. 182

international law as reflected in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. See
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, §§ 401-02.
179. See General Prohibition Two - Reexport

and Export from Abroad of
Foreign-Made Items Containing more than a De Minimis Amount of Controlled
U.S. Content (Parts and Components Reexports), 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(2) (1997).
180. See General Prohibition Three - Reexport and Export from Abroad of
the Foreign-Produced Direct Product of U.S. Technology and Software (Foreign
Produced Direct Product Reexports), 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(3) (1997).
181. It is worth emphasizing that the only "wrongdoing" which may have
occurred is the failure to comply with extraterritorial U.S. requirements related to
transferring products traceable to U.S. origin parts or technology.
The
transaction could otherwise be fully compliant with all applicable local laws.
182. Ignoring the U.S. administrative processes does not help. In a recent
case, for example, Pan Asia Exim Enterprises PTE in Singapore was charged with
re-exporting U.S. origin engine parts to Vietnam without a proper authorization
from BXA. Pan Asia did not respond to the "charging letter" which starts the
process. Consequently, the alleged facts were deemed to be correct resulting in
an order adding Pan Asia to the DPL for a period of two years. By virtue of this

order:
no person may, directly or indirectly... export or reexport to or on behalf
of [Pan Asia] any item subject to the [Export Administration]
Regulations;... take any action which facilitates the acquisition or
attempted acquisition by [Pan Asia] of the ownership, possession, or
control of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be
exported from the United States, including financing or other support
activities... or... engage in any transaction to service any item subject
to the Regulations.
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The mere threat of this sanction effectively extends the reach
of the U.S. trade controls. The force of the U.S. controls and the
threat of blacklisting becomes even more credible when there is
some affiliation between the foreign persons or organizations and
parties in the United States, as when it is a foreign subsidiary,
branch, or contractually related party such as a distributor. The
U.S. blacklists can reach not only the actual persons or
organizations who committed the violation of the controls, but
also "related" persons or parties, those who are connected by
"ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other
connection in the conduct of business."18 3 Thus, when one part
of a group of companies commits a violation, the entire corporate
enterprise may find itself "denied." As a practical matter, this
places tremendous pressure on the U.S. parent or affiliate to take
whatever steps it can to ensure that foreign "related parties"
comply with the extraterritorial controls, as those more closely
involved or dependent upon U.S. products, technology, and
markets will be the most adversely affected by a denial or
debarment. The Delft case dramatically illustrates how these
provisions interrelate to bolster the effectiveness of the U.S.
controls well beyond the direct reach of U.S. legal processes.
Instrubel N.V. and OIP N.V., two Belgian subsidiaries of the
Delft group of companies based in the Netherlands, manufactured
night vision devices.1 8 4 These devices contain imaging equipment
and parts, which are controlled under the ITAR, and
manufactured by Hughes Aircraft Corp in the United States.
Hughes shipped the imaging equipment and parts to OIP and
Instrubel, via another Delft subsidiary, Franke & Co. Optik
GMBH, in Germany, under a U.S. State Department license
indicating that the exporters were to be incorporated into night
vision devices intended for NATO military forces. 18 5 However, in
1991 during the Gulf War, the Delft night vision devices were
found in the possession of captured Iraqi forces. 186
The State Department suspended all licenses and other
approvals, as of January 25, 1991, for Delft Instruments, OIP,
and Franke & Co., based upon a "reasonable belief" that a

Pan Asia Exim Enterprises PTE Limited, Decision and Order, 62 Fed. Reg.
30,842-3 (1997).

183.

15 C.F.R. § 766.23(a) (1997).

See also infra note 187.

The ITAR

provision is very similar, looking to relationships defined by "affiliation,
ownership, control, position of responsibility, or other commercial connection." 22
C.F.R. § 127.9 (1997).
184. See In the Matter of: Delft Instruments, N.V. et aL, 56 Fed. Reg.
50,308 (1991).
185. Hughes was not charged or sanctioned in the Delft affair.
186. See Delft Instruments, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,308 (1991).
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violation of the ITAR occurred.1 8 7 The Commerce Department
similarly issued a Temporary Denial Order naming the three
companies on February 28, 1991, based upon the assumed ITAR,
not EAR, violation.18 8 As was explained when the Commerce
Department's ex parte Temporary Denial Order was subsequently
renewed:
Establishing prior violations of the Export Administration
Regulations is one way to establish that an imminent violation is
likely to occur. It is not the only way. Here the Department has
established that Delft ignored U.S. export controls in the past and,
given the gravity of that action may likely do it again. That the past
violations were of munitions controls is no guarantee that Delft
would not supply goods controlled under the EAR in a future

violation.

18 9

At the same time, Commerce significantly expanded the scope

of the Denial Order to include the entire Delft enterprise, fortyseven companies located in thirteen countries or territories, as
known "related parties" of OIP and Instrubel.°9 0 Arguments that
alleged violations by two subsidiaries should not support denial of
export privileges for the entire group of Delft companies were
initially rejected, 19 1 but when the Denial Order was next renewed

187.
Interestingly, this ex parte suspension under 22 C.F.R. §§ 126.7(a)(1)
& (2) (1991) did not appear in the Federal Register until March 1, 1991. See
Public Notice 1354, 56 Fed. Reg. 8824 (1991).
188. Action Affecting Export Privileges: Delft Instruments N.V., Op.
Instrubel, and Franks & Co. Optik Gmbh, 56 Fed. Reg. 8321 (1991).
189. Action Affecting Export Privileges, Delft Instruments N.V., et aL,
Decision and Order on Renewal of Temporary Denial Order, 56 Fed. Reg. 42,977
(1991). As the initial Order was issued in an ex parte proceeding, many of Delft's
arguments were not formally presented until BXA requested the Acting Assistant
Secretary for Export Administration to renew the order on August 30, 1991.
According to 15 C.F.R. § 766.24(b)(4) (1997), the maximum duration of a
Temporary Denial Order is 180 days, although they may be renewed indefinitely.
The Order was renewed for 90 days at this time. See Decision and Order, 56 Fed.
Reg. 42,978 (1991).
190. There were two companies named in Belgium, one in Denmark, two in
France, three in Germany, one in Hong Kong, one in Italy, one in Japan, twentyfive in the Netherlands, one in the Netherlands Antilles, one in Spain, two in
Switzerland, two in the United Kingdom, and five in the United States. See
Decision and Order, 56 Fed. Reg. 42,978. The Assistant Secretary also noted that
"a person related to a denied person, even without being named in an order, is

usually covered by the terms of the order [because an exporter/vendor] may not
engage in an export transaction if a person denied export privileges may obtain
any benefit' from that transaction." Id. at 42,977. One of the named companies
was subsequently successful at getting itself removed by showing that it had sold
to unrelated owners, and therefore transactions with them would confer no
"benefit" upon Delft. See Action Affecting Export Privileges, Delft Instruments,
N.V. and OIP Instrubel and Franks & Co. Optik Gmbh, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,491

(1991).
191.
This occurred on October 4, 1991. See Delft Instruments, 56 Fed. Reg.
50,308 (1991).
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its coverage was reduced to just the seven Delft companies with
substantial involvement in defense-related businesses. 19 2 At the
next renewal of the Denial Order, in February 1992, its coverage
was again reduced to deny export privileges only for OIP and
Instrubel as negotiations with the U.S. government on a
resolution continued. 193 In July 1992, Delft paid $3.3 million in
fines 19 4 and pled guilty to a criminal indictment charging Delft,
and OIP and Instrubel, with violating the re-export prohibitions of
the ITAR. 19 s
As part of a consent settlement, the State
Department lifted its suspension of Delft's export privileges 19 6 and
the Commerce Department's Temporary Denial Order was
revoked. 197 However, because of the conviction resulting from the
entry of the guilty plea, OIP and Instrubel simultaneously received
a seven year formal denial of their export privileges under the
EAR, 19 8 and Delft's seven defense-related companies were
statutorily debarred under the ITAR. 19 9 Although defense-related
business accounted for less than ten percent of Delft's overall
revenue, the loss of access to U.S. products, technology, and
markets for the larger enterprise due to its blacklisting resulted in
a net operating loss of $26.6 million for 1991.2 ° ° The collateral
effects of the case still linger on in 1997, as Delft recently paid a
civil fine to settle allegations that it knowingly made false

192. Once again, on November 27, 1991, the Denial Order was renewed for
90 days. See Action Affecting Export Privileges, Delft Instruments N.V. et aL, 56
Fed. Reg. 60,085 (1991).
193. Action Affecting Export Privileges; Decision and Order, 57 Fed. Reg.
6583 (1992).
194. Douglas Frantz, Firm Admits Giving Iraq High-Tech Gear, L.A. TIMEs,
July 18, 1992, at A2.
195. This occurred on August 26, 1992. See Recession of Suspended
Exports Regarding Delft Instruments, N.V. and Related Parties, 57 Fed. Reg.
38,708 (1992).
196. Id.
197. The revocation was published on August 11, 1992. See Action
Affecting Export Privileges, Instrubel, N.V. and OIP, N.V., 57 Fed. Reg. 35,779
(1992).
198. See id.; Order Modifying Order Denying Permission to Apply for or Use
Export Licenses, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,447 (1993). Issuing a Denial Order following
conviction for violating a trade related statute is discretionary, but also common.

See 15 C.F.R. § 764.6(d) (1997).
199. See Public Notice No. 1,678, 57 Fed. Reg. 38,708, (1992); Public Notice
No. 1798, 58 Fed. Reg. 26,028 (1993). This second notice, issued on April 29,
1993, nine months after the guilty plea, appears to have been issued as part of a
negotiation -where the second and third years of the three year statutory
debarment would be suspended. See id. Debarment is mandatory upon
conviction of one of the designated criminal provisions of the statutes. See 22
C.F.R. §§ 120.27 & 127.7(c) (1997).
200. See Delft Instruments Reports Big Loss After U.S. Sanctions, THE REUTER
Bus. REP., May 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, REBUS File.
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statements to the government while opposing renewal of the
20 1
Temporary Denial Orders.
This illustrates the interrelated operation of the trade
blacklists, the incentive they provide to innocent foreign parties to
comply with the controls abroad, and the rapid and dramatic
consequences of being accused of violating the extraterritorial
requirements of U.S. trade controls. Here, only one part of the
Delft enterprise acted contrary to the U.S. rules, but several of the
larger group of related companies, and for a period of time the
entire enterprise, was cut off from access to U.S. products,
technology, and markets for over a year-and-a-half without
administrative charges or civil or criminal proceedings ever being
instituted. 2 °0
This also serves to emphasize why it is the
administrative sanction of blacklisting rather than more formal
criminal or civil enforcement proceedings that has the greatest
impact upon, and prompts the most concern from, foreign
businesses who must comply with U.S. laws and regulations. As
noted previously, this traditional use of blacklisting to enforce
U.S. trade controls is now further augmented by new blacklist
tools expressly aimed at encouraging those beyond the reach of
U.S. jurisdiction to comply with the EPCI nonproliferation
20 3
controls.
In the hypothetical with Pierre, America Online Canada does
not appear to face an imminent threat of blacklisting by
Commerce. Its immediate concern is its obligations under the

OFAC regulations regarding dealings with Cuba and Pierre
Boileau's status as a Cuban SDN. Amidst the complexities of the
interrelationships among the U.S. economic sanctions and trade
control programs, that could change rapidly, however. If America
Online Canada is convicted of violating the TWEA because of its
dealings with Pierre, the conviction will trigger "statutory
debarment" under the ITAR 204 and possibly a denial of export

201. Commerce Department Imposes $50,000 Penalty on Netherlands
Company in Connection with Iraqi War Case (last modified June 16, 1997)

<http://www.bxa.doc.gov/delftpr.htn>. This press release alleges that Delft
knowingly made five false and misleading statements concerning whether
members of its Executive Board knew that it had exported the imaging devices
without the proper license approvals.
202. The use of temporary suspensions or denials, which may be initially
issued ex parte and are easily renewed, in lieu of pursuing the minimal
administrative proceedings required to issue a standard Denial Order or
Debarment is not uncommon.
This prompted Commerce Department
Administrative Law Judge Hugh J. Dolan, even as he upheld one of the early
renewals of the Temporary Denial Order in the Delft case, to bemoan "[a]s in prior
cases, I lament the failure to issue a charging letter and get on with the
adjudication." See 56 Fed. Reg. 50,308, 50,309, at n.2 (1991).
203. See supra notes 123-36 and accompanying text.
204. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.27 & 127.7(c) (1997).
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privileges by Commerce 20 5 as collateral sanctions for the initial
violation. Beyond just the threat of what might happen under
U.S. law, however, America Online Canada's response will be
greatly influenced by what the Canadian government might do if
it does comply with the U.S. requirements.
The Canadian
government's reaction will, itself, be greatly influenced by the
prior history of intergovernmental disputes over extraterritorial
sanctions and trade controls such as these blacklists. 20 6

III.

RESPONSES TO EXTRATERRITORIAL CONTROLS AND BLACKLISTS

Blacklisting is a very powerful yet easily applied tool, and is
for that reason most attractive to policy makers and regulators.
This, in turn, creates a very interesting dichotomy with other
aspects of U.S. policy. The U.S. government is willing to use
blacklisting in its economic embargoes, terrorist and narcotrafficking sanctions, or trade and nonproliferation controls, to
influence and coerce behavior in and by third-party countries to
meet U.S. policy objectives. At the same time, however, the U.S.
government is unwilling to be similarly influenced or coerced
itself. This reluctance to be coerced by others can be seen in the
U.S. response to the League of Arab States 2 7 boycott of Israel.2 0 8

Accordingly, before considering how other nations respond to the
extraterritorial application of U.S. blacklists, it is instructive to
briefly review how the United States itself reacted in similar
circumstances with the Arab-Israeli boycott.

205.

See Temporary Denials, 15 C.F.R. § 766.24 (1997).

Interestingly,

TWEA is not listed among those statutes for which a conviction justifies entry of a
standard denials order, as opposed to taking prophylactic action with a temporary
denial order in order to protect the public from an "imminent violation;" however,
IEEPA is listed among those statutes justifying a standard denial order. See 15
C.F.R. § 766.25(a) (1997).
206. See infranotes 268-86 and accompanying text.
207. For a brief background on the formation of the League by 21 states in

the Middle East under the Alexandria Protocol of October 7, 1944, see 3 ANDREAS

F. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITIcAL ENDS, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIc LAW,

309 (2d ed. 1983).

208. The boycott actually predates the establishment of Israel as a state in
1948, and can be traced to Arab League Council Res. No. 16, Dec. 16, 1945,

calling for the prohibition of importing any goods manufactured by Jewish
industry in what was then Palestine. LOWENFELD, supra note 207, at 313. A
Central Boycott Office was established in Damascus, Syria, in 1951, to coordinate
efforts; a Unified Law on the Boycott of Israel was promulgated in 1954 and
subsequently adopted in most of the member states, although enforcement varies
greatly. See id. at 313-29 (describing the Arab League Boycott).
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A. NationalLegislation: U.S. Antiboycott Laws
The Arab-Israeli boycott, like the various U.S. trade controls
and sanctions, has elements of both a primary and a secondary
boycott. 20 9 The primary boycott is reflected in the provisions that
prohibit direct dealings between the belligerent countries, for

example, in the prohibition on direct trade between an Arab

League country and Israel itself2 10 or direct trade between the
United States and Cuba.2 11 The Arab League often enforced this

209. These terms are not found in the boycott or antiboycott laws, but are
commonly used by legislators, commentators, and analysts to help make sense
out of the complex and often contradictory provisions in this area. See, e.g.,
Comments of Senators Brooke and Bayh regarding S. Bill No. 69, CONG. REC.
13,810-11 (1977); Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Report of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S. REP. No. 95-104, at
21-24 (1977). See also KENNAN LEE TESLIK, CONGRESS, THE ExEcuTIvE BRANCH, AND
SPECIAL INTERESTS: THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE ARAB BoYcoTr OF ISRAEL 22 n. 12

(1982).
These terms are analogous to those terms used when dealing with strikes,
lockouts, and boycotts in the context of labor/management disputes to
distinguish between permissible (primary) and impermissible (secondary boycott)
labor practices under the Taft Hartley Act of 1947, which introduced § 8(b) into
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)4. In commenting upon the
prohibition of secondary boycotts in the NLRA, Judge Learned Hand stated:
The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon
the . . . party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no
concern it. Its aim is to compel him to stop business with the employer in
the hope that this will induce the employer to give in to his employees'
demands.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d. 34,
37 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951). The same mechanism is at work in
the Arab-Israeli boycott and many of the U.S. economic and trade control
programs.
210. The "primary" aspects of the Arab-Israeli boycott can be seen, for
example, in the first two provisions of the Unified Law On the Boycott of Israel
which state:
(1) All persons within the enacting country are forbidden to conclude any
agreement or transaction, directly or indirectly, with any person or

organization (i) situated in Israel; (ii) affiliated with Israel through
nationality; or (iii) working for or on behalf of Israel, regardless of place of
business or residence; and
(2) Importation into the enacting country is forbidden of all Israeli goods,
including goods elsewhere containing ingredients or components of Israeli
origin or manufacture.
LOWENFELD, supra note 207, at 314.
Compare these Arab-Israeli boycott
provisions with the provisions of the U.S. CACR, infra note 211.
211. The CACR imposes a "primary boycott" on all dealings with Cuba or
Cuban nationals, which is not dissimilar from the Arab boycott of Israel.
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part of the boycott by requiring "certificates of origin" so that
Israeli origin goods could be identified and rejected, or by refusing
to issue visas to Zionist, Israeli, or sometimes simply Jewish
visitors to their countries. 2 12 The secondary boycott is reflected
in the prohibitions on trading with individuals or companies in
third-party countries that in turn do business in or with the
primary target. Examples of secondary boycotts are the Arab

boycott prohibition against dealing with named U.S. firms who

conduct business with Israel, 213 and the U.S. prohibition against
dealing with named Canadians who do business for Cuba.2 1

4

The

principal tool for enforcing a secondary boycott is the blacklist.

The Arab League's Central Boycott Office in Damascus, along
with separate regional and national boycott offices, maintains

blacklists of individuals and firms who invest in or conduct
business with Israel. 21 5 The Arab League member states agreed
to refrain from dealing with these blacklisted persons and

All of the following transactions are prohibited . . . if either such
transactions are by, or on behalf of, or pursuant to the direction of [Cuba]
or any national thereof, or such transactions involve property in which
[Cuba] or any national thereof, has . . . any interest of any nature
whatsoever, direct or indirect
31 C.F.R. § 515.201(a) & (d) (1997). Compare these CACR provisions with the
provisions of the Arab-Israeli boycott, supra note 210.
212.
See TESLIK, supra note 209, at 9, 14-15.
213.
The "secondary" aspects of the Arab-Israeli boycott can be seen, for
example, in the third and fourth provisions of the Unified Law On the Boycott of
Israel which state:
(3) Foreign companies with offices, branches or general agencies in Israel
are considered prohibited corporations for purposes of the prohibition on
agreements or transactions under paragraph 1; and
(4) Al goods destined for Israel, directly or indirectly, or for persons
prohibited by the preceding paragraphs,are considered Israeli goods and
therefore subject to the ban on exports as well as transit (emphasis
added).

LOWENFELD, supra note 207, at 314-15.

Compare these Arab-Israeli boycott

provisions with the provisions of the U.S. CACR, infra note 209.
214. The "secondary boycott" aspects of the CACR are found in the manner
in which it equates SDNs outside of Cuba with "nationals" of Cuba for purposes of
the basic prohibitions of the regulations. See supra notes 13-22 & 209 and
accompanying text. See also 31 C.F.R. § 515.203(a) (1997), which states:
Any transfer after the "effective date" which is in violation of any provision
of this part ...
and involves any property in which a designated national
has or has had an interest... is null and void and shall not be the basis
for the assertion or recognition of any interest in or right, remedy, power or
privilege with respect to such property (emphasis added).
215.

See LOWENFELD, supra note 207, at 315.
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organizations 2 16 although, as the lists are not published, there is
often confusion and substantial variation from country to country
as to who might be sanctioned. 2 17 Some have suggested that this
confusion enlarged the potential impact of the Arab blacklist and
thereby served, ironically, both the Arab proponents and Israeli
2 18
opponents of the boycott.
The rules governing the blacklisting of parties in third
countries are found in the "General Principles for the Boycott of
Israel" issued in 1972.219 As an adjunct to the blacklist, the
Boycott Offices would sometimes provide questionnaires, either
directly to blacklisted entities who wished to demonstrate that
they had altered their position to comply with the boycott and
therefore should be removed from the blacklist, or to others when
there would be a question regarding their possible connections or
links to Israel. 220 This comports with the claim that the function
of the Arab blacklist is to influence future behavior toward Israel,
rather than to sanction past conduct.
Accordingly, the
questionnaire process provides an opportunity for firms to clarify

or correct their status with the Boycott Offices prior to incurring
any adverse consequences under the boycott. 2 2 1

Additionally,

"certificates" are often requested from contractors or bidders, as

216.

See id. at 314.

217.
See TESLIK, supranote 209, at 9-13. Some Arab League member states
(Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia) never really enforced
the secondary boycott at all. See id. at 11. Moreover, the mechanisms behind the
Arab-Israeli boycott have begun to be dismantled as the Middle East peace
process continues to evolve. This began in 1980 with the Israeli-Egyptian Peace
Treaty of 1980 and gained momentum with the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty of
1994 and the announcement that same year that many of the Gulf Cooperation
Council countries (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates) that they were abandoning enforcement of the "secondary" aspects of
the boycott. Unlike Egypt and Jordan, however, neither the Gulf Corporation
Council countries nor the Arab League have changed their laws or regulations,
although Qatar has closed its national Boycott Office. See BXA ANNUAL REPORT,
supranote 128, at 1-124.
218.
See TESLIK, supra note 209, at 13.
219.
See LOWENFELD, supranote 207, at DS-333 to 393. The Principles are
quite lengthy, running to more than 30,000 words in the original Arabic version.
They prohibit dealings with those who have "contributed to Israel's strength with
direct investment or contractual partnerships, consulting, supplying goods or
intellectual property, operating offices or agencies, etc."
Significantly, the
principles also include refusing to answer the Boycott Office's questions as
grounds for being blacklisted. There are also numerous exceptions, permitting
business when it is deemed to be in the interest of a given country; for example,
in the government procurement of defense items and strategic products. See
TESLIK, supra note 209, at 10-11.
220.
See LOWENFELD, supranote 207, at DS-398 to 400.
221.
See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, " . . . Sauce for the Gander: The Arab
Boycott and United States Political Trade Controls, 12 TEx. INTL L.J. 25, 27-28
(1977).
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one means of enforcing the rules that firms contracting with Arab
states were not themselves blacklisted, nor supplying products or
222
parts from entities that were blacklisted.
Over time, the United States became increasingly concerned
with the questionnaires, certificates, and blacklisting of persons
and organizations by the Arab League, but the U.S. reaction built
slowly. While blacklisting dated back to the 1950s when the Arab
League called for the refusal to supply ships that carried cargo or
immigrants to Israel, 2 23 it was not until 1965 that the United
States initially acted.
At that time, a modest reporting
requirement was instituted. U.S. firms were required to inform
the Commerce Department when they were asked to support a
boycott or "restrictive trade practice."2 24
Although officially

"discouraged," there was no actual prohibition against complying
22 5

with such a request.
Stronger measures were advocated by Senator Harrison
Williams of New Jersey in a proposal to amend the Export Control
Act of 1949, then up for renewal.2 2 6 The Johnson Administration
opposed the proposed measures because they might be viewed as
an affront to other nations' sovereignty and undermine U.S.
efforts to gain support for its own extraterritorial controls aimed
at isolating communist countries during the Cold War. Under
Secretary of State George Ball stated:
In our judgement [the proposed amendment] . . .could interfere
seriously with the effective operation of programs of economic
denial that we are now conducting against several Communist
countries. Because they interfere with the free flow of commerce
these programs of economic denial are not popular in the
international trading world and there is considerable complaint
about them. [Senator Williams' antiboycott bill] if adopted, would

provide the excuse for other governments to interfere with their
effective execution. If foreign governments were to refuse to
provide information to the United States to assist us in the
enforcement of these programs - and were to prohibit their
domestic firms from providing such information - we would be
sharply restricted in our ability to make these programs
2 27
effective.

222.

Id. This obligation not to supply the products of blacklisted entities is

sometimes referred to as the "tertiary" boycott.
Other times it is simply
subsumed within the notion of a "secondary" boycott.
223.
See TESLIK, supranote 209, at 8-9.

224.

Amendments to the Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 89-63, 79

Stat 209 (1965).
225.
See LOWENFELD, supra note 207, at 329-32.
226.
S. 948, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
227. Hearings to Amend Section 2 of the Export Control Act of 1949 before
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 7-8
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Thus, the reporting obligation remained the only federal
Then, following the
requirement through the mid 1970s. 2 28
October 1973 War, the OPEC Oil Embargo, and gasoline

rationing, the Arab boycott was seen in a new light and again

became a topic for debate. A number of measures were discussed
and considered in 1975 and 1976.229
The Ford Administration acknowledged an increasing concern
over discrimination against U.S. citizens and businesses resulting

from the boycott,2 30 and both expanded the reporting obligations

(1965) (testimony of George W. Ball), quoted in LOWENFELD, supra note 207, at
329-30.
228. By the mid 1970s, several states were beginning to enact their own
antiboycott measures, which added further impetus to the effort to pass
preemptive federal legislation. See, e.g., Illinois Blacklist Trade Law, 775 ILL.
COmP. STAT. ANN. 15/1-6 (West 1993) (most recent codification); Human Rights
Law, N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296 (McKinney 1993) (most recent codification).
229. Domestic politics played a large role in these debates. It should also
be recalled that this was shortly after the Watergate affair. When Congressional
demands to see the boycott reports Commerce had received "in confidence" under
the old 1965 law were initially refused by Secretary Rogers Morton in 1975, it
began to look like "stonewalling" or obstructionism by the White House, thereby
generating domestic political pressure on the Executive branch to move forward
on the boycott issue. Moreover, internationally, the oil crisis had changed the
perception of the importance of the Middle East, and made the pursuit of new
policies there of greater concern than when the Johnson Administration was
preoccupied with the Cold War against Communism. Still, there was no clearly
antiboycott sentiment was
as pro-Israeli,
identified policy approach
counterbalanced by the tremendous growth of Arab League economic power in
"petrodollars" and the possible adverse reaction of other countries seeing a
See
potential double standard at work regarding extraterritorial controls.

LOWENFELD, supranote 207, at 338-40.
230. Anti-Jewish discrimination against U.S. citizens and businesses was
increasingly being used by the proponents of stronger antiboycott measures
during the mid 1970s. President Ford's statement and his expansion of the
antiboycott reporting obligation was in part motivated by Arab dominated
underwriting syndicates, which promised certain European banks in 1975 that
they would make generous deposits or loans if the bank would agree that no
member of the Jewish faith would sit on its board or control a substantial portion
of its stock. Nonetheless, while religious discrimination was certainly a part of
the boycott, commentators suggest that it was not the principal motivation behind
the Arab League's boycott of Israel. See TESLIK, supra note 209, at 13-16. As
Teslik states:
however, religious discrimination was not the driving force behind the
boycott that many advocates of strong anti-boycott measures claimed.
After the boycott became a major issue in 1975, Arab leaders made a
genuine effort to keep religious discrimination out of boycott
implementation, and certainly American businessmen, once educated
about boycott requirements, had no desire to practice a shadow boycott.
Indeed one of the ironies of the boycott debate was that when Jewish
leaders, the press, and members of Congress continually spoke of the
boycott's 'discriminatory' nature-whether for strategic purposes or out of
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of the 1965 law23 1 and prohibited discrimination against U.S.
2 32

citizens based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
In doing so, however, President Ford also continued to emphasize

the need to balance these new measures with internationally
accepted sovereign rights, which recognized the Arab League's
ability to conduct a boycott and limited the U.S. ability to
respond. "[M]y administration," President Ford declared, "as in
the administration of George Washington, will give 'to bigotry no
sanction'. 2 3
[Mly administration will not countenance the
translation of any foreign prejudice into domestic discrimination
against American citizens."2 34
Nevertheless, the expanded
obligations President Ford instituted were "taken with due regard
for our foreign policy interests, international trade and commerce,
and the sovereign rights of other nations."2 3 5
President Ford
continued to oppose stronger measures for the remainder of his
administration as being counterproductive. 2 36 His administration
argued that:
a far more constructive approach . . . is to work through our
growing economic and political relations with the Arab states as
well as our close relationships with Israel and the broad range of
contacts the Executive Branch and the regulatory agencies

ignorance-they spread misconceptions that gave extra life to the shadow
boycott.
Id. at 16. See also infra note 238.
231. Under the 1965 law, only actual exporters were required to report the
receipt of "boycott requests." President Ford directed that this obligation be
expanded to all who were involved in the export transaction, i.e., "related service
organizations" such as freight forwarders, banks, shipping companies, etc,
Additionally, federal agencies and contractors were directed to report any
countries excluding or denying visas to U.S. citizens connected to their overseas
business or activities, which might be related to discrimination based upon race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. See Foreign Boycott Practices, 11 WKLY.
COMP. PREs. Doc. 1305 (Nov. 20, 1975).
232. Thus, for the first time, federal agencies were prohibited from
considering race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or age requirements of
foreign nations in making overseas assignments. Federal contractors, exporters,
and "related service organizations" were prohibited from complying with boycott
related requests to discriminate against U.S. citizens on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. See id. at 1305-06; 15 C.F.R. § 760.2(b) (1997).
233. ForeignBoycott Practices,supranote 231, at 1205. President Ford was
referring to Washington's August 17, 1790, letter to the Hebrew congregation at
Newport Rhode Island, in which he wrote, "[H]appily the government of the United
States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires
only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good
citizens, in giving it on all occasions their effectual support." 31 THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745-99, at 93 n.65

(John C. Fitzpatrick ed. 1939).
234. ForeignBoycott Practices,supranote 231, at 1305.
235. Id.
236. See generally TESLIK, supranote 209, at 128-160.
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business community to achieve progress on
maintain with the U.S.
2 37
the boycott issue.

Moreover, the United States was the only industrial nation clearly
opposing the Arab boycott, and its capacity to influence the Arab
League was limited as there was "precious little that the United
States supplies to the Arab nations that is not available from
sources in other countries and they are eager to take the [United
2 38
States] place."
As a presidential candidate, Jimmy Carter thought the Ford
Administration's attempt at balancing interests was "a
disgrace"23 9 and endeavored to stake out the moral high ground
Carter
during the second televised debate of the campaign.
stated:
I believe that the boycott of American businesses by the Arab
countries because those businesses trade with Israel or because
they have American Jews who are owners or directors in the
company is an absolute disgrace. This is the first time that I
remember in the history of our country that we've let a foreign
country circumvent or change our Bill of Rights. Ill do everything I
can as President to stop the boycott of American firms by the Arab
countries. It's not a matter of diplomacy or trade with me. It's a
24 0
matter of morality.

This capitalized on the emotional appeal of the common
misconception, in the midst of the presidential elections, that the
boycott of Israel by the Arab
principal motivation for the economic
2 41

League was religious discrimination.

237. Extension of the Export AdministrationAct of 1969: Hearings before the
Comm on InternationalRelations, 94th Cong., 58 (1976) (remarks by Sec. Treas.
William Simon), quoted in TESLIK, supranote 209, at 131.
238. Teslik also reports that 80% of the goods and services traded with the
Arab nations at this time came from non-U.S. sources. See id.
239. Second Carter-Ford Presidential Debate, Oct. 6, 1976, quoted in
TESLIK, supranote 209, at 154.
240. Id.
241. Several commentators have noted that religious discrimination, while a
factor in the boycott, accounts for only a small percentage of the "boycott
requests" received and reported by U.S. businesses. For example, Ludwig and
Smith state:
Much of the legislative impetus in the 94th Congress was the result of
widespread belief.., that the Arab boycott was essentially discriminatory
in nature, imbued with discriminatory animus against firms with Jewish
officers or directors. Boycotting governments and their officials have.
steadfastly denied this charge. Reports of boycott requests filed at the
Department of Commerce ... disclose that boycott requests manifesting
racial or religious discrimination are extremely rare, and that the Arab
boycott of Israel has become in large part what it purports to be - an
economic boycott.
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As president, Carter was somewhat more circumspect when
he signed the antiboycott amendments to the EAA in 1977.
President Carter noted that the issue of a nation's or a group of
nations' ability to conduct a boycott, and the ability of other
nations such as the United States to sanction such activity:
The new
goes to the very heart of free trade among nations ....
(U.S. antiboycott) law does not threaten or question the sovereign
right of any nation to regulate its own commerce with other
2 43
countries,2 4 2 nor is it directed toward any particular country.
The bill seeks instead to end the divisive effects on American life of
foreign boycotts aimed at Jewish members of our society. If we
allow such a precedent to become established, we open the door to
similar action against any ethnic, religious, or racial group in
24 4
America.

Much more than a change in administrations led to the
passage of the antiboycott amendments to the Internal Revenue
Code 2 45 and the EAA in 1977.246 The boycott was vigorously
debated between 1975 and 1977247 by Congress, the Executive

Eugene A. Ludwig & John T. Smith, II, The Business Effects of the Antiboycott
Provisions of the Export Administration Amendments of 1977 - Morality Plus
PragmatismEquals Complexity, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L 581, 587 n.15 (1979). See
also supranote 230.
242. That is, the U.S. antiboycott legislation was aimed at limiting the
effects of the secondary boycott rather than denying the right or ability of any
nation to conduct a primary boycott. See supranotes 209-14 and accompanying
text.
243. The U.S. antiboycott legislation and regulations, somewhat
disingenuously, refer to boycotts by foreign countries "against a country friendly
to the United States," although the entire debate was framed in terms of the ArabIsraeli boycott. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. App. § 2407(a) (1994); 15 C.F.R. § 760.5(a)
(1997).
244. Remarks of the President upon signing H.R. 5840 Anti-Boycott
Legislation, Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, June 22,
1977, quoted in TESLIK, supra note 209, at 216. Teslik notes that "Carter's
statement... combined strong words of support for Israel... a modest attempt
to soothe the Arabs, a misrepresentation of the discriminatory impact of the
boycott on American Jews (post passage antiboycott rhetoric-habits are hard to
break) and an attempt to put a political gloss over the conclusion of the debate."
Id. at 217.
245. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 contained provisions introduced by
Senator Abraham Ribbicoff of Connecticut, which denied certain tax credits and
deferrals to firms who "agreed' to cooperate with the Arab boycott, but which did
not actually prohibit participation in the boycott. See Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§
1061-64, 1066-67, 90 Stat. 1649-50, 1654 (1976). This measure was separate
and distinct from the amendments to the EAA. While it generally complemented
the EAA antiboycott provisions, it was not part of a coordinated antiboycott
strategy and passed into law with relatively little discussion. See TESLIK, supra
note 209, at 141-45.
246. See Export Administration Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 9552, 91 Stat. 235 (1977); 50 U.S.C. App. § 2407 (1994).

247.

See LOWENFELD, supranote 207, at 344-50.
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Branch, and a number of established interest groups such as the
Anti Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish
Congress, the American Jewish Committee, 24 8 and the then newly
formed Business Roundtable representing the CEO's of 180 major
The final legislation and the
American corporations.2 4 9
implementing regulations were in fact largely the result of an
extraordinary collaboration and series of compromises 25 0 worked
out between the various lobbying and business interests and then
adopted by the government. 25 1 The two Presidents' comments,
however, do evoke the major themes of the debate. On the one
of
the principles
touch upon
comments
the
hand,
nondiscrimination 25 2 and territorial sovereignty. 25 3 On the other
hand, the comments touch upon the more utilitarian concerns of
what is achievable and what might be the consequences of any

See TESLIK, supra note 209, at 31-46. The Arab lobbying interests in
248.
the United States were generally less organized or effective. Id. at 46-50. Teslik
quotes Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota as stating that "the reason the
Arabs have lost those battles in the Middle East is because they have lost them
previously here in Washington." Id. at 46.
249.
See id. at 51-53.
See generally TESLIK,
See LOWENFELD, supra note 207, at 332-49.
250.
supranote 209.
See LOWENFELD, supranote 207, at 347-50.
251.
252. The nondiscrimination arguments encompassed both traditional
American notions of fairness and international free trade principles.
The principle of nondiscrimination had a genuine and not contrived bearing on
legislation.
The principle reached beyond religious discrimination to figure within the
recurring free-trade arguments against the boycott.

Free trade arguments in the Congress may have been used instrumentally
to cover other motives for attacking the boycott. But their prominence
suggests that they carried some weight of their own.
Henry J. Steiner, Pressures and Principles - The Politics of the Antiboycott
Legislation, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 529, 537-38 (1978).
Steiner notes that the nondiscrimination and territorial sovereignty
253.
arguments are interrelated.
As it merges into free-trade objectives, the non-discrimination principle
borders upon the second major principle in the legislative arguments, that
A de jure Arab boycott on export of goods,
of territorial sovereignty ...
capital or technology to Israel threatened to become de facto our export
ban as well.
Seen from this [perspective] Congress' action can be understood to assert:
if any government imposes a systematic boycott scheme upon American
industry, that government should be our own.
Id. at 538.
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acti6n. 2 54 As promulgated, the legislation and extraordinarily
complex regulations were aimed essentially at blocking the
secondary effects of the Arab boycott. They prohibited compliance
with the Arab blacklisting of U.S. firms, while recognizing the
Arab League's right to conduct a primary boycott on direct Arab2 5S
Israeli dealings.
While the U.S. antiboycott
laws are themselves
extraterritorial, affecting the behavior of U.S. nationals, residents,
companies, and their controlled overseas branches and
subsidiaries, this response was considered justified because the
Arab blacklisting of U.S. firms with:
[a] secondary boycott, a territorially aggressive policy, [which]
sought to absorb third-countries [the U.S.] into the boycotters
economic warfare against the target country [Israel]. It reached
extraterritorially in an explicit way, leaving upon the third
country's [U.S.] territory a trail of questionnaires, certifications and
letters of credit with boycott-related conditions.
Moreover the boycott attempted to absorb American business into
a discriminatory scheme against Israel, a country enjoying broad
public sympathy as well as one receiving our military and economic
aid. The boycott could hardly have touched more sensitive
national nerves, or avoided the charge of interfering with our

territorial sovereignty.2 5 6

254. See id. at 540-46.
255. As was noted in the Senate Committee Report on the Export
Administration Amendments of 1977:
The committee recognizes that the Arab States regard their boycott efforts
as part of a continuing struggle against Israel .... The committee is aware
that primary boycotts are a common, although regrettable, form of
international conflict and that there are severe limitations on the ability of
outside parties to bring such boycotts to an end. However, the committee
strongly believes that the United States should not acquiesce in attempts
by foreign governments through secondary and tertiary boycotts to embroil
American citizens in their battles against others by forcing them to
participate in actions which are repugnant to American values and
traditions. Accordingly, the bill reported by the committee directly attacks
attempts to interfere with American affairs while creating mechanisms for
more subtle and flexible pressure against the other dimensions of foreign
boycotts ....
The committee also recognizes that such legislation, however well
intentioned, could unjustly interfere with the sovereignty of others and
thus violate the very principle which the bill seeks to establish . ...
[L]egislation which fails to recognize the political sensitivities of the Arab
States themselves, most of which are as jealous of their prerogatives as
the United States is of its own, could erode U.S. influence in the Arab
world and undermine efforts toward peace ....
S. REP. No. 95-104, at 20-21.
256. See Steiner, supranote 252, at 538-39.
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Nevertheless, the legislation also included:
certain limited accommodations to the laws and rights of other
nations, including boycotting nations, with the realization that
where the rights of nations conflict, each must make adjustments,
however reluctantly, to avoid confrontations on "principles" which
are as strongly opposed by others as they are deeply held by the
257
United States.

This focus on the "secondary" aspect of the Arab-Israeli boycott
derives as much from domestic policy as from a practical
limitation on the U.S. ability to do anything more to oppose the
Arab League's actions under international law.
Secondary
boycotts were considered problematic under the antitrust laws, 25 8
and their use in the context of labor and management relations
had been proscribed by statute since 1947.259
The basic mechanism of the antiboycott legislation is simple.
It essentially imposes a broad prohibition, 2 60 which states that no

257. S. REP. No. 95-104, at 21.
258. It is well established that § 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits a concerted
"refusal to deal" and potentially reaches activities that produce "substantial
effects" within the United States. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.
764, 796 (1993). Suits have been instituted on the basis that cooperation with
the Arab blacklist is an actionable refusal to deal. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bechtel Corp.,
648 F.2d. 660, 662 (9th Cir. 1981); Bulk Oil (ZUG) A.G. v. Sun Co., Inc., 583 F.
Supp. 1134, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Use of the antitrust laws to pursue an
antiboycott violation remains rare, however, despite an express statement that
the antiboycott law does not limit the antitrust or civil rights laws. See 50 U.S.C.
App. § 2407(a)(3) (1994).
259. The National Labor Management Relations Act prohibits labor
organizations from using "secondary picketing" or "secondary boycotts" to apply
pressure to neutral employers when striking or picketing the "primary" employer
in any dispute. This was one of the limits and duties imposed upon unions by
the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1994). If the union
engages in secondary picketing/boycotts, as an unfair labor practice it is subject
to being enjoined and also to federal suits for monetary damages. See id. §§ 160,
162 & 187. There is an extensive line of NLRB decisions and cases interpreting
these provisions.
In the debates concerning this provision, Senator Taft stated that the
"provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the

business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement" 93
CONG. REc. 4198 (1947). The secondary boycott ban, however, does not apply to
publicizing the primary dispute, nor to seeking consumer boycotts of the products
produced by the primary employer. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 582-83 (1988).
260. The amended EAA and the implementing regulations actually provide
four basic prohibitions addressing boycott-related (1) refusals to do business, (2)
discriminatory actions, (3) furnishing information about race, religion, sex or
national origin, or (4) implementation of letters of credit containing boycott-related
provisions. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 2407(a) (1994); 15 C.F.R. § 760.2 (1997). The
tax code provisions do not contain any prohibitions, but do deprive taxpayers of
certain tax credits and deferrals if they agree to participate in a boycott. See
supra note 245.
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U.S. person, affiliate, or controlled-in-fact subsidiary2 6 ' can
participate or cooperate with the Arab-Israeli boycott or blacklist.
This is combined with a number of carefully crafted exceptions to
the broad prohibition in order to authorize actions related to the
primary boycott. 2 62 Additionally, as was the case under the 1965

law, the mere receipt of a request to cooperate in the boycott has
to be reported to the U.S. government. 263 The failure to file the
proper report itself constitutes a violation of these provisions. 2 64
Ironically, one of the sanctions Congress has urged be used more
frequently to address violations of the U.S. antiboycott legislation,
is naming the violator to the Commerce Department's own
65
2

DPL.

Interestingly, the Canadians thought the approach embodied
in the U.S. antiboycott legislation was a useful mechanism,
because they employ very much the same tools in responding to
the U.S. embargo of Cuba. It is this Canadian response to the
U.S. laws that America Online Canada must also bear in mind
while trying to avoid violating the CACR controls in dealing with
the blacklisted Pierre Boileau.

261. The statute uses the term "U.S. person," which the regulations defined
broadly, as was done under TWEA to include foreign controlled entities. See
supra note 141 and accompanying text. Unlike TWEA, however, there is an
additional requirement that the transaction must also involve "activities in the
interstate or foreign commerce of the United States." See 50 U.S.C. App. §
2407(a)(1), (5); 15 C.F.R. § 760.1 (1997).
262. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 2407(a)(2); 15 C.F.R. § 760.3 (1997). As the
"devil is in the details," it is in these exceptions and qualifications to the
prohibitions that many of the compromises struck by the various interest groups
and industry are reflected. The antiboycott regulations are unique among trade
controls in the amount of detail and voluminous examples they employ to define
what is prohibited and what is permissible, producing what often appears to be a
triumph of form over substance. For example, boycott-related discrimination
based upon "national origin" is prohibited, but discrimination based upon
"nationality" is permissible (at least under the antiboycott regulations). Compare
15 C.F.Y
§ 760.2(b)(1), with 15 C.F.R. § 760.2(b), ex. (iii) (1997). Such fine
distinctions may have value in the domestic political arena, but when applied to
foreign boycott requests which are generally being translated from other
languages, the formulaic arguments often become meaningless.
263. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 2407(b)(2); 15 C.F.R. § 760.5 (1997).
264. See 15 C.F.R. § 764.2M (1997).
265. See Oversight of the Office of Antiboycott Compliance: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 102d Cong. 36, 51-53, 64-65 (1991).
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B. NationalLegislation: Foreign 'Blocking Measures"
Canada has long disagreed with the U.S. policy toward
Cuba,2 6 6 and opposes the extraterritorial application of that policy
in much the same way as the United States responded to the
Arab League policy toward Israel. 2 6 7 Canada accordingly created
similar measures, aimed at directing Canadian nationals and
companies to refrain from cooperating with the U.S. embargo of
Cuba and further requiring that they also report any and all
communications requesting their cooperation or support for the
embargo to the Canadian Attorney General. This is embodied in
the Canada's Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act of 1985
(FEMA),268 and the orders issued under that Act, 2 6 9 which is
enforceable with fines of up to C$1.5 million and terms of
imprisonment of up to five years. 2 70 Similar measures aimed at

266.

See, e.g., James Irvine Whitcomb Corcoran, The Trading With the

Enemy Act and the Controlled CanadianCorporation, 14 MCGILL L.J. 174, 202-05

(1968).
267. Canadian opposition to the extraterritorial application of U.S. controls
goes well beyond the Cuban embargo. In fact, it dates at least to the application
of Korean War era TWEA-based controls targeted at China to prevent Canadian
subsidiaries of U.S. companies from expanding trade with China in the 1950s and

1960s. See generally id. at 187-201 (providing a historical survey of the TWEA's
effect on U.S. owned or controlled Canadian corporations). It then continued
through the 1970s and 1980s with the uranium cartel litigation, Bank of Nova
Scotia subpoenas case, and the Russian pipeline embargo.
See Douglas H.
Forsythe, Introductory Note, Canada:
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act
Incorporating the Amendments Countering the U.S. Helms-Burton Act, 36 I.L.M.
111, 112 (1997); infra Part IU.C.1.
268.
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29, §§1-11 (1985)
(Can.), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 794 [hereinafter FEMA]. As the U.S. policy toward
Cuba was tightened, first with the Cuban Democracy Act and then with the
LIBERTAD or Helms-Burton Act, so too FEMA was amended to counter the
tougher U.S. policies. FEMA was substantially amended by Bill C-54, which was
passed in late 1996, and became effective on January 1, 1997. See An Act to
Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, Bill C-54 (1996), reprintedin 36
I.L.M. 115-24 (1997).
269. The only Order currently in effect under FEMA specifically evokes its
provisions with regard to the U.S. Helms-Burton Act. See Schedule to FEMA, 36
I.L.M. 124. This is an amended version of the original Order issued in 1992,
which triggered FEMA with regard to the Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. §§
6001-6010. See generally 24 I.L.M. 794 (1985). Both Orders are predicated upon
a Canadian belief that the extraterritorial application of these U.S. laws "adversely
affect Canadian trading interests or infringes upon Canadian sovereignty." See
FEMA, § 5.
270.
In the case of an individual defendant the maximum fine is
C$150,000. See FEMA, § 7(1)(a).
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countering the United States-Cuba policy were instituted by
27 2
Mexico 2 7 1 and the EU.
The FEMA, unlike the U.S. antiboycott law, goes beyond
simply prohibiting compliance with extraterritorial laws from
other jurisdictions. It is also a "blocking measure," designed to
insulate Canadian nationals and companies from foreign attempts
to enforce their extraterritorial requirements or penalize their
violation. In an effort to limit the clear conflicts-of-law issues
(1)
such blocking measures create, FEMA only applies to:
particular foreign trade laws that are designated as being
"contrary to international law or comity;" 2 73 (2) situations where a
foreign state or tribunal takes actions that adversely affect
Canadian interests in international trade and commerce;2 74 or (3)
situations where a foreign state or tribunal takes actions that
adversely affect Canadian sovereignty.2 75 In each case, a formal
order must be issued by the Canadian Attorney General after
to bring the
consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs
6
27
foreign measure within the scope of the FEMA.

A variety of different "blocking" techniques are employed to
augment the basic prohibition on complying with offensive foreign
Firstly, there is the reporting requirement, which
laws. 27 7
presumably permits the Canadian government to both monitor
attempts to compel enforcement of extraterritorial measures
within Canada, and to intervene on a state-to-state level, if

271.
See "Ley de Proteccion al Comercio y la Inversion de Normas
Extranjeras que Contravengan el Derecho Internacional," D.O., Oct. 23, 1996
(Mex.), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 133 (1997) [hereinafter Act to Protect Trade and
Investment].
272.
See Protecting Against the Effects of the Extraterritorial Application of
Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, Council Regulation 2271/96, 1996 O.J.
(L 309) 39, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 125 (1997) [hereinafter Eur. Council Reg.
2271/96].
273. These designations are accomplished by an Order issued by the
Canadian Attorney General, after consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
which amends a Schedule of foreign trade laws to which FEMA applies. The
Helms-Burton (LIBERTAD) Act is the only trade law which currently appears in
the FEMA schedule. See FEMA, § 2.1.
274. The Canadian "interests" in trade or commerce which are adversely
affected must be, at least in part, within Canada. See generally FEMA, §§ 3, 5 &
8.
275.
See id.
276.
See id.
277. The basic prohibition on Canadian residents, nationals, and
companies complying with designated foreign trade laws or measures is found in
a provision which states that the Canadian Attorney General may "prohibit any
person in Canada from complying with such measures, or with any directives,
instructions, intimations of policy or other communications relating to such
measures from a person who is in a position to direct or influence the policies of
the person in Canada." Id. § 5(l)(b).
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necessary. 2 78
The reporting requirement, like the basic
prohibition, is quite broadly worded, reaching even "intimations of
policy," which may be conveyed by a corporate parent or affiliate,
for example. 2 7 9 Secondly, in order to frustrate the enforcement of
extraterritorial requirements, Canadian citizens or residents may
be prohibited from producing, disclosing, or identifying records or
information sought by foreign tribunals. 28 0 In appropriate cases,
Canadian courts are even empowered to order the seizure of
records in Canada to prevent their disclosure. 28 1
Thirdly,
recognition and enforcement of any foreign judgments that are
rendered regarding offensive extraterritorial measures 28 2 may be
prohibited, or their awards reduced. 28 3
Finally, Canadian
residents, citizens, or companies are given the right to "clawback"
any awards that foreign parties may have recovered elsewhere in
a new cause of action. 28 4 That is, the Canadian party who loses
in a foreign forum may sue the foreign party for the amount of the
judgment the foreign party obtained, the expenses incurred in
both the foreign action and the Canadian "clawback" suit, and for
any consequential losses or damages suffered by the Canadian
party because of the foreign judgment. 28 5 The Canadian award
resulting from a clawback action may itself be executed not only
against the foreign party, but also against the property of any
person or entity, which owns or controls, or is part of a group that

278.

The reporting requirement states that the Canadian Attorney General

may "require any person in Canada to give notice to (the Attorney General) of
such measures, or of any directives, instructions, intimations of policy or other
communications relating to such measures from a person who is in a position to

direct or influence the policies of the person in Canada." Id. § 5(1)(a).
279. See id. This is, in fact, broader than the U.S. antiboycott reporting
requirement, which only reaches actual "boycott requests." See 15 C.F.R. §
760.5.

280.
281.

See FEMA, § 3.
See id.§4.

282. This would include, for example, the Title In provisions of the HelmsBurton (LIBERTAD) Act, which authorizes private suits for treble damages against

traffickers in expropriated Cuban property.
283. See FEMA, § 8(l)(b). This section is applicable primarily to antitrust
awards, and designated trade laws set forth in the FEMA schedule. It is also
bolstered by another section, which specifically prohibits the enforcement in
Canada of any awards made under the U.S. Helms-Burton (LIBERTAD) Act,
irrespective of whether or not Helms-Burton appears on the FEMA schedule at
the time. Seeid § 7.1.
284. As with the provisions on enforcement and recognition of foreign
judgments, with which this is closely related, this section applies to antitrust
suits and suits relating to scheduled trade laws (Le., Helms Burton Act). See
generally FEMA, §

285.

9.

See id. § 9(1).
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owns or controls, the foreign party who obtained the impugned
28 6
foreign judgment.
This mechanism is not unique to Canada, but reflects a
history of opposition to the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws

and regulations by a number of countries throughout the latter
half of the century. 28 7 The Canadian, Mexican, and European
statutes do represent, however, a new stage in the development of

286.
Thus, this permits the "clawback" award to be executed against any
parent company property located within Canadian jurisdiction, or the property of
other members of a holding corporation or group. See id. § 9(2).
287.
FEMA is an example of what might be considered a "third stage" in the
development of blocdng measures.
The "first stage" in the widespread use of blocking measures is traceable to
the extraterritorial application of U.S. merchant shipping regulations and
documentation demands by the Federal Maritime Commission beginning in the
1960s, which culminated in a series of antitrust actions against European
shipping cartels or conferences in 1979. See In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust
Litigation 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,585 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Numerous blocking
measures were passed as this dispute developed, primarily aimed at blocldng
"US-style" sweeping discovery requests, which many other countries regarded as
simply fishing expeditions by the U.S. government and private plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
"Law Concerning the Regulation of Marine Transport," Mar. 27, 1969, 723 Bull.
Usuel des Lois et Arr-t&s 500 (amended to include Air Transport, June 21, 1977,
1490 Bull. Usuel des Lois et Arrdtds 1075) (Belg.); "Law Relating to the
Transmission of Documents and Information to Foreign Authorities in the Area of
Maritime Trade," J.O., 1968, p. 7267, B.L.D. 1968, p. 438 (Fr.); "Federal Maritime
Shipping Act," v. 24.5.1965 (BGB1. II S. 833) (F.R.G.); "Power for the King to
Forbid Shipowners to Give Information, etc. to Foreign Authorities," Act of June
16, 1967, Norges Lover 1685-1985, at 1726 (Nor.); "Ordinance Regarding
Prohibition in Certain Cases for Shipowners to Produce Documents Concerning
the Swedish Shipping Industry," Svensk Forfattningssamling No. 156, at 411
(1966) (Swed.); Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87
(Eng.). See also infranote 293.
The "second stage" of blocking measures was prompted by the increasing
extraterritorial application of the U.S. antitrust laws, especially in connection with
the Uranium Litigation, see infra notes 290 & 295. These blocking measures
reflected many foreign countries' view of private treble damage awards as
"punitive," and saw the introduction of "clawbacl mechanisms in addition to
measures aimed at frustrating discovery. The blocking measures passed at this
time varied, with some targeted just at the nuclear industry, and some with a
more general application. See, e.g., Foreign Proceedings (Excess Jurisdiction) Act,
1984, No. 3 (replacing Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence)
Amendment Act, 1976, No. 121) (Austl.); Atomic Control Act, R.S.C. ch. 49, § 9
(1970) (Can.); Uranium Information Security Regulations, S. Prov. C. 1976-2368,
O.R. 77-836 (1977) (Can.); "Law Relating to Communication of Economic,
Commercial, Industrial, Financial, or Technical Documents or Information to

Foreign Natural or Legal Persons," Law No. 1799 of July 16, 1980, J.0., 1980
(Fr.); § 2 of Second General Law Amendment Act 94 of 1974, 12 Stat. S. Afr. 602
(S. Aft.). Other applications of the U.S. antitrust laws, notably the Light Bulb
Litigation, U.S. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), prompted
passage of blocking statutes of this type as early as 1956.
See Economic
Competition Act, 28 June 1956, § 39 (Neth.), reprinted in A.V. LOWE,
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICION 123 (1983).
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"blocking measures."28 8 This is demonstrated in the statutes'
focus on offensive2 8 9 foreign trade laws, generally, and in the
breadth of their "clawback" provisions when such foreign laws are
enforced elsewhere. 290 They represent an expansion of earlier
blocking measures, such as the U.K.'s Protection of Trading
Interests Act 1980,291 which was in fact the model for the
2 92
blocking provisions in the Canadian FEMA.

288.

Id.

289. That is, each of these statutes applies only against foreign trade laws
that are deemed to violate international norms. See FEMA, § 2.1(a) ("IT]he
Attorney General of Canada is of the opinion that the law or provision is contrary
to international law or international comity."); Eur. Council Regulation 2271/96
("Whereas by their extra-territorial application such laws, regulations, and other
legislative instruments violate international law. . ."). The application of the
Mexican blocking statute was made clear in President Zedillo's message to the
Senate when the Bill was introduced:
The formulation of legislation, by a foreign country, purporting to restrict
the acts of trade taking place outside its territory and which are not
executed by its own nationals, constitutes a clear example of a claim of
extraterritoriality which is contrary to our legal tradition, and which has
always been respectful of the fundamental principles of international law.
See 'Excerpts from Legislative History," Act to Protect Trade and Investment,
reprintedin 36 I.L.M. 133, 148-49 (1997).
290. The Mexican and EU statutes are the first such blocking measures to

be issued by those respective jurisdictions. Both the Mexican and EU blocking
measures were specifically targeted at the U.S. Helms-Burton (LIBERTAD) Act,
but are broadly written so they may be invoked with regard to any similar trade
measures that are issued by the U.S. or other countries simply by adding those
measures to the appropriate annex or schedule. (The EU Annex, in fact, includes
the U.S. Cuban Democracy Act of 1996 and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of
1996 in addition to the Helms-Burton Act in its list of offensive trade measures.)
This is the same approach as that employed in Canada's FEMA, and reflects the
strong influence the Canadian legislation had on the drafting of these statutes.
Like FEMA, the Mexican and EU blocking statutes require reporting of any
direction to comply with the offensive foreign trade laws (Mexico, Art. 3; EU, Art.
2), prohibit the production of documents or information to foreign enforcement
efforts (Mexico, Art. 2; EU, Art. 5), deny recognition to any foreign judgments that
are rendered (Mexico, Art. 4; EU, Art. 4), and authorize the "clawbacl of any
awards paid outside their respective jurisdictions (Mexico, Arts. 5 & 6; EU, Art. 6).
See Act to Protect Trade and Investment; Eur. Council Reg. 2271/96.
Interestingly, the Mexican statute also authorizes sanctioning, with fines,
against "foreign persons" outside of Mexico who violate the Mexican blocking
measure, if the foreign persons' actions have substantial "effects" within Mexico,
not unlike the United States own antiboycott laws. See Act to Protect Trade and
Investment, art. 9; supra notes 258-63 and accompanying text. Sanctions for
violating the EU Regulations are left up to the individual member states, but must
be "effective, proportional and dissuasive." See Eur. Council Reg. 2271/96, art.
9.
291. See generally Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (Eng.)
reprintedat 21 I.L.M. 834 (1980).
292. See FEMA. However, perhaps the first "blocking measure" was passed
by the province of Ontario, with the Business Records Protection Act of 1947,
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The passage of the Protection of Trading Interests Act was the

U.K.'s response to the extraterritorial application of the antitrust

laws2 9 3 to sanction activities performed in
but which purportedly had "effects" 2 94
States. 2 9s According to the U.K. Secretary
was an effort to "reinforce the defenses in

the United Kingdom,
within the United
of State for Trade, it
the United Kingdom

against attempts by other countries (i.e., the United States) to
enforce their economic

and commercial policies unilaterally

R.S.O., ch. B.19 (1947) (Ontario). The Ontario provision was passed in response
to subpoenas issued by a New York grand jury investigating potential antitrust
violations in the paper industry. See generally In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces
Tecum Addressed to Canadian Intl Paper Co. et al., 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y.
1947).
293. The 1980 Act is actually an expansion of earlier legislation, the
Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87 (Eng.), and
thus is an example of the "second stage" in the development of blocking
measures. The 1964 Act was, in turn, typical of the "first stage" in the
development of blocking statutes. It was aimed at protecting the historic English
shipping cartels, called "conferences," from suits challenging activities performed
in the United Kingdom based upon an extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
law in accord with the "effects doctrine" developed in the Alcoa case. U.S. v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
The decisions in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th

Cir. 1976), and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum, 595 F.2d. 1287 (3d Cir.
1979), epitomized the "balancing" approach of weighing the foreign and U.S.
interests in any extraterritorial antitrust action, which characterized an uneasy
truce that lasted until the case of In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248
(7th Cir. 1980), 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979), prompted the 1980 Act. See
generally, A.V. Lowe, Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:The British Protection of
TradingInterestsAct, 1980, 75 AM. J. INTI L. 257 (1981). For the current state of
the law on the extraterritorial application of the U.S. antitrust laws, see also
HartfordFireIns., 509 U.S. 764.
294. The 'effects principle" is one of the internationally recognized bases for
a state exercising jurisdiction over "conduct outside its territory that has or is
intended to have substantial effect within its territory." As is the case with all
exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction, however, it is subject to a reasonableness
limitation. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, §§ 402(I)(c) & 403.
295. In a complex series of actions, Westinghouse was sued for $2 billion
for nonperformance of various supply contracts for uranium, and both Congress
and the Justice Department began investigations. Westinghouse in turn sued a
British company, Rio Tinto Zinc, alleging it was part of an international uranium
cartel and sought treble damages of $6 billion. See In re Westinghouse Elect.
Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, 3 WLR 492 (C.A. 1977); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v.
Westinghouse Elect. Corp, 1978 App. Case. 547 (H.L. 1978). The foreign uranium
producers were largely unable to sell in the U.S. market because of import
restrictions. RTZ in opposing discovery of documents pertaining to its activities
outside the U.S. market was unable to rely upon the 1964 Act because of an
inability to show a direct infringement of British "jurisdiction," but was
nevertheless successful is establishing that compliance with various U.S.
sweeping discovery requests would be a violation of British sovereignty. See id.
The suits were eventually settled.
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against us"2 96 by blocking the production of documents, 2 97 the
recognition of judgments, 2 98 or the collection of awards 29 9 in
support of U.S. governmental or private antitrust actions. 3 °0
Even

as the U.S.

government

itself was becoming

more

301
it
sensitive to foreign objections regarding extraterritoriality,

was the growing number of private civil suits for treble damages

that caused the greatest concern and prompted the Protecting of
In an exchange of diplomatic notes
Trading Interests Act.
concerning the Protection of Trading Interests Act, the United

Kingdom explained that the measure was not "anti-American, "S 0 2
but rather a defensive step to protect British interests on matters
that were not amenable to resolution on an intergovernmental
30 3
basis.
[M]ultiple damage judgments of other states, which are regarded by
Her Majesty's Government as penal, are non-enforceable by the
U.K. courts, just as are other judgments of a penal character...
Her Majesty's Government's main objections to the private treble
a crucial aspect of U.S. Anti-Trust
damage action, which is ...
enforcement, are that it provides an incentive to private parties to
act as "private Attorneys-General," [and] that such a system of

296. 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533 (1979).
297.
See Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, art. 2 (Eng.).
298.
See id. art. 5.
299.
See id. arts. 6 & 7. Moreover, this includes the ability for British
defendants to "clawbacl awards collected outside of the United Kingdom. See
infra note 306 and accompanying text.
300. Similar actions were taken by the various governments where other
uranium cartel members were located. See supranotes 287 & 295.
301. For example, the 1977 enforcement guidelines acknowledge the
importance of considering foreign interests. See generally U.S. DEP'r OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977).
302. In the Parliamentary debates over the blocking measure, it was stated
It is designed to
that the "bill is not anti-American, or indeed anti-anybody ....
protect and not to provoke.... It is a legitimate exercise of our own sovereignty."
See 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1538, 1546 (1979).
303. It should be noted that it is not just the United States which pursues
an "extraterritorial" antitrust or "competition law" policy. The EU and Germany
both make use of the "effects" principle in some form to extend the reach of their
competition laws. See, e.g., Case 89/95, Wood Pulp Case, 1988 E.C.R. 5193;
Kammergericht, Decisions I and II, WuW/E OLG 2411 (1980) (Bayer/Firestone v.
Bundeskartellamt); Kammergericht, Decision, WuW/E OLG 3051 (1983)
See also David J. Gerber, The
(Morris/Rothmans v. Bundeskartellamt).
ExtraterritorialApplication of the German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INTL L. 756

(1983). But of. Joseph P. Griffin, B.C. and U.S. Extraterrtoriality: Activism and
Cooperation, 17 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 353, 378-79 (1994) (arguing that it is the
nature of "implementation" of conduct within the EU, rather than the "effects" of
foreign conduct, that is determinative). Only the United States, however, uses
private treble damage lawsuits to augment governmental enforcement of the law
in this area.
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enforcement is inappropriate and in many respects objectionable in
3 4
its application to international trade. G

Additional concerns were raised regarding the application of
U.S. long-arm personal jurisdiction to foreign nationals outside
the United States, the prospect of default judgments, and "Wide
and prejudicial discovery procedures" in private suits where the
"potential penalties can be enormous and totally out of proportion
to the alleged mischief, particularly where the activities concerned
were entirely legal where they occurred. "3 0 5 It was in this context
that the techniques of earlier blocking measures, which were
largely aimed at frustrating discovery, were augmented in the
Protection of Trading Interests Act with the new provisions
denying recognition to foreign judgments and permitting the local
defendants to recover or "clawback" treble damage awards
collected outside of the United Kingdom. 3 ° 6 This also explains
some of the hostility currently being shown to Title III of the
Helms-Burton Act, the provision which authorizes private treble
damages actions against traffickers in Cuban expropriated
3° 7
property.
Interestingly, no Orders were immediately issued actually
invoking the U.K. Protection of Trading Interests Act, the
diplomatic point having been made with the passage of the

304.

The Note further elaborated:

Her Majesty's Government believe that two basically undesirable
consequences follow from the enforcement of public law in this field by
private remedies. First, the usual discretion of a public authority to
enforce laws in a way which has regard to the interests of society is
replaced by a motive on the part of the plaintiff to pursue defendants for
private gain thus excluding international considerations of a public
nature. Secondly, where criminal and civil penalties co-exist, those
engaged in international trade are exposed to double jeopardy.

See United Kingdom Response to U.S. Diplomatic Note Concerning the U.K.
Protection of Trading Interests Bill, U.K. Diplomatic Note No. 225, Nov. 9, 1979,
reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 847, 848-49 (1982).
305. Id. at 849.
306. The United Kingdom rejected arguments that at least the
"compensatory" portion of the damage award should be enforceable and exempt

from any subsequent "clawback," based upon their broader objection to the use of
any private treble damages action to enforce "public" economic policy.
Bearing in mind the objectionable features which appear to Her Majesty's
Government to arise from the impact of private treble damage actions on
international trade, as well as the general principle [of not enforcing penal
awards], Her Majesty's Government sees no justification for proposing that
there should be a specific provision enabling U.K. courts to be used to
enforce a part of such judgments.
Id
307.

See supranotes 287, 291 &295 and accompanying text.
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blocking and clawback measure.3 0 8 Orders under the U.K.'s
Protection of Trading Interests Act, however, have subsequently
been issued that are directed at legislation 3 °9 in both the United

States 310 and Australia.3 1 1 There are now approximately twenty
jurisdictions with some form of blocking legislation in place in
their

national

laws.3 1

2

These

remain

potent

tools

despite

and international3 1 4 efforts intended to
numerous
minimize conflict of laws issues through increased government to
government cooperation and information sharing. Even without
blocking measures, however, some unusual forms of government
intervention have been used to periodically frustrate the
extraterritorial application of economic sanctions and trade
Of course, inextricably intertwined with these
controls.
developments were the various cases and enforcement actions
that provided much of the impetus for blocking legislation.
bilateral3 1 3

308. During the debate of the bill, Lord Hackney remarked that "nobody
really expects the provisions of the bill to be used;" Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran added
that "in so far as British industry is concerned, [the clawback] has no effect
whatsoever from the view of realistic commercial sense." 405 PARL. DEB., H.L.
(5th ser.) 926, 934, 943 (1980).
309. The U.K. government has been more reluctant to issue Orders
designating specific pieces of foreign legislation as objectionable under the Act
than it has been in forbidding particular actions in individual cases and, in
essence, administratively enjoining cooperation with foreign litigation under
Article 2(4) of the Act. It has used this authority in approximately fifteen
instances since the Act was passed. See KARL M. MEESSEN, EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 161 (1996).

310. See, e.g., Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Reexport Control) Order,
1982, S.I. 1982, No. 885 (U.K.); Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Antitrust
Measures) Order, 1983, S.I. 1983, No. 900 (U.K.); Protection of Trading Interests
(U.S. Cuban Assets Control Regulations) Order, 1992, S.I. 1992, No. 2449 (U.K.);
Extraterritorial U.S. Legislation (Sanctions against Cuba, Iran, and
Libya)(Protection of Trading Interests) Order, 1996, S.I. 1996, No. 3171 (U.K.).
This last Order was jointly issued under Eur. Council Reg. 2271/96.
311. See Protection of Trading Interests (Australian Trade Practices) Order,
1988, S.I. 1988, No. 569 (U.K.).
312. See MEESSEN, supranote 309, at 157.
313. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification,
Consultation, and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National
Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9, 1984, U.S.-Can., reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 275 (1984);
Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.Austl., 34 T.I.A.S. 10,365; Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding
Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, U.S.-F.R.G. 27 U.S.T. 1956.
314.

See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL

ENTERPRISES (CIME), 1984 REVIEW OF THE OECD DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1984); Council Recommendation

Concerning Cooperation Between Member Countries on Restrictive Business
Practices Affecting International Trade, reprinted in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT (1984).
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C. Litigation and Enforcement

Certainly, America Online in the United States and America
Online Canada both will want to avoid running afoul of either the
U.S. controls or the Canadian blocking statute if at all possible.
Given that they are diametrically opposed, however, strict and
complete compliance under both sets of laws may not be
feasible 31 5 despite the substantial penalties attached to violating
these statutes and regulations. 3 16 The companies' decisions as to
what to do are rendered even more difficult because the outcome
in cases dealing with extraterritorial controls appears to differ
depending upon where the action is brought.
1. On the National Level
The classic illustration of this problem from the perspective of
the United States are the cases that arose out of the Russian
Trans-Siberian Pipeline dispute in 1982. Dresser Industries in
the United States had a French subsidiary, which in turn had a
French-based customer3 17 who was going to buy locally produced
products3 1 8 that were going to be used in the Russian pipeline.
When the Reagan Administration unilaterally3 19 expanded the
trade controls3 2 0 on dealing with the Soviet Union as a result of

315. This is the type of case that should establish the "true conflict" of
which Justice Souter spoke in Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 798-99 (finding no
true conflict between U.S. and U.K. law in the facts of the case).
316.
317.

See supranote 8.
The customer was a recently nationalized former U.S. holding

company, Creusoit-Loire, which also became embroiled in the same controversy
based upon its status as a continuing licensee of the former U.S. parent and as a
recipient of the "direct produc" of U.S. origin technology. See infranote 325. The
other contract party was V/O Machinoimport, a Soviet Foreign Trade
Organization.
318. The products involved were 21 French built gas compressors, based
upon U.S. technology. Thus, they were "controlled" from the U.S. perspective
based both upon Dresser's status as a subsidiary of a U.S. company, and because
of the inclusion of U.S. licensed technology. See infra notes 322-24 and
accompanying text.
319. Facing a lack of broad support for sanctions on Poland and the Soviet
Union, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger summed up the U.S. position by
stating that the Polish situation was "one of those times when, in order to assert
leadership and strengthen security, unilateral initiatives to implement sanctions
become necessary." Bernard Gwertzman, Debate on Curbs Against Moscow to Go
to Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1982, at 1.

320. The sanctions at issue involved trade controls on oil and gas
exploration and product equipment. See Statement on U.S. Measures Taken
Against the Soviet Union Concerning Its Involvement in Poland, PUB. PAPERS:
RONALD REAGAN 1209 (Dec. 29, 1981) (placing into effect the trade controls);
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its role in the imposition of martial law in Poland,3 2 1 the U.S.
parent told Dresser (France) S.A. that they would be unable to
fulfill the pre-existing contracts with the French customer. The
expanded U.S. trade controls specifically imposed limitations on
transactions related to the pipeline by foreign entities "owned or
controlled"32 2 by U.S. residents, nationals, or companies, as well
as on transactions by licensees or distributors who were involved
in the re-export of U.S. origin goods or technology or their direct
products. 32 3 Therefore, the transactions were clearly proscribed
from the US. perspective.
The French government disagreed with the U.S. policy and
sanctions, and especially with the application of the U.S. trade
controls to transactions between a French company and a French
customer involving goods manufactured in France. In order to
ensure that the goods were delivered, the French government
"requisitioned" the goods and compelled delivery as originally
contracted. 3 24 The U.S. government considered this a breach of
the controls and the direction the French subsidiary had received,
and the Commerce Department issued an ex parte Temporary
Denial Order against the subsidiary, blacklisting Dresser
(France).325 Four other foreign companies in different countries
were similarly blacklisted, based upon their refusal to comply

with the extraterritorial U.S. Pipeline controls.3 2 6

Controls on Exports of Petroleum Transmission and Refining Equipment to the
U.S.S.R., 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (1982) (spelling out the trade controls).

321. See Statement of the President on the Extension of U.S. Sanctions, 18
PUB. PAPERS: RONALD REAGAN 798 (June 18, 1982) (extending sanctions because
of martial law); Amendment of Oil and Gas Controls to the U.S.S.R., 47 Fed. Reg.
27,250 (1982) (explicating the U.S. reaction to martial law).
322. This definition reflects the same expansive view found under the TWEA
of who is obligated to follow U.S. controls. See supranote 141 and accompanying
text.
323. This reflects the unique U.S. assertion of continuing jurisdiction over
the re-export of U.S. origin goods, parts, or technology on the basis of something
akin to a "nationality" principle for the items involved. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(d)
(1982) (asserting jurisdiction); 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982). See also supra note
178 and accompanying text (explaining U.S. jurisdiction policy).
324. See Dresser (France) S.A. Decision and Order of Assistant Secretary for
Trade Administration, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,463 (1982) (factual background).
325. See 47 Fed. Reg. 38,170 (1982). A holding company which had
recently been nationalized was also denied its export privileges at the same time,
based upon its continuing obligations as a licensee of its former U.S. parent. See
47 Fed. Reg. 38,169 (1982) (temporarily denying the expert privileges).
326. The four were Nuovo Pignone of Italy, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,709 (1982),
John Brown Engineering of the United Kingdom, 47 Fed. Reg. 40,205 (1982),
AEG-Kanis and Mannesmann Anlagenbau of West Germany, 47 Fed. Reg. 44,603
& 44,604 (1982).
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Delft case some years later,3 27 the U.S.

government resorted to an ex parte Temporary Denial Order to
accomplish the blacklisting of Dresser (France).
The U.S.
government justified its choice on the grounds that the Temporary
Denial Order was a quick and timely measure aimed at preventing
future violations with further deliveries. Despite having virtually
the same practical effect upon Dresser's ability to conduct
business, the Temporary Denial Order was not intended as a
substitute for more extensive administrative proceedings leading
to a formal Denial Order retroactively punishing Dresser for the
3 28
deliveries demanded by the French government requisition.
Dresser had anticipated the Commerce Department action and
filed suit in the United States in an attempt to enjoin the entry of
the Temporary Denial Order, but was unsuccessful.3 2 9 It also
sought relief after the Order was entered, but was again
unsuccessful.3 0 Attempts to appeal the Temporary Denial Order
through the administrative process were also unavailing, 3 3 1 as
was yet another resort to the courts. 3 3 2 The U.S. administrative

327. See supra notes 185-201 and accompanying text (describing the Delft
case).
328. In denying Dresser's subsequent administrative appeal of the entry of
the Temporary Denial Order (TDO), the Commerce Department Assistant
Secretary for Trade Administration stated:
[Dresser] charges that the TDO was 'punitive'. Throughout its brief,
appellant has premised much of its argument on the basis of the TDO
being 'punitive' in nature. Precisely what is meant by 'punitive' is never
explained by appellant, but appellant apparently means the TDO was
issued to punish it for the delivery of the three compressors under its
Soviet contract rather than to forestall future violations or aid in the
investigation. Because I determine that this TDO was properly designed to
forestall future violations and fulfill its intended role . . . appellant's
'punitive' argument fails ....
The TDO was not designed to punish
appellant indeed no substantive violations have yet been proven. There is
no question, and the Department does not dispute, that appellant may
well suffer damage as a result of the imposition of the TDO. Whether
damage may be suffered, however, is not the pertinent inquiry in
determining whether the TDO was properly issued. All TDO's by their
nature can impose some injury on their recipients as an unavoidable
consequence of their purpose which is to prevent future violations and
facilitate an ongoing investigation.
Dresser (France) S.A. Decision and Order of Assistant Secretary for Trade
Administration, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,463 (1982) (emphasis added).
329. Dresser Industries Inc. v. Baldrige, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. Aug. 25,
1982) (order delaying temporary restraining order).
330. Dresser Industries Inc. v. Baldrige, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982).
331. See In the Matter of Dresser (France) S.A., reprintedin 18 INTL TRADE
REP. U.S. ExPoRT WKLY 25 (1982); Dresser (France) S.A. Decision and Order of
Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,463 (1982).
332. Dresser Industries, No. 82-2385 (order supporting temporary denial
order).
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and judicial processes upheld the U.S. controls, and rejected
3
Dresser's arguments regarding "foreign sovereign compulsion" 33
or violations of international law due to the reach of the
334
controls.
The U.S. legal position has been much criticized. As one
commentator wrote:
In the Dresser case, it seems apparent that neither of the
traditional principles of jurisdiction-territoriality and nationalityjustified the extension of U.S. export regulations to Dresser
(France). Dresser (France) had no operation within the United
States; and although it was owned by a U.S. parent company, it
was incorporated in France and therefore, under recognized legal

principles, was a national of that country. [While o]ne could argue
that jurisdiction was based on a considerably expanded notion of
the 'effects doctrine' inasmuch as continued exports to the Soviet
Union by Dresser (France) would affect U.S. foreign policy
objectives . . . the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law . . .
explicitly states that such effects must be direct and substantial. It
is doubtful if the Dresser 'effects' met either criterion under the
33 5
standards heretofore applied.

Ultimately, the case was mooted when the Temporary Denial
Order was vacated s3 6 as a result of the sanctions themselves

333. Id. The court rejected Dresser's last attempt at injunctive relief, in
part, by stating, "[t]his court is not convinced [by their argument concerning
foreign sovereign compulsion] that the plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing of
likelihood of success on the merits to warrant granting this extraordinary
preliminary relief." Id. at 300.
In its administrative appeals, the foreign sovereign compulsion defense was
rejected as irrelevant to the TDO process:
[Dresser's] argument that it is being impermissibly punished for acts
[T]his case involves the
compelled by the French government, fails ....
issuance of a TDO to permit completion of the investigation and to forestall
any future regulatory violations. This case does not involve the imposition
of penalties on appellantfor conduct done under compulsion of the French
government in violation of U.S. law. Accordingly, the defense of foreign
compulsion is inapplicable (emphasis added).
See Dresser (France) S.A. Decision and Order of Assistant Secretary for Trade
Administration, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,463 (1982).
334. The Assistant Secretary of Commerce, in rejecting Dresser's
administrative appeal, stated that allegations that the trade controls were

contrary to accepted principle of international law "[are] not within the purview of
Decision and Order of Assistant Secretary for Trade
my jurisdiction."
Administration, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,467 (1982).
See Monroe Leigh, ExportAdministrationAct - ExtraterritorialJurisdiction
335.
Over Foreign IncorporatedSubsidiaries of U.S. ParentCompanies Upheld in United
States Court 77 AM. J. INT' L. 626, 627 (1983).
The Orders denying all the other parties, who had been similarly
336.
sanctioned for violating the Pipeline controls, see supra notes 325-26, were
vacated at the same time. See 47 Fed. Reg. 52,490 (1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 52,480
(1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 52,491 (1982).
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being lifted in late 1982,3 7 in response to the overwhelming
opposition to their unilateral extraterritorial application from
industry and from concerned governments abroad.3 8
Nevertheless, the U.S. government's ability to invoke
unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions, and to punish those who
ignored such measures either at home or abroad with its
blacldisting tools, was upheld.
Thus, based upon Dresser's
experiences, America Online or America Online Canada would

337. See Revision of Export Controls Affecting the U.S.S.R. and Poland, 47
Fed. Reg. 51,858 (1982).
338. The extension of the U.S. trade controls to foreign subsidiaries in June
1982, caused an immediate outcry. On the same day the regulations appeared in
the Federal Register, the European Economic Community (now the EU) decried
the U.S. actions as violating international law in a lengthy memorandum of law.
It concluded by stating:
The European Community considers that the Amendments to the Export
Administration Regulations ... are unlawful since they cannot be validly
based upon any of the generally accepted bases of jurisdiction in
international law. Moreover, insofar as these Amendments tend to enlist
companies whose main ties are to the E.C. Member States for purposes of
American trade policy vis-6.-vis the U.S.S.R., they constitute an
unacceptable interference in the independent commercial policy of the
E.C. Comparable measures by third states have been rejected by the U.S.
in the past ....
For these reasons, the European Community calls upon
the U.S. authorities to withdraw these measures.
See Legal Service of the Commission of the European Communities, Economic
Communities' Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade with the
U.S.S.R., reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 891, 904 (1982). This was followed by an AideMemoire to the U.S. on July 14, 1982, expressing the E.C.'s "strongest
reservations." See LOWENFELD, supranote 207, at DS-307.
The United Kingdom issued an Order triggering its blocking statute, the
Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, and followed with its own statement in
August 1982, which asserted that the U.S. Pipeline controls "attempt to interfere
with existing contracts and . . . fare] an unacceptable extension of American
extraterritorial jurisdiction in a way which is repugnant in international law.... I
would hope that . .. our approach would make the American Administration
think again." See U.K. Statement and Order Concerning the American Export
Embargo with Regard to the Soviet Gas Pipeline, Aug. 2, 1982, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 851 (1982). The "approach" the United Kingdom took was to invoke the
blocking measure only as it pertained to the U.K. companies (e.g., John Brown
Engineering) being sanctioned by the U.S. temporary denial orders. See supra
note 326. France, West Germany, and Italy also separately denounced the U.S.
actions. See LOWENFELD, supranote 207, at 282.

The pipeline sanctions were also discussed in a number of different fora
including, the U.N. General Assembly, NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, and the
U.S. Congress, where a bill was approved by the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, which would have required the termination of the controls. See id at
303. President Reagan announced the repeal of the pipeline sanctions on the day
after General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev died. See Radio Address to the Nation
on East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions, 2 PUB. PAPERS:
RONALD REAGAN 1464, 1465 (Nov. 14, 1982) (repealing the sanctions).
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probably not want to be forced to challenge or defend themselves
against the U.S. controls in U.S. fora.
However, the foreign cases produced a different result and
show that choosing to comply with the extraterritorial application
of the U.S. laws is also fraught with difficulty. In another case
arising out of the pipeline dispute, Compagnie Europ~enne des
Ptroles, S.A. v. Sensor Nederland, B.V., a s 9 a Dutch company was
sued in the Netherlands for specific performance of a contract to

deliver goods covered by the U.S. trade controls.

Compagnie

Europdenne des Pdtroles (CEP) contracted with Sensor prior to
the U.S. imposition of the pipeline sanctions for the delivery of
"geophones," geological sensing equipment, which would be used
in connection with the construction of the Soviet pipeline. When
the U.S. sanctions were expanded in June 1982, Sensor as a
wholly owned subsidiary of Geosource Inc. in Texas, informed
4
CEP that it was precluded from completing the contract.
CEP insisted the contract be completed, and the court issued
an order to compel delivery with a penalty of 10,000 Nfis per day
fine for nonperformance.3" The court rejected the argument that
the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. trade controls compelled the
Dutch defendant to breach its contract, and that it could
s 42
to excuse its
therefore rely upon the doctrine of force majeure
principles of
general
under
that
stated
court
The
obligations.
with
jurisdiction
exercise
not
may
state
a
law,
international
respect to acts performed outside its borders unless permitted by
certain exceptions, 343 which the court found to be inapplicable.
In particular, the "owned or controlled" standard used in the U.S.
controls was a "dubious" application of the "nationality principle"
under international law and additionally was contrary to the
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty between the
Netherlands and the United States, which provided for mutual
4
recognition of companies established under each other's laws.3
Moreover, with regard to the "effects principle" the court stated

339. Case 82/716, 1982 Rechtspraak van de Week 167 (Dist. Ct, Neth.),
reprintedin 22 I.L.M. 66 (1983).
340. See id. at 68.
341. See id. at 74.
342. Sensor Nederland wished to invoke Article 74 of the Uniform Act
governing the International Sale of Goods. See id. at 69.

343.

See id. at 72.

344. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Mar. 27, 1956, U.S.Neth., art. XXIII(3), 8 U.S.T. 2043.

This echoes one of the criticisms of the U.S. position in the Dresser case, that
in applying its controls extraterritorially the U.S. government ignored Dresser
(France) status as a French juridical entity contrary to Article XIV(5) of the

Convention of Establishment, Dec. 21, 1960, U.S.-Fr., 11 U.S.T. 2398. See Leigh,
supra note 335, at 627 (criticizing the U.S. position).
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that it could not "be seen how the export to Russia of goods not
originating in the United States by a non-U.S. exporter could have
any direct and illicit effects within the United States. Via this
route too, therefore, the jurisdiction rule cannot be brought into
compatibility with international law."3 4s Lacking any valid basis
for the U.S. assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Dutch
defendant's refusal was not really a compulsory act and therefore
Sensor had no defense to its nonperformance. As with Dresser, it
took the lifting of the sanctions to resolve the case as a practical
matter. Thus, America Online or America Online Canada is likely
to find foreign fora as hostile to those who choose to ignore local
laws as the United States is with respect to its own local rules
and regulations. This situation can only be exacerbated when the
local laws, such as those in Canada, include blocking measures
specifically aimed at preventing the extraterritorial application of
the U.S. law.
The extent of the opposition abroad, and the risks to
businesses caught in the middle of competing governmental
policies and requirements, is illustrated by an earlier, and more
renowned, case involving the Detroit-based Freuhauf Corporation.
In the mid 1960s, Freuhauf held two-thirds of the shares in
Freuhauf-France, S.A., with the remainder of the shares being
held by French interests.3 46
One of its major customers,
Automobiles Berliet, S.A., contracted with Freuhauf-France for a
large number of Freuhauf semi-trailers. Subsequent to entering
into the contract, Freuhauf-France learned that the semi-trailers,
together with truck tractors manufactured by Berliet, would
eventually be delivered to China. 3 47 The proposed delivery to
China ran afoul of a now largely defunct OFAC embargo program
embodied in the Transactions Control Regulations, 3 4s and the

345.

See supranote 339 and accompanying text.

346. Five of the directors on Freuhauf-France's board were appointed by
Freuhauf in the United States (but were actually represented by a single
American expatriate under a permanent proxy) and three French directors were
appointed by the minority French shareholders. One of these three French

Directors, Raoul Massardy, also served as the President and General Manager of
Freuhauf-France. See LOWENFELD, supranote 207, at 92.
347. Although Freuhauf-France knew that Automobiles Berliet eventually
intended to export the trailers, no specific destination had been disclosed at the
time of contracting. See id.
348. The Transaction Control Regulations (TCR) were issued under the
authority of TWEA, like the FACR and subsequent CACR, and appeared at 31
C.F.R. §§ 505.01-505.60 (1954).
See Regulations Prohibiting Transactions
Involving the Shipment of Certain Merchandise Between Foreign Countries, 18
Fed. Reg. 4291 (1953). They were issued in the early 1950s, at a time when the
commodity focused East-West trade controls administered by the Commerce
Department did not reach re-exports of non-U.S. origin products and technology.
Accordingly, the role of the TCR was to supplement the Commerce controls with a
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U.S. government directed Freuhauf to rescind the contract or face
penalties for violating TWEA.
Automobiles Berliet, not unlike CEP in the Dutch case,
refused to release the subsidiary from its contract and threatened
suit. Raoul Massardy, the President of Freuhauf-France resigned,
and with the other minority French directors, petitioned the local
A judicial administrator was
French courts for relief.3 4 9
management of Freuhaufover
appointed to temporarily take
France for three months and perform the contract, and the Court
of Appeals of Paris subsequently affirmed this extraordinary

intervention

in the management

of the French Freuhauf

subsidiary.3 s o This appears to have been an application of the
French doctrine of abus de droit (abuse of a legal right), where the
controlling (foreign) management's desire to avoid liability under
the TWEA lost out to concerns over potentially drastic
consequences for Freuhauf-France itself if the contract were
canceled. 3 5 The Court of Appeals specifically noted that contract
cancellation would:
definitely ruin the financial equilibrium and credit of FreuhaufFrance and bring about its disappearance and laying off of more
than 600 workers, that these circumstances establish sufficiently

the emergency and the justification of the conservatory measure
taken ... [which was] governed by social interests in preference to
interests of certain members [of the Board of
the personal
3 52
Directors].

Underlying this approach was a rejection of the U.S. expansion of
the "nationality" principle to reach Freuhauf-France as a
"controlled" foreign subsidiary, and a concern for maintaining
French "sovereignty" in the face of an extraterritorial U.S.

requirement to license trade in strategic, non-U.S. origin goods being conducted
by "persons within the United States," as that term was defined in the FACR, see
31 C.F.R. § 505.20 (1997) (referring to the definition in § 500.300), to specified

Communist countries, which then included China. See 31 C.F.R. §505.10 (1997).
The interesting "trick" within the regulations was that "persons within the
United States" actually includes foreign business entities that are "owned or
See 31 C.F.R. §
controlled" by U.S. residents, nationals, or companies.
500.330(a)(4). Accordingly, the TCR reached Freuhauf's "controlled" subsidiary in

Francel
The TCR were largely removed with the demise of COCOM and the end of the
Cold War. See 60 Fed. Reg. 34,143 (1995).
349. See LOwENFELD, supra note 207, at 92-93.
350. See CA Paris, 14e ch., May 22, 1965, J.C.P. 1965, II 14274 (Freuhauf
Corporation v. Massardy) (upholding the decision of the judicial administrator).
351. See William Lawrence Craig, Application of the Trading with the Enemy
Act to Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans; Reflections on Freuhauf v.
Massardy, 83 HARV. L. REv. 579, 581-82 (1970).
352. See Freuhauf,J.C.P. 1965,1 14274.
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policy. 35 3
Interestingly, with the appointment of the judicial
administrator the United States no longer deemed FreuhaufFrance to be under U.S. "control" and declined to pursue the
matter further or impose any sanctions for completing the
deliveries. 3 5
Thus, as in the Dresser case, the sanctions were
effectively circumvented, but contrary to what occurred in the

pipeline dispute, no retaliatory action was taken by the United
States and Freuhauf was not blacklisted.
2. On the International Level
Private litigation in various national courts has not been the
only response to the extraterritorial application of the U.S.
controls and blacklists, and it is certainly not the most efficient
vehicle for resolving what is primarily a conflict in policies
between different governments. In fact, it is fair to assume that
private litigation over these issues is merely a symptom, an
indication
that
the
governments
concerned
are
not
communicating with each other about their conflicting policies, or
that their dialogues have broken down.
At the international level, it is not uncommon for
governments to resist the extraterritorial application of the U.S.
blacklists and controls. Such resistance aims not so much to
espouse the interests of the other countries' nationals and
companies, although that is certainly part of the motivation, as to
preserve those countries' interests in notions of state sovereignty
and jurisdiction. This resistance manifests itself in a variety of
government-to-government communications ranging from private
diplomatic communications, to public statements or debate in
both domestic and international fora, to the passage of blocking
legislation, and the pursuit of international remedies where
available. The intergovernmental dialogue can be conducted on
many levels simultaneously.
One example of this process might be the Canadian concerns
over the extraterritorial application of the U.S. TWEA, especially
with regard to China, during the late 1950s and early 1960s,
roughly the same general time period as the Freuhauf matter in

France. The discussions during this period, internally and
between the concerned governments, were sometimes heated, but
did not result in litigation or enforcement actions in either

353.

See LOwENFELD, supra note 207, at 99-100 (summarizing French

diplomatic notes sent to Washington protesting the U.S. direction to Freuhau).
354. The U.S. government also decided to overlook the wording of the
regulatory requirement, which extends the controls to those foreign business
entities that were "owned" by U.S. nationals or companies in addition to those
that were 'controlled" by them. See id. at 100.
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country, unlike the incident in France. Continued dissatisfaction
with the U.S. approach to extraterritoriality has, of course, led to
strong Canadian blocking measures and an increased prospect for
direct conflict. So, perhaps it may just be that Canadian tempers
3 55
remain cooler longer than tempers in some other jurisdictions.
Although the U.S. sanctions on China under the TWEA were
imposed in 1950 in connection with the Korean War,3 5 6 their
extraterritorial application in Canada did not become a public
issue until 1957-58, when it became apparent during the course

of prominent studies by a Royal Commission that "foreign controF
led to significantly different conduct by Canadian companies in a
number of areas.3 5 7 One of those areas was trade with China,
which was restricted by the U.S. FACR. 35 8 In the succeeding

years there were a number of prominent incidents in which U.S.controlled Canadian companies refused business with China
based upon the extraterritorial application of the U.S.
requirements, such as Ford's 1958 refusal to permit its Canadian
The Ford incident
subsidiary to sell 1000 cars to China.
produced an immediate reaction. The Canadian Minister of Trade
and Commerce, Harold Winch, declared in Parliament that:
[Tihe government must now make it explicitly and implicitly clear
that it is not going to be prone to deference to the United States.
Deference to our powerful neighbor to the south must not give way
to subservience either in the international field or with regard to
our own economic policies .... [T]his is our country and no matter
where companies are owned which are operating in our country, on
our natural resources, and on the wealth produced by our people,
if necessary, that we in
it must be made clear, by legislation
35 9
Canada sell where we desire to sell.
The Ford incident was sufficiently prominent that it was a
topic for discussion later that year when President Eisenhower

355. Also, for many years the Canadian government maintained a general
policy of not intervening in disputes between suppliers, dealers, and customers in
their business arrangements. See Corcoran, supra note 266, at 198-201.
356. See supranote 62 and accompanying text.
357. The areas in which the Commission found controlled subsidiaries
behaved differently included the issuance of securities, personnel policies, annual
reporting practices, research activities, charitable contributions, and commercial
policies regarding domestic sourcing and export sales. See Corcoran, supranote
266, at 189.
358. However, as many American businesses simply combined their
Canadian subsidiaries' export licensing and trade controls compliance operations
into their own operations in the U.S., there was less general "visibility" in Canada
as to what was being done in the name of the Canadian companies. See id. at
189-92.
359. Speech of Mr. Winch, House of Commons Debates, May 19, 1958, I, at
196 (quotedin Concoran, supranote 266, at 194-95).
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met with Prime Minister Diefenbaker, and an agreement was
reached to establish formal consultations on such issues.
The Canadian and United States governments have given
consideration to situations where the export policies and laws of
the two countries may not be in complete harmony. It has been
agreed that in these cases there will be full consultation between
the two governments with a view to finding through appropriate
procedures satisfactory solutions to concrete problems as they
36 0
arise.

This case by case approach did result in expedited license
approvals in some situations, and an intergovernmental study
group was formed to promote even greater cooperation. 3 61
Refusals continued to occur, however, although it was often
difficult to determine if a particular refusal to trade was solely
based upon the application of the U.S. FACR or reflected some
other business consideration or requirement. 3 62 Similar refusals
by U.S.-controlled Canadian firms were also occurring with regard
to the Soviet Union, under the extraterritorial application of the
U.S. EAA and regulations, which further added to the Canadian
3 63
government's concerns.
One result of the Canadian-U.S. dialogue during this period
was an increased sensitivity in the United States to other nations'
concerns about the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. This
led to the inclusion of a limitation on the extraterritorial
application of the Cuban embargo regulations, with what some
call a "Canadian exception," 3 64 when they were first issued in
1963.365
The CACR employs broad general prohibitions, and reaches
out to impose its obligations upon all "persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States," in the familiar pattern of the

360.
361.

Statement on Export Polices, DEP'" ST. BULL., July 1958, at 209.
See Communiqu6 of the U.S. Canadian Joint Committee on Trade and

Economic Affairs, DEP'" ST. BULL., Jan. 1959, at 128, 130.

362. Automobile, tractors, and related equipment were refused, for various
reasons, in subsequent inquiries by the Chinese. For example, MasseyFerguson's refusals to sell 400 tractors to China in 1961 was attributed to a lack

of production capacity. Parts suppliers' refusals to sell to China in 1963, 1964,
and 1965 were similarly attributed to mixed motives. See Corcoran, supra note

266, at 200-201. Many Canadian nationalists viewed these instances as further
demonstration of U.S. domination of Canadian business. See LOWENFELD, supra
note 207, at 102.
363. In 1964, U.S. parent corporations prevailed upon their Canadian

subsidiaries not to show Canadian manufactured equipment at a Moscow trade

fair. See Corcoran, supranote 266, at 200.
364. See id. at 203. Calling the offshore trading exception to the CACR a
"Canadian" exception is a misnomer, however, as it was available for use by all

non-U.S. businesses.
365.

See 31 C.F.R. § 515.541 (1963).
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FACR. 366 As initially written, however, the regulations included a
"general license,"3 67 which excluded transactions by foreign nonbanking firms in non-U.S. origin goods from the scope of the
CACR prohibitions.3 68 Additionally, no U.S. financing, dollars, or
36 9
transport was permitted for these "off shore" transactions.
Over time, as the U.S. policy toward Cuba changed, this provision
was "clarified" to specifically exclude U.S. nationals or companies
from participating in or approving foreign transactions with
Cuba.3 7 0 Subsequently, the provision was entirely replaced with
a requirement that all such transactions be individually licensed
by OFAC on a case by case basis. 3 7 1 OFAC's ability to license
these "offshore" transactions with Cuba was then eliminated by
Congress with the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992.372 In essence,
this act aligns the prohibitions of the Cuban embargo with the full
extraterritorial reach of the other TWEA-based embargoes
3 73
administered under the FACR.
This type of diplomatic dialogue directly or indirectly
attempting to harmonize differing polices is clearly imperfect, but

still generally preferred over more confrontational methods.
Actual cases challenging these extraterritorial controls and
blacklists on the international level are infrequent, and even more
rarely result in a decision. In part, this is because economic
sanctions and trade controls are often inextricably interwoven
with matters of national security or foreign policy that are not
ordinarily regarded as justiciable in international fora.
In Nicaraguav. United States, 3 74 for example, when the U.S.
support to the Contras and the imposition of the trade embargo
against Nicaragua3 75 was challenged, the United States refused to
submit to the International Court of Justice's jurisdiction stating:
[t]he United States has consistently taken the position
proceedings initiated by Nicaragua in the International
Justice are a misuse of the Court for political purposes
the Court lacks jurisdiction and competence over such a
The conflict in Central America.

that the
Court of
and that
case...

. . is an inherently political

366.
See supranote 141.
367. A "general license" is a regulatory authorization that requires no
specific application or approval by the government.
368.
See 31 C.F.R. § 515.541 (1965).
369. Id.
370.
See 31 C.F.R. § 515.412 (1975).
371.
See 31 C.F.R. § 515.558 (1975).
372. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1997).
373. This tightening of the restrictions on offshore transactions also
occasioned the passage of blocking statutes in a number of jurisdictions. See
supranotes 287-314 and accompanying text.
374. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Jurisdiction and Admissibility
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 392 (Nov. 26, 1984).
375.
See supranote 73 and accompanying text.
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problem that is not appropriate for judicial resolution. The conflict
will be solved only by political and diplomatic means-not through
a judicial tribunal. The International Court of Justice was never
intended to resolve issues of collective security and self-defense
3 76
and is patently unsuited for such a role.
Interestingly, the World Court nevertheless went on to
render a decision in Nicaragua's favor on a number of grounds
following the U.S. withdrawal,3 7 7 but did not find that the U.S.
embargo on trade with Nicaragua violated principles of customary
international law.3 78 Perhaps this was because the NTCR were
less extraterritorial and more of a "primary"3 79 boycott on trade
than may be the case with the other OFAC sanctions
38 0
programs.

This natural preference for diplomatic as opposed to
confrontational means of resolving disputes over differing
governmental policies is also reflected in the formal incorporation
of a "national security exception" from the dispute mechanisms
provided in major international agreements, such as the General
381
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO Agreements,

376. Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by
Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, DEP'r ST. BULL., Mar. 1985, at 64.
377. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, Merits (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27, 1986).
378. The I.C.J. stated:
Nicaragua has also asserted that the United States is responsible for an
"indirect" form of intervention in its internal affairs inasmuch as it has
taken, to Nicaragua's disadvantage, certain action of an economic
nature.... While admitting... that some of these actions were not
unlawful in themselves, counsel for Nicaragua argued that these measures
of economic constraint add up to a systematic violation of the principle of
non-intervention. The Court does not here have to concern itself with
possible breaches of such international economic instruments as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade . . . any such breaches would
appear to fall outside the Court's jurisdiction... the Court merely has to
say that it is unable to regard such action on the economic plane as is
here complained of as a breach of the customary-law principle of nonintervention.
See id.
244-45.
379. See supranotes209-14 and accompanying text.
380. See supranote 73 and accompanying text.
381. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. The security exemption in the
GA'IT/WTO reads:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests;
or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests;
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and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),3 8 2 which
might otherwise provide a vehicle for challenges over these types

of controls. 38 3 Traditionally, the appropriateness of invoking the
exemption is wholly subjective and left entirely to the state
asserting the national security interest. 38 4 Thus, it is difficult to

(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and
to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of
its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Id. art. XXI.
382.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
reprintedin 32 I.L.M. 289, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. The security
exemption in NAFTA reads:
[NIothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any Party to furnish or allow access to any information the
disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its essential security
interests;
(b) to prevent any Party from taking any actions that it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and

to such traffic and transactions in other goods, materials, services and
technology undertaken directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a
military or other security establishment;
(ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(iii) relating to the implementation of national policies or international
agreements respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices; or
(c) to prevent any Party from taking action in pursuance of its obligations
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international
peace and security.
Id. art 2102.
383.
The United States used the national security exemptions to justify its
trade controls on Czechoslovakia in 1949, the Cuban controls in 1962, and in the
Nicaraguan case in 1985. Other countries have also invoked GATT Art. XXI on
several occasions, including Ghana's defense of its Portuguese boycott in 1961,
the United Arab Republic's defense of the Arab/Israeli boycott in 1970, Sweden's
import quotas for shoes in 1975, the 1982 EEC, Canadian, and Australian ban on
Argentinian imports, and the EU's 1991 restrictions on trade with the former
Yugoslavia. See 1 GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAw AND PRACTICE
600-08 (6th ed. 1995). There have been no cases where Art. 2102 of the newer
NAFTA regime has been at issue.
384.
During the discussion of the Czechoslovakian complaint regarding the
U.S. trade controls in 1949, it was stated that "every country must be the judge in
the last resort on questions relating to its own security." Id. at 600. GAIT
member states, however, were admonished that '[o]n the other hand, every
contracting party should be cautious not to take any step which might have the
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pursue an international case challenging economic sanctions,
trade controls, and blacklists to conclusion, but perhaps not
impossible. 38 5
Despite these difficulties, both Canada and Mexico
threatened to challenge the U.S. Helms-Burton Act under
NAFTA, 38 6 and the EU did, in fact, initiate a complaint with the
WTO. 38 7 Although, as expected,
Under Secretary Eizenstat
stated that the WTO Panel "is not an appropriate forum for
resolving differences over what is essentially a disagreement over
foreign policy,"3 8 8 the EU argued that a country should not be
allowed to avoid the WTO dispute resolution process simply by
asserting the national security exemption.
Rather, it must
satisfactorily justify any claim of exemption to the panel itself.38 9
"If countries can just say this or that policy or law is motivated by
national security interests more than trade interests, and thus

effect of undermining the General Agreement" Id. The panel in the Nicaraguan

case reached a similar result stating that it "did not consider the question of

whether the terms of Article XXI precluded it from examining the validity of the

United States' invocation of that article." Id. at 601. Although its unfettered use is

increasingly criticized, there has been no successful challenge to the assertion of
the "security exemption" as yet. See MEESSEN, supranote 309, at 196.
385. For example, the EU argues that the security exemption is not
applicable to the U.S. embargo of Cuba and cannot be used to justify secondary
boycotts or trade restrictions in third countries. See Frances Williams & Nancy

Dunne, EU Forces Dispute Panel on Cuba Trade: World Trade Organisationto Rule
on Helms-BurtonLaw, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 21, 1986, § 1, at 14.

386. See, e.g., Debra Beachy, Sanctions on Cuba Rile Mexico, Europe; But
U.S. Trade Too Important to Lose, Hous. CHRON., May 31, 1996, BUS. at 1. For a
discussion of the Helms-Burton Act's possible violations of the NAFTA
agreements, see Brian J. Welke, GATT and NAFTA v. The Helms-Burton Act: Has
the United States Violated MultilateralAgreements?, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INTt L. 361
(1997).
387. The WTO agreed to establish a panel to consider the EU complaint
under its dispute resolution procedures on November 20, 1996. The EU
complaint actually challenges both the Helms-Burton (LIBERTAD) Act and the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 50 U.S.C. 1701 note.
See John Zarocostas, Trans-Atlantic Brinkmanship on Cuba Threatens to Hobble
World Trade Court, J. COM., Feb. 4, 1997, at IA. The EU complaint alleges that
Titles I and IV of the Helms-Burton Act, see supranotes 30-50 and
accompanying text, violate GATT Arts. I, III, V, XI, and XIII, and the related
General Agreement on Trade in Services Arts. I, Im, VI, XVI, and XVI. See
Overview of the State-of-play of WTO Disputes (last modified Jan. 23, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org/dispute/ bulletin.htm> [hereinafter Overview of the State-ofPlay of WTO Disputes]. For an analysis of the strength of these claims, see Pavel
K. Chudzicki, The European Union's Response to the LIBERTAD Act and the IranLibya Act Extraterritorialitywithout Boundaries?,28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 505 (1997).
388.
See Jim Lobe, U.S.! Cuba-Trade: U.S. to Reject WTO Pane4 INTER PRESS,
Feb. 20, 1997.

389. Of course, this is not what happened when the U.S. withdrew from the
Nicaraguan case. See supranotes 374-78 and accompanying text.
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to have a hard
block a case from going forward, the WTO is3 9 going
0
forum."
credible
a
as
itself
time establishing
This highlights that the greatest "threat" growing out of the
current dispute over the U.S. controls is not to the United States
nor the EU, Canada, or Mexico, but rather to international
institutions such as the WTO.
The United States is the single largest user of the WTO
dispute resolution process, 3 9 1 and was the major proponent of a
dispute mechanism that could not be "frustrated" by a potential
defendant. 39 2 The problem presented by the EU complaint is that
pursuing the case is a "lose-lose" proposition.3 9 3 If the United
States succeeds in asserting the security exemption it will provide
a precedent for other nations to abandon compliance with the
GATT/WTO rules whenever they are involved in a "political row
with a neighbor;" and if a decision is rendered against the United
States, it could lead to increased opposition to continued U.S.
It was this
membership in the WTO from Congress.3 94
conundrum which was avoided, or at least postponed, by the EU
agreement to suspend further action on the complaint in
exchange for the Clinton Administration's efforts to seek repeal of
the Title IV visa restrictions and continue the suspension of the
Title III provisions authorizing private civil actions against
"traffickers" in expropriated Cuban property.3 9 S It remains to be
seen whether this truce can be maintained, however.
Thus, the tools available on the international level are
essentially diplomatic or political, and not the sort of remedies
that lead to immediate and predictable results in individual cases.
Nevertheless, practical and political approaches on both the
national and international levels have proven to be more
efficacious for companies caught in the middle between competing
governmental policies than have the more formal legal tools and
remedies. The recent Wal-Mart incident is an example, and not
far removed from the issues facing America Online in our
hypothetical.

390.
391.

See Lobe, supranote 381.
See Overview of the State-of-play of WTO Disputes,supranote 387.

See John H. Jackson, Helms-Burton, The U.S. and the WTO, A.S.I.L.
392.
INSIGHT (Mar. 1997) <http://www.asil.org/insight7.htm>.
See Robert Evans, EU, U.S. Seen Working to Avoid WTO Clash on Cuba,
393.
REUTERS WORLD, Dec. 4, 1996.

See id.
394.
See R.W. Apple, Split Over Cuba is Eased by U.S. and Europeans, N.Y.
395.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1997, at A3. The WTO Panel suspended its work on April 25,

1997. See Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes; "Memorandum of
Understanding Concerning the U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act," Apr. 11, 1997, DEP"T COM. BULL., reprintedat 36 I.L.M. 529
(1997).
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When a customer in Wal-Mart Canada's store in Winnipeg
noticed a "Made in Cuba" label on inexpensive pajamas, the store
manager became concerned about Wal-Mart's compliance with
the U.S.-Cuban controls. The pajamas had been imported by
another Canadian company and then supplied to Wal-Mart in
Canada. It was initially decided to remove the pajamas from the
shelves of all 135 stores in Canada. That decision, however,
triggered an investigation by the Canadian Justice Department
into possible violations of the FEMA. Simultaneously, Wal-Mart
Inc., based in Arkansas, was in discussions with OFAC at the
U.S. Treasury Department, and directed its Canadian subsidiary
to comply with the U.S. laws and keep the pajamas off the
shelves. Wal-Mart Canada, however, "after a comprehensive
review and consultation with [Canadian] customers, legal
advisors, and Canadian Government officials" decided to restock
the pajamas.3 9 6 "Wal-Mart Canada made this decision in direct
contradiction of directives it received from Wal-Mart Stores Inc.,"
according to a company spokesperson who emphasized that the
Canadian subsidiary was told to 'comply with U.S. law and
3 97
regulations, including the Cuban Assets Control Regulations."
Despite subsequent protestations by OFAC that "we have a law to
fulfill, " 398 there has been no public indication that any further
action was taken by either U.S. or Canadian authorities. Some
have even suggested that the actions of the respective companies
were coordinated to demonstrate the parent's and subsidiary's
compliance with their respective local laws, notwithstanding the
apparent conflict between those provisions.3 9 9

In many respects, this leads to an unsatisfactory result for
America Online and America Online Canada. Absent reliable,
predictable direction as to how competing and conflicting legal
requirements will be enforced, individual businesses caught in
the middle must rely upon uncertain politics and prosecutorial
discretion, at least in the short term. In the longer term,
however, there is evidence that a new standard of customary
international law is emerging, which would proscribe the use of
unilateral extraterritorial blacklists as impermissible secondary
boycotts. If such a standard does emerge, it will both inhibit the
adoption of unilateral extraterritorial measures in the first

396. See David E. Sanger, U.S.-CanadianSplit on Cuba Tangles Wal-Mart's
Pajamas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1997, at Al; Wal-Mart Continues Cuban Pajama
Sales, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Mar. 27, 1997, at 217, C3.
397. See David E. Sanger, Wal-Mart Canadais Putting Cuban Pajamas Back
on Shelf, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997, at D4.
398. See Norman Kempster, Wal-Mart May Face Sanctions Over Cuban Pjs
Policy, L. A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1997, at D1.
399. See Sanger, supranote 397.

1998]

BLACKLISTING AND SECONDARY BOYCOTTS

instance, and additionally provide a legal basis for challenging
such measures in either domestic or international fora.

IV. EMERGENCE OF A CUSTOMARY STANDARD
ON SECONDARY BOYCOTTS

Some urge that all forms of "economic coercion" between
nations should be proscribed by international law, 4 ° and
endeavor to find support for this proposition in various U.N.
Charter provisions 4 °1 and declarations 4°2 dealing with aggression
and the "threat or use of force," the general principle of nonintervention in another state's affairs, 4 03 or in similar documents
and pronouncements by other bodies such as the Organization of

400.
See e.g., D.W. BOwETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 147, 176
(1958); HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 726-731 (1950); MYRES S.
McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

124-129 (1961); Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General
Assembly: A Post-Cold WarAssessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-ive
Year Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 901, 931-950 (1995)
(discussing Cuba's various proposals for a U.N. resolution condemning the U.S.
embargo in general terms).
401. For example, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter requires that "all
members refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." U.N.
CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
402.
See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, 2315th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 48, at art. 32, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/3281 (1974); Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. GAOR, 254th Sess., Annex, 1883d plen. mtg., Agenda Item 85, at 1, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2625 (1970); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and
Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20th Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 14, 1408 plen.
mtg., Agenda Item 107, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2131/Rev. 1 (1965). These
resolutions were passed largely without the support of the developed nations, who
tend to oppose restrictions on the use of economic measures, whereas developing
countries tend to favor restricting the use of such measures. See Porotsky, supra
note 400, at 920-26; Christopher C. Joyner, The Transnational Boycott as
Economic Coercion in InternationalLaw: Policy, Place, and Practice, 17 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 205, 243-248 (1984).
403. Although "force" is not defined in the U.N. Charter, the term as used in
Article 2(4) is generally considered as not encompassing economic aggression
because of the legislative history behind the provision. As the Charter was being
drafted in 1945, Brazil proposed that Article 2(4) include "the threat or use of
economic measures in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations." Brazil's proposed wording was expressly rejected. See Joyner, supra
note 402, at 240 n.128 (citing Doc. 25, I/l/10, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 525, 549
(1945); Doc. 784, 1/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 331, 334-25 (1945)). It is for this
reason, in part, that those arguing for such a norm in international law also place
such emphasis upon other similar documents and resolutions.
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American States (OAS).4 04 Such a claim is, however, over
broad 4°5 and clearly not supported by customary state
4° 5
practice.
Certainly, the use of boycotts, blacklists, and similar
economic measures as foreign policy tools is to be recognized and
preferred if the alternative is a greater proclivity for states to use
force to resolve foreign policy differences. Conversely, it is equally
certain that international norms have progressed 4 ° 7 in the 250

404. The language in the OAS Charter states, "No state or group of States
has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other states" and "[n]o state may use or
encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in
order to force the sovereign will of another state and obtain from it advantages of
any kind." Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2
U.S.T. 2394, 2420, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 56. After a largely unsuccessful attempt at
directing its members to impose sanctions on Cuba, the OAS replaced its own call
for sanctions with a resolution, which acknowledged that each member state had
the right to determine its own diplomatic and trading relationships with Cuba.
See Final Act, Sixteenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, July 29, 1975, OEA/Ser.F/II.Doc.9/75, Rev. 2 (1975).
This was interpreted by the United States as requiring a (slight) reduction in the
extraterritorial application of the Cuban embargo regulations as they then existed
and resulted in a "favorable licensing policy" for offshore transactions which
remained in place until Congress directed otherwise with the Cuban Democracy
Act of 1992. See 39 Fed. Reg. 25,317 (1974).
405. See Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion
Against Developing Countries: Note by the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., Agenda Item 91(a), U.N. Doc. A/48/535 (1993).
406. See Porotsky, supra note 400 at 930-31, 949-50, 957-58; Joyner,
supra note 402, at 240-56, 285-86.
407. While perhaps not rising to the level of a new international norm
proscribing economic coercion, the support expressed among the developing
countries in eight U.N. resolutions passed since 1983 reaffirming the 1970
Declaration of Principles and the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights is significant.
See G.A. Res. 48/168, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, 86th plen. mtg., at
148, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/168 (1993); G.A. Res. 46/210, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, 79th plen. mtg., at 143, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/210 (1991); G.A. Res.
44/215, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, 85th plen. mtg., at 141, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/215 (1989); G.A. Res. 42/173, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 49,
96th plen. mtg., at 130, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/173 (1987); G.A. Res. 41/165, U.N.
GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp.. No. 49, 96th plen. mtg., at 130, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/41/165 (1987); G.A. Res. 40/185, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53,
119th plen. mtg., at 146, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/185 (1985); G.A. Res. 39/210,
U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, 104th plen. mtg., at 160, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/39/210 (1984); G.A. Res. 38/197, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 41,
104th plen. mtg., at 153, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/197 (1983).
Additionally, the gradually increasing support for Cuba's annual proposal for
a Resolution on the Necessity of Ending the U.S. Embargo against Cuba, from
1992-96, suggests that more countries are recognizing that at least certain types
of economic measures are problematic. See Resolution on the Necessity of Ending
[the Economi, Commercial and FinancialEmbargo Imposed by the United States of

America] against Cuba, G.A. Res. 51/17, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
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years since Emmerich de Vattel advocated that unfettered
freedom in formulating economic policies and conducting trade

was an attribute of sovereignty with his classic statement that

"[e]very state has consequently a right to prohibit the entrance of
foreign merchandises; and the nations that are affected by such
prohibition have no right to complain of it, as if they had been
refused an office of humanity."4° 8 Thus, given that some uses of
economic measures such as blacklists will be accepted and others
will draw condemnation, 4 09 the problem is to determine where the
limits might lie. This is especially difficult when resort to the
principal trade treaties may be blocked by broad exceptions 4 10
the general use
and there is no clear international norm regarding
411
of economic measures for policy reasons.
The debate is often framed as a question of what are the
limits on a state's ability to exercise its proscriptive jurisdiction
extraterritorially, when extraterritorial measures will inherently
impinge upon the sovereignty and policies of other nations.
Although this issue can be analyzed from a number of
perspectives, it is typically addressed as a matter of

12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/17 (1996); G.A. Res. 50/10, U.N. GAOR, 50th. Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, Agenda Item 27, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/10 (1995); G.A. Res.
49/9, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Agenda Item 24 at 8, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/49/9 (1994); G.A. Res. 48/16, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
Agenda Item 30, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/16 (1993); G.A. Res. 47/19, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Agenda Item 39, 70th plen. mtg., at 40, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/47/19 (1992); U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Agenda Item
142, at 524, U.N. Doc. A/46/L.20 (1991), uihdrawn G.A. Decision 46/407, 46th
mtg., Nov. 13, 1994.
408. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 38 (photo. reprint 1982)
(1758).
409. The compatibility under international law of any state's actions,
economic or otherwise, with regard to another state may also be influenced by
whether the action is considered to be an act of "retorsion" or an act of "reprisal."
An act of retorsion occurs when one state, whose citizens are subjected to harsh,
but legal, treatment by a foreign government, responds with equally harsh, but
legal, measures of its own. A reprisal is similar, but differs conceptually in that
the acts taken would not be legal but for the illegal behavior of the foreign state at
which the reprisal is directed. Thus, a retorsion is an inherently legal act limited
only by political policy, and a reprisal is a self-help countermeasure whose
legality requires a higher level of justification. See Porotsky, supra note 400 at
915-18; Joyner, supranote 402, at 253-55. Both concepts are closely related to
internationally recognized rights of self-defense and self-help, as a species of
retaliation against acts of other states. These notions are perhaps less useful
here, as the blacklisting and other economic measures being discussed are not
necessarily related to any form of "retaliation," but are simply being used as tools
to meet various foreign policy objectives. See also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW, § 905.
410. See supranotes 381-85 and accompanying text.
411. See supranotes 400-06 and accompanying text.
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"reasonableness" and international comity. 41 2 As the connection

with the legislating state becomes increasingly attenuated when
compared with the extraterritorial measure's intrusion upon
actions taken within a foreign state, the likelihood that the
measure will be deemed an objectionable impingement of foreign
state sovereignty increases. Accordingly, actions based upon the
"territorial" principle or the "nationality" principle are typically
accepted and those based solely upon the "effects" principle
become more problematic, usually because of disagreements as to
how "substantial" the effects need to be before a state can claim
them as a basis to proscribe extraterritorial behavior. 413 This is
the framework in which the U.S. extraterritorial laws and
controls, such as those in the current Helms-Burton Act, are
usually approached and debated, as a question of the U.S.
4 14
government's "power" to proscribe behavior abroad.
This approach is perhaps misplaced and inappropriate when
applied to the blacklists accompanying these extraterritorial
controls, which incidentally embody the very elements most often
criticized in the extraterritoriality debate: a broad view of both
the "nationality" and "effects" principles. Rather, the question is
not whether the U.S. government has the authority to proscribe
behavior based upon U.S. "control" of foreign firms, 4 15 the direct
or indirect presence of U.S. parts or technology in foreign made
goods,4 16 or the "trafficking" in expropriated property of U.S.
citizens, 4 17 under an expansive notion of the "nationality" or
"effects" principles supporting proscriptive jurisdiction. Rather,
the question is whether the U.S. government should refrain from
doing so. The issue is not one of authority or power, but one of
what is prudent and appropriate in the presence of what Justice

412. What is or is not "reasonable" can then be broken down into a number
of factors, as is done in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. See
REsTATEMENT Op FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 403.

413. Neither the "protective" principle (that certain extraterritorial acts,
such as espionage, affect the security of the state) nor the "universality" principle
(that certain acts, such as slavery, piracy, etc., are so heinous that may be
prosecuted in any state) enunciated in the Restatement are considered here, as
they are not typically employed in justifying the extraterritorial application of
economic sanctions, trade controls, or blacklists. See id. §§ 402(3) & 404.
414. See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, AGORA: The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (L1BERTAD) Act, 90 AM. J. INTL LAw 419 (1996); Brice M.
Clagett, Title L7 of the Helms-BurtonAct is Consistent with InternationalLaw, 90 AM.
J. INT'L LAW 434 (1996); Brice M. Clagett, AGORA: The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LiBERTAD) Act, Continued: A Reply to ProfessorLowenfeld,

90 AM. J. INT'L LAw 641 (1996) [hereinafter Clagett, Reply to Lowenfeld].
415.

See supraPart 1.C.1.

416.
417.

See supra Part 1.C.2.
See supra Part 1I.B.1.
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Souter called a "true conflict" in the Hartford Pire Insurance
4 18
case.
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United

States indicates that,
[w]hen it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to
exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions
of the two states are in conflict, each state has an obligation to
evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in exercising
jurisdiction. . . [A] state should defer to the other state if that
4 19
state's interest is clearly greater.

Without affecting the ability of belligerent nations to use
blacklisting to impose primary controls or boycotts domestically
or even upon their own nationals abroad, an international
consensus does appear to be building that the unilateral
extraterritorial application of these controls to third parties is
impermissible. 42 0
Irrespective of the basis claimed for the
authority to do so, the international community is coming to
regard the blacklisting of third parties, or secondary boycotts, as
"unreasonable," and therefore an unjustifiable intrusion upon the
sovereignty of the neutral state. It is perhaps too early in the
process to assume that international secondary boycotts are
recognized as per se illegal, 4 2 1 but it is certainly too late to claim
4 22
that they are not problematic under international law.

418.

See HartfordFireIns., 509 U.S. at 798-99.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, § 403(3).
420. The term "third parties" here would include foreign business entities
established in accordance with local laws, and reject the expansive U.S. notion of
nationality extending to foreign "controlled" entities.
421. Professor Lowenfeld states:
419.

As I see it, the Helms-Burton Act is thus in intent-and probably in
effect-a classical secondary boycott, much like the Arab boycott of

Israel.... It is true that the sanctions imposed by the Helms-Burton Act
are distinguishable from the Arab boycott of Israel, in that the sanction for
violation under Helms-Burton is not a prohibition, only exposure to
litigation and exclusion .... The objective, in any case, is the same. X, a
national of state C (say Canada), is being coerced by state A (the United
States) to stop trading with B (Cuba) or handling the merchandise
containing products of state B, although the law of C makes such trade
perfectly legal and may even encourage it. I believe that (in time of peace)
the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States for these purposes, to
impose a secondary boycott on Cuba, like the exercise of jurisdiction by
the Arab League to impose a secondary boycott on Israel, is contrary to
international law, because it seeks unreasonably to coerce conduct that
takes place wholly outside of the state purporting to exercise its
jurisdiction to prescribe.
See Lowenfeld, supranote 414, at 430.
422. In his response to Professor Lowenfeld, Clagett states:
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This trend in customary international law can be traced to
the United States own aversion to the use of secondary boycotts
in its domestic labor law, 42 3 and in its legislation to counter the

secondary and tertiary effects of the Arab League's boycott of

Israel.424 The trend also can be seen in U.S. efforts to encourage
other nations to pass similar antiboycott legislation of their
own. 42 5 Equally significant is the increasing willingness of major
trading allies to augment their diplomatic objections to
extraterritorial laws with the passage or invocation of local
"blocking measures." 42 6 These blocking measures are specifically
intended to frustrate the use of the U.S. controls as secondary or
tertiary boycotts within their countries and, ironically, derive from
the United States own antiboycott legislation. It also is seen in
the increasingly unified opposition to extraterritoriality being
generated in the United Nations 42 7 and other international
bodies 4 25 in response to laws like the Helms-Burton Act. Finally,
it is also increasingly likely that international tribunals, when

Professor Lowenfeld .

.

. wants to characterize [Title III of the Helms-

Burton Act] as a "secondary boycott," a crude attempt by the United States
to impose its entire trade embargo against Cuba on foreign countries and
companies. On the other hand, he is too fine and honorable a scholar
wholly to ignore the fact that Title III deals only with "trade" of a specific
type: occupying, dealing in, or otherwise benefiting or profiting from
property that was confiscated from U.S. nationals without
compensation....
Having branded Title III as a secondary boycott,
Professor Lowenfeld does not, as I would have expected, go on to argue
that such boycotts violate customary international law. He says only that
the Arab boycott of Israel is such an animal, and that the United States
"strongy condemned" it in its antiboycott legislation.
But that
condemnation was expressly on the ground of U.S. policy, not

international law. . . . If a legal case against Title III can be made,
Professor Lowenfeld has not made it.
See Clagett, Reply to Lowenfeld, supranote 414, at 641-42.
423. See supranote 209.
424. See supranotes 245-65 and accompanying text.
425. See, e.g., Joyner, supra note 402, at 268-85 (discussing antiboycott
legislation in Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom).
426. See supranotes 268-314 and accompanying text.
427. See supranote 407 and accompanying text.
428. The Juridical Committee of the OAS issued a nonbinding opinion that
the Helms-Burton Act violates generally accepted principles of international law,
in part, because of its operation as a secondary boycott. The opinion stated that
the U.S. "does not have the right to attribute liability to nationals of third states
for a claim against a foreign state (ie., Cuba)" and that it "does not have the right
to impose liability on third parties not involved in a nationalization through the
creation of liability not linked to the nationalization or unrecognized by
international law on this subject, thus modifying the [recognized] juridical bases
for liability." See Inter-American Juridical Committee Opinion Examining the U.S.
Helms-Burton Act, Organization of American States Document OEA/Ser. G,
CP/doc. 2803/96, Aug. 27, 1996, reprintedin 35 I.L.M. 1322, 1332 (1996).
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given the opportunity, will give voice to this trend and declare
secondary boycotts as violative of customary international law.
One of the first demonstrations of this emerging rule of
customary international law has already occurred in connection
with a WTO case involving U.S. environmental laws and
regulations. 4 2 9 The EU and the Netherlands challenged U.S.
restrictions on the import of tuna established under the Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972.43
Essentially, the U.S. law
prohibited the use of "purse seine nets" when fishing for tuna
because they endangered dolphins, and imposed a "primary
embargo" against imports from other nations whose tuna fishing
fleets used the nets.4 1 It then augmented the embargo with an
"intermediary embargo," or secondary boycott, against tuna

imports from countries who purchased their tuna from those

nations that were the subject of the primary boycott.4

2

While no "national security" exemption was available in this
situation, there was another provision which permitted deviations
from the GAIT/WTO obligations in order to protect natural
resources. 3 3 The Dispute Panel conceded that the U.S. laws
protecting the dolphins could extend extraterritorially under this
exception, but only to U.S. nationals and vessels. 43 4 With regard
to the import restrictions, however, it found that the tuna
embargo was an "indirect" and "coercive" measure not sufficiently
related to its stated conservation objective to fall within the
exception:
The Panel noted that measures taken under the primary nation
embargo prohibited imports from a country of any tuna, whether or
not the particular tuna was harvested in a manner that harmed or
could harm dolphins, and whether or not the country had tuna
harvesting practices and polices that harmed or could harm
dolphins, as long as it was a country that imported tuna from
countries maintaining tuna harvesting practices and policies not
comparable to those of the United States. [It] then observed that
the prohibition on imports of tuna into the United States could not,
by itself, further the United States conservation objectives. The
primary nation embargo could achieve its intended effect only if it
were followed by changes in policies or practices, not in the
country exporting tuna to the United States, but in third countries
4 5
from which the exporting country imported tuna. 3

429. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna II].
430. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994).
431.
See Tuna H, supra note 429, at 847-49.
432. See id. at 849-50.

433.

GATT art. XX.

434.
435.

See Tuna HI,supra note 429, at 893-94.
See id.
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The Dispute Panel thus concluded that the embargo violated the
GATT/WTO agreements4 6 in what may be regarded as one of the
first applications of a new rule of customary international law
437
limiting the use of secondary boycotts.
V.

CONCLUSION

What's left of Pierre Boileau's coffee has long since gotten
cold. After spending much more time online than he thought he
would, bleary eyed, he turns off his computer. "Not bad," Pierre
muses to himself. "I think Il use this Internet service," he
mutters while shuffling off to bed in the early morning hours.
Time is now running out for America Online and America Online
Canada. When Pierre's free time expires and charges are incurred
on his credit card, they will be in violation of the U.S. Cuban

embargo regulations passed under the TWEA. Decisions have to
be made.
Unfortunately for businesses caught in the middle of a true
conflict between competing governmental policies, there may be
no strictly legal solution to this type of problem. Business still
needs to continue, however, even while customary rules of
international law on the use of unilateral extraterritorial
secondary boycotts continue to evolve. Accordingly, practical
considerations may become as important as strictly legal
propositions.
The OFAC embargoes are primarily aimed at controlling
financial transactions, and by controlling the flow of monies, they
also control international trade. The regulations, however, were
written against a background where the classic international
business transaction was conducted as a documentary sale (i.e., a
letter of credit transaction) involving financial institutions,
carriers, and forwarding agents, in addition to the buyer and
seller, each with their own contracts and responsibilities. Most
significantly, this type of transaction took time, and depended
upon each of the parties having a moderate amount of
information regarding its respective "customers." The current

436. That is, they violated the basic "most favored nation" and "national
treatment" principles, which are at the heart of the GATT. This finding is in
accord with an earlier Tuna case. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1992) [hereinafter Tuna I].
437. It should be noted, however, that neither the Tuna I nor the Tuna II
Panel decisions were adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. See Tuna I,
id; Tuna II, supra note 429. See generally Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International
Trade and the Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for
Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INTL L. 268 (1997); Ilona Cheyne, Environmental
Unilateralismand the WTO/GATT System, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 433 (1995).
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regulations are not well attuned to other types of business
dealings. They are especially ill-suited to business that may be
conducted virtually instantaneously online, and sometime with
very little information regarding who is on the other end of the
connection, or even where that connection might be located.
Thus, there is now a sizable gap between the letter of the law and
regulations, and the U.S. government's enforcement practices,
depending upon the level of knowledge concerning the customer,
and the size of the transaction.

This gap is sometime referred to as the "McDonald's"
problem. Despite the extraterritorial application of many of the
regulations to "controlled" foreign subsidiaries and affiliates, and
the presence of thousands of names on the OFAC blacklists at
any given time,4 38 retail cash transactions with a blacklisted
party do not appear to be prosecuted. One might argue that this
is because McDonald's does not necessarily know they are dealing
with a blacklisted party when they sell their burgers over the
counter, and incidentally highlights that the U.S. regulations do
not typically require businesses to actually screen all their
customers against a blacklist. However, it is also easy to envision
an increasingly complex series of small transactions, which
gradually provide more information about a blacklisted customer
to the seller, with the addition of delivery or credit card
information, for example. The cash sale at McDonald's may be at
one end of the spectrum, a detailed order form and contract
execution at the other end, and an online or telephone catalog
sale using credit cards somewhere in the middle. Once the seller
has information concerning the "identity" of its customer, it
becomes impossible to defend the violation on the basis of a lack
of knowledge. There may be no duty to affirmatively investigate
customers, but "screening" whatever information is acquired in
the ordinary course of the business does seem to be an element of
any good faith attempt at complying with the U.S. regulatory
4 9
requirements. 3
Similarly, small non-banking transactions with blacklisted
parties generally appear not to be prosecuted. Presumably a

438. The most recent publication of the consolidated OFAC blacklist, on
June 27, 1997, lists over 2100 names. Of these, approximately 660 individuals
or entities are identified as Libyan SDNs, 489 are Cuban SDNs and vessels, 452

are Iraqi SDNs and vessels, 435 are narcotics traffickers (SDNTs), 85 are
terrorists (SDTs), and 7 are North Korean SDNs. See Blocked Persons, Specially
Designated Nationals, Specially Designated Terrorists, Specially Designated
Narcotics Traffickers, and Blocked Vessels, 62 Fed. Reg. 34,934 (1997) (amending

31 C.F.R. ch. V) (1997).
439.

This is sometimes referred to as an obligation to avoid "self-blinding" to

information that would normally be received in the ordinary course of business.
See Fitzgerald, supra note 10, at § D(2)(c).
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single, knowing, sale of a McDonald's burger to Pierre, even over
the border within the United States, would not ordinarily be
pursued by the U.S. government. The knowing sale of a single
pair of nine dollar pajamas also would not seem to merit the
resources required to prosecute the case. The sale of 30,000 such
pajamas merits more attention but, as was seen with the WalMart incident, still does not necessarily result in penalties or

prosecution.
While this might appear to offer some comfort to America
Online or any other business facing this type of conflict, given the
size and severity of the penalties that can be imposed for a
violation, there is a high degree of risk in simply relying upon the
government's discretion in not pursuing a prosecution. Moreover,
this reliance may be particularly risky as the politics and public
relations issues associated with these embargoes can be highly
charged and very volatile, resulting in policies that can change
rapidly. Trusting that the government would not prosecute small
or innocent violations was less of an issue in earlier years when
the blacklists applied to fewer programs, and transactions did not
proceed with the pace of modern transactions augmented by
global electronic communications and digital networks.4 0 The
business environment, however, has changed from the 1950s
when the basic framework of the OFAC embargoes was developed.
Changes in the regulations are needed. Rather than leaving
businesses such as America Online with a Hobson's choice of
violating either the U.S. extraterritorial controls or the foreign
blocking measures, and then relying upon prosecutorial
discretion to avoid any penalties, the best course would be for the
government to refrain from using blacklists to impose secondary
boycotts altogether in accordance with the emerging rules of
customary international law. If this is not done, for political
reasons or otherwise, the U.S. government should at least
incorporate some sort of de minimis threshold or other

mechanism to better align the letter of the prohibitions imposed
by these secondary boycotts with regulators' willingness to
enforce the restrictions. Otherwise, the controls are going to be
viewed by businesses as commercially impracticable, perhaps
undercutting the motivation to comply with the controls in their
various operations. Moreover, the controls will be viewed by
foreign governments as unnecessarily impinging upon their
sovereign rights and creating conflicts that could and should be
avoided in the international marketplace.

440.
But see supra notes 317-18 (Dresser case); supra notes 346-54
(Freuhauf case) and accompanying text.

